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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the different areas of agency theory including managerial 
discretion, corporate governance compliance, voluntary disclosure policies and 
regulation.  The institutional setting for these studies will be the Alternative 
Investments Market (AIM) as this market provides a unique regulatory environment 
and distinctive corporate governance features that makes it suitable for analysis.  
Specifically, AIM, unlike its FCA-regulated main market counterpart, operates under 
a self-regulated environment, where application of the FCA rules and combined codes 
are voluntary.  This allows great discretion in a firms operation leading to potential 
agency problems as mandatory disclosure is limited to price-sensitive information, 
allowing for the presence of information asymmetry.   As well as agency theory, one 
of the main arcs of this thesis explores the role of Nomads.  As principle regulator, 
these firms are charged with ensuring the compliance of their clients with the AIM 
rules, as well as ensuring the continued success of AIM itself.   
 
The first investigation creates a Nomad reputation index to test how the market 
responds when companies change to more reputable Nomads.  To do this, event study 
methodology is utilised to examine the abnormal returns earned around Nomads 
switches.  The key findings indicate that when managers switch-up to a more reputable 
Nomad, a proxy for managerial bonding, the market responds favourably, in spite of 
the costs associated with hiring a more reputable Nomad.  Similarly, when managers 
make the unnecessary decision to switch to a Nomad of equal rank, the market 
responds negatively.  As there is no intuitive advantage to switching to a Nomad of 
equal rank, it might therefore be seen as a costly and unnecessary move that will not 
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improve the value of the firm.  Therefore, the market reacts negatively, indicating the 
presence of market discipline as investors are punishing managers for making a 
decision perceived as unnecessary.  The final analysis introduces the concept of ‘strict’ 
Nomads who are perceived to follow the AIM rules more closely than other Nomads.  
The reporting lag is used as a proxy and finds a positive relation with switches to a 
strict Nomad over a lenient one.   
 
The second study examines the determinant of corporate governance compliance with 
a focus on the effect of regulation.  The findings document that regulation has not 
influenced the level of compliance, but rather there has been a convergence in 
governance standards over time given the increased awareness and demand for 
governance attributes.  The findings also extend the Nomad reputation analysis with 
regards to governance and find a significant positive relation indicating Nomads 
influence governance standards as part of their monitoring role.   
 
The final study examines how the extent of voluntary disclosure is influenced by the 
company’s corporate governance attributes and the reputation of the Nomad.  This 
study finds a positive relation between the level of voluntary disclosure, board 
independence and the presence of a nomination committee.  Furthermore, this study 
reveals that voluntary earnings disclosure is a signal for bad news as the LS regression 
documents a negative relation between abnormal returns and the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  This is corroborated in the event study where the announcement of a 
notification of results and the subsequent earnings announcement are associated with 
negative abnormal returns being earned. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
In this thesis I will examine different areas of agency theory including managerial 
discretion, corporate governance, voluntary disclosure policies and regulation.  The 
Alternative Investments Market (AIM) is used as the institutional setting for analysis, 
as the self-regulatory environment that AIM operates under provides a unique 
opportunity to discover how managers react and is influenced by its shareholders; in 
the absence of formal regulation.  Another unique feature of AIM is that they are 
required to retain a Nomad (Nominated Adviser), who acts as the company’s’ sole 
adviser and regulator.  To date, very little has been done to examine the importance of 
the Nomads role in providing this supervisory service.  This thesis, in all three studies, 
aims to fill this gap and provide evidence that Nomads, like the Big-4 auditors, are 
ranked according to their reputations and that a Nomads influence and reputation plays 
an important governance function.  Chapter three will examine AIM and its suitability 
in greater depth. 
 
1.2 Managerial Discretion 
 
The first study examines the market reaction to managers who use their managerial 
discretion to make changes to the company that are potentially costly and unnecessary.  
Jensen (1986) states that when managers have excess free cash flows at their disposal 
they make unnecessary decisions, leading to overinvestment.  The first project uses 
this concept to hypothesise that since AIM managers are largely self-regulated, they 
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have a large discretion regarding the investment decisions they make.  This is because 
the governance requirements are voluntary and there is a low regulatory burden of 
disclosure means they don’t have to communicate their investment strategies in the 
same way, this can lead to managers making decision, such as Nomad switches, that 
investors may not deem necessary/appropriate.  The first study will analyse the market 
reaction to such decisions and examine whether the market disciplines managers when 
the managerial discretion is deemed unnecessary.  It would be expected that when 
management makes a perceived unnecessary or costly change to the company, the 
market would react negatively and vice versa.   
 
In order to examine these managerial decisions, the first study uses the decision to 
switch a company’s Nomad, as their role as principal regulator is integral to the success 
of companies they represent and the AIM itself.  However, there is no requirement to 
disclose the reason a manager might make such a switch.  Therefore, analysis of the 
market reaction is the only way to garner whether this decision is seen as valuable or 
alternatively, regarded by investors as a costly mistake.  Furthermore, it may also be 
plausible that managers might make such a decision to switch Nomads to signal 
information about company quality to their investors.  For example, Firth and Liau‐
Tan (1998) states that signalling through higher-quality auditor engagements is a 
signal of good quality IPO to entrepreneurs.   
 
In addition to signalling theory, a hypothesis will also be formed around bonding 
theory.  Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow problem leads to an overinvestment agency 
problem that can be mitigated with managerial bonding.  As mentioned in section 
2.3.1, this is where a manager expends a company’s resources to provide guarantees 
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that they will not invest in wealth-destroying projects.  These guarantees include 
offering higher dividends (Jensen and Smith, 2000; Officer, 2011).  A Nomad switch 
might also be considered a bonding cost as if a switch is made to a more reputable and 
costly Nomad, a manager is lowering their free cash flows available for 
overinvestment as well as submitting themselves to better quality monitoring and 
regulation from a stricter/more reputable Nomad. 
 
The above theory indicates that a Nomad change will results in price effects.  If a 
manager makes an unnecessary (lateral) switch, shareholders may perceive this as 
managers using their discretion by making a costly switch, and using up cash 
unnecessarily.  This will ultimately have a negative on the company’s market value 
and may lead shareholders to discipline managers by selling their shares, further 
devaluing the market value.  Additionally, a downward switch might signal to 
investors that there is a cash-flow problem in the company and that management has 
chosen to switch to a cheaper Nomad and one that may not necessarily provide the 
same quality of oversight.  This may induce a negative market reaction as shareholders 
perceive this downward as bad news about the company’s future prospects.  
Conversely, a switch to a more reputable Nomad should be seen as a positive signal as 
managers are using up free cash flow to provide the company with better quality 
oversight and monitoring.  Although, this may be a costly decision in terms of cash 
flow, a positive reaction in the market will increase the market value of the company. 
 
 
Contribution 
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This first study makes the following contribution to the literature.  The unique Nomad 
Reputation index is the first inclusive index of its kind to be generated.  Espenlaub et 
al (2012) uses five factors to measure Nomad reputation, three of which specifically 
refer to the AIM companies at the time of IPO.  This present study uses seven factors 
in an index including: Client Market Value, Nomad Credit Score, and Number of 
clients per Nomad, with only the Nomad credit score being taken from the Espenlaub 
et al (2012) study.  The analysis also empirically supports the use of these seven 
measures and has supported the index of the top-15 Nomads that can be used and 
replicated for future analysis. 
 
The results supports bonding theory alluded to before as a switch to a better quality 
and more costly Nomad will be well received by investors as managers are subjecting 
themselves to greater monitoring and by hiring a more expensive Nomad which 
reduces the likelihood of overinvestment.  In addition, the findings also provide 
support for signalling theory as a switch-up to a more reputable Nomad is met with 
significant positive company performance, providing evidence that a switch-up 
indicates a signalling effect regarding company quality to investors.  Finally, the first 
study has explored the importance of the role of Nomads by finding evidence 
supporting the Nomad reputation index and the theoretical reasoning behind the 
decision to switch to certain types of Nomad. 
 
1.3 Corporate Governance Compliance 
 
The second study establishes the quality of corporate governance structures within a 
self-regulated environment and whether the governance quality has improved since the 
adoption of new regulatory standards that increase the transparency and visibility of 
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the listed companies.  Lardon (2012) find that European companies listed on 
unregulated markets only disclose information to investors when in the company’s best 
interests.  This second study provides evidence regarding the effect and success of 
increasing regulation by observing whether corporate governance has improved or 
whether companies choose to incorporate good corporate governance standards from 
the inception in order to remain comparable with their Main Market competitors.  Prior 
evidence by Parsa and Kouhy (2008) relating to the disclosure of CSR on AIM has 
found that companies act in much the same way as companies listed on primary 
markets in order to be considered reputable by investors.  
 
As well as extending the theory on the effect of regulation, the study also examines 
how markets react in the absence of regulation.  AIM has a very limited disclosure 
requirement with only disclosure of price sensitive information and the annual/interim 
report being compulsory.  Given this, there is a considerable information asymmetry 
problem as managers are able to hold information about the company to which 
investors are not privy.  This in turn leads to the availability of a degree of managerial 
discretion as managers may choose the extent and quality of the disclosures they make 
to investors.  Therefore, increasing regulation may reduce this managerial discretion 
and encourage managers to disclose more information to investors.   
 
This study will use AIM rule 26 to examine the effects of regulation.  This rule required 
all companies to have an up-to-date website containing information about directors, 
auditors, and other governing boards as well as the companies’ admission document.  
This rule, therefore, requires all managers to make disclosures about the level of 
corporate governance within their company.  Although this rule requires disclosure 
1-6 
 
about a company’s corporate governance, it does not indicate the level/quality of 
governance that must be employed.  Therefore, analysis will show whether regulation 
to make corporate governance more visible to investors has the effect of actually 
improving the quality of corporate governance given the potential backlash from 
investors if the company is found to be unsatisfactory. 
 
It is also possible to consider this type of regulation as a bonding cost given that an 
up-to-date website increases the visibility of the company and allows for more 
accessible monitoring by investors and other stakeholders (Grullon et al, 2004).  
Furthermore, a manager might take this corporate governance disclosure requirement 
as an opportunity to signal company quality to investors.  For example, a manager may 
employ a comprehensive corporate governance system following AIM Rule 26 and 
make detailed disclosures of this system on their website which will not only reduce 
information asymmetry but signal company quality to investors.  
 
Contribution 
 
This will be the first study to analyse the quality corporate governance structures and 
the effect of regulation in a self-regulated market setting.  Inchausti (1997) reports that 
regulation promotes disclosure and reduces the agency problem.  However, given that 
AIM has very limited disclosure requirements, any disclosure effect of regulation 
should be more profound.  By using AIM, there is also the opportunity to discover how 
markets behave in relation to corporate governance by analysing companies before and 
after the regulation is adopted to see whether there is a significant change.  In addition, 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) find that since the introduction of SOX, US listings 
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behave as an appropriate bonding method given the stronger emphasis on regulation 
and corporate governance.  This study therefore uses this concept to examine what 
happens in the context of UK companies as well as self-regulated companies, and 
assesses the potential for regulation to act as a bonding cost.  The findings report that 
regulation has not affected the quality of governance on AIM.  Rather, there has been 
a convergence over time with regards to compliance.  This could be attributed to the 
propagation of the study of governance as well as the recent economic crisis, making 
shareholder and manager more aware of the importance of governance structure in 
protecting shareholder interests and reducing agency costs. 
 
1.4 Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure Policies 
 
Finally, I examine whether voluntary disclosures such as earnings pre-announcements 
and trading updates are affected by the company’s level of corporate governance.  This 
is achieved by using the results from the second study to form the basis of the level of 
a company’s corporate governance.  The voluntary disclosures are all pre-
announcement disclosures before the release of a company’s final and interim results.  
I explore whether there is a connection between the quality of corporate governance 
structures, at company level, and the extent of voluntary disclosures that are not 
covered by the markets existing regulation.   
 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) report that companies who incorporate better and more 
comprehensive corporate governance mechanisms make better quality disclosures.  
Furthermore, Ntim et al (2012b) also find that companies with better quality corporate 
governance were associated with better quality voluntary disclosures.  Given these 
findings, an increase in voluntary disclosure will also serve to reduce information 
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asymmetry as management will increase the amount of information available to 
investors and reduce uncertainty and risk (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
Ajinkya et al (2005) and Klein (2002) report that better quality corporate governance 
increases the rate of information disclosure and decreases information asymmetry.  
Therefore, this study will also examine whether the quality of a company’s corporate 
governance structure is directly related to the levels of information asymmetry. 
 
Another dimension to examine in this study concerns voluntary disclosures as a form 
of signalling.  Managers might take the opportunity to issue voluntary disclosures to 
signal information to their investors.  In the case of earnings announcements, Soffer et 
al (2000) state that companies which are about to issue bad news in their formal 
quarterly financial results will pre-announce earnings prior to the official 
announcement to reduce earnings surprises.  Similarly, Skinner (1997) contend that 
companies will voluntarily disclose bad news before the official results date to avoid 
litigation from investors.  This evidence suggests that as well as signalling information 
about positive company quality, managers might also signal to investors about 
impending bad news to avoid litigation and adverse returns earned on the 
announcement of poor financial results.  Furthermore, when investors have more 
information about their company, information asymmetries are reduced (Morris, 
1987).  Therefore, there is an opportunity to discover whether managers adopt such 
signalling strategies and whether making voluntary disclosures decrease information 
asymmetry observed on the AIM. 
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Contribution 
This final study takes agency theory literature such as corporate governance and 
information asymmetry theory and applies it to the AIM.  This is the first study to 
analyse the levels of information asymmetries on AIM, which are potentially very 
large given the markets limited regulation with regards to disclosure.  Given the 
possibility of large information asymmetries, this study is well placed to see how these 
asymmetries are affected by a company’s level of disclosure as well as the quality of 
their internal corporate governance structures.  This study will also contribute by 
providing results from the post-financial crisis period.  It will show how the level of 
voluntary disclosure has changed over this time. 
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1.5  Organisation of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review regarding agency theory.  The main 
focus of this chapter is to provide the theoretical background and support for all three 
studies.  As well as agency theory, extent literature pertaining to associated theories 
such as corporate governance, information asymmetries and managerial discretion will 
also be provided. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed background into the institutional setting of all three 
projects.  This thesis uses the Alternative Investments Market (AIM) data as a basis 
for analysis and this chapter will concentrate on the background of this market as well 
as a summary of prior literature. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the first area of study.  Using auditor literature as a basis, 
a comprehensive Nomad reputational index is created.  Using this index, the theories 
of market discipline and bonding are examined by analysing the market reaction when 
companies make certain Nomad switches to either a ‘lenient’ or ‘strict’ Nomad. 
 
Chapter 5 covers the second area of research.  The study incorporates the corporate 
governance literature to analyse how SMEs comply with governance standards with 
specific focus on the effects of regulation.  This study also develops the theories into 
the role of Nomads by examining how compliance is associated with the reputation of 
the company’s Nomad. 
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Chapter 6 is concerned with the third and final area of research.  This study 
encompasses information asymmetry theories provided in the second chapter to 
statistically analyse how corporate governance is related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  This study uses earnings pre-announcements to test which corporate 
governance, if any, best relate to the level of disclosure.  In addition, an event study is 
performed to see how the market reacts to certain pre-announcements which will 
determine whether managers disclose information to reduce information asymmetries 
or to signal information to investors as a means of reducing earnings surprises. 
 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter and provides a summary of the areas of research 
examined over the course of this study.   
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Chapter 2  A Review of Corporate Governance Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis uses the AIM market to develop the role of Nomads; explore the 
determinants of corporate governance quality; and the extent of voluntary disclosures 
made by companies with limited disclosure requirements.  The present chapter 
provides a review of the literature on corporate governance, and agency theory, along 
with associated topics such as: information asymmetry, managerial discretion and 
market discipline.  As well as establishing the theoretical background for the study, 
gaps in the literature are identified to motivate the hypotheses underpinning the 
empirical work.  The three studies in this thesis will then draw down from this literature 
to build on the theory in relation to the proposed examination and develop the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory describes the relationship between two parties such as the owners of 
the company and the managers hired to run the company on the owner’s behalf.  
However, complications arise from this separation of ownership and control and this 
is known as the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Jensen, 2005).  Shareholders (principals) delegate the responsibility 
of the operational running of their company to its managers (agents) who carry out this 
function, ideally in a manner that produces and maintains shareholder wealth.  
However, agency problems occur when the incentives of owners and managers are not 
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aligned, causing agents to make decisions the principal considers detrimental to their 
wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989; Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Agency theory addresses the main 
agency problems.  The first concerns opposing attitudes to risk.  For instance, a 
manager might use a company’s resources to invest in projects that shareholders deem 
too risky, causing conflicts of interest between the two groups.  The same may be said 
for the reverse situation.  A manager might avoid taking risky projects and therefore 
not allow shareholders the opportunity to earn additional returns and income. 
 
Another well-cited agency problem is known as managerial empire building.  This is 
where a manager tries to expand the company they manage beyond its optimal level.  
This usually occurs to aid the manager’s own self-benefitting objectives such as, to 
increase their salary compensation, reputation and status within the company (Jensen, 
1986; Masulis et al, 2007; Chan et al, 2012).  This utility maximizing is achieved by 
excessive growth where managers try to rapidly expand the size of the company 
(commonly by extensive hiring of staff) in order to communicate their ability to 
shareholders and increase the assets under their control (Marris, 1964; Stulz, 1990).  
The other method is over-investment, where managers increase operations such as 
foreign investments beyond the optimum level to preserve their private interests 
(Marris 1964; Williamson 1975; Jensen 1986).  Either method is not considered to be 
in the best interests of shareholders as both methods only serve to decrease operating 
performance and company value (Jensen, 1986; Hope and Thomas, 2008).  Given that 
managers are assigned the power to control how that company develops; monitoring, 
regulation, governance and internal controls need to be in place to make sure the 
requirements of the company’s shareholders are still accomplished.  AIM’s limited 
formal regulation, voluntary application of the UK Corporate Governance Code, and 
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low level disclosure requirements gives rise to the potential of the agency problem 
which will be examined throughout this thesis. 
 
2.3 Agency Costs 
 
The study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) encompasses the theories of property rights, 
property, agency and finance to create a theory behind the ownership structure of 
companies.  The paper also expands the definition of agency theory by explaining that 
when a principal-agent relationship exists, divergences or conflicts of interests will 
arise when both parties are utility maximisers.  These divergences of interests can lead 
to the agent making decisions that are not in the best interests of the principal.  In order 
to keep the agent-principal relationship aligned, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
that monitoring and bonding be carried out to limit the actions of the management and 
provide guarantees that certain actions will not be taken.  In addition, they state that 
where a loss has been incurred as a result of management’s divergence, this loss is 
defined a residual loss.  The combined costs of monitoring, bonding and the residual 
losses incurred are called agency costs.  That is, costs directly associated with the 
agency conflict between owners and managers. 
 
As mentioned above, corporate finance literature details two techniques that are 
considered to reduce the agency conflict and, in turn, agency costs.  These techniques 
include internal and external controls.  External methods include regulation and the 
monitoring role undertaken by the capital market, investors and analysts (Depken et 
al, 2006).  With regards to AIM, steps taken to reduce agency costs are limited.  
However, Nomads provide a supervisory function that confirms to the LSE and 
shareholders that the company they represent are fully compliant with the AIM Rules.  
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However, internal controls used to limit agency costs may still be inconsistent as 
corporate governance adoption is voluntary.  Therefore, this thesis will explore 
corporate governance compliance and the importance of the role of Nomads in 
following adopting governance mechanisms, to determine whether AIM companies 
take steps to reduce the agency problem by adopting comprehensive governance 
structures.    The external mechanisms will be considered later on in the chapter.   
 
2.3.1 Bonding Costs 
 
Another technique used to alleviate agency costs is known as bonding mechanisms, 
which also incur bonding costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Hart, 1995).  These 
are the methods to reduce agency costs and are costs that are sustained and decided on 
by the management.  Bonding strategies include: issuing dividend to relinquish control 
of resources by returning surpluses, and thus discretion to consume them, to 
shareholders (Jensen and Smith, 2000; Officer, 2011); Issuing debt to limit empire 
building opportunities (Mahadwartha, 2004; Hart, 1995; Easterbrook, 1984); 
increasing the visibility of the company to provide more external monitors to managers 
(Grullon, et al, 2004); cross listing in a country where the regulatory environment is 
greater than that of the host nation (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999 & 2002; Piotroski and 
Srinivasan, 2008; Doidge et al, 2009). 
 
The final example bonding is where management agrees to have the accounts audited 
by an outside auditor, and contracts set-up between the shareholders and management 
to limit the decision-making capabilities of the management.  This form of bonding is 
particularly applicable to AIM in terms of the choice of Nomad.  Fan and Wong (2005) 
2-16 
 
examine the role of external auditors as a bonding mechanism to moderate agency 
conflicts.  Their study uses 3,119 firm-year observations from 1994-1996 for East 
Asian firms.  Fan and Wong (2005) find that companies are more likely to engage a 
Big-Five auditor when there are more severe agency problems within the firm.  This 
indicates that managers bond themselves to their firm by employing a larger, more 
expensive auditor, as these auditors are perceived to be more reputable.  Similarly, Ho 
and Hutchison (2010) state that a company’s internal audit is a type of bonding cost as 
it sends a signal to investors that the management are acting responsibly.  The study 
analyses the characteristics of a company’s internal audit and concludes that, 
increasing the size and scope of the internal audit serves as a bonding cost as it reduces 
the level to which managers can expropriate funds.  The study also claims that 
increasing internal audit should reduce the expenditure on external audit.   
 
Given the evidence surrounding the role of the audit as a bonding function, it might 
also be possible for other monitors to provide this bonding role.  For example, the AIM 
market requires all listed companies to employ a Nomad at all times to act as monitor 
and primary regulator of the company.  It is therefore conceivable that a manager might 
increase bonding costs by employing a better quality/more reputable Nomad.  In doing 
so, monitoring may be more rigorous, signalling to investors that managers are willing 
to act more conscientiously by incurring more costs that do not benefit them directly.  
This, in turn, should mitigate any present agency conflicts. 
 
2.4 Managerial Discretion 
 
Section 2.2 discussed the agency problem relating to manager empire building when 
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there are free cash flows.  This agency problem is one of the theories that form the 
basis of the managerial discretion hypothesis.  Williamson (1963) argued that 
inadequate monitoring and control of the management allows considerable scope in 
the operational running of the company.  This scope is referred to as managerial 
discretion.  Williamson (1963) uses expansion of staff as an example of this discretion.  
Empire building, by increasing the size of the workforce, demonstrates the scope that 
management has to take self-benefitting measures that ultimately increase their own 
salary and reputation but damage the value of the company.  Jensen (1986) argues that 
when managers have excess free cash flows available they have the opportunity to 
exercise discretion by adopting value-destroying projects leading to an overinvestment 
problem.  However, procedures taken to improve the information asymmetry problems 
and the wider agency problems limit the opportunity for managerial discretion 
(Drobetz et al, 2010).  Stulz (1990) analyses policies used by companies to mitigate 
the managerial discretion that arises when there is information asymmetry between the 
managers and shareholders.  Stulz (1990) states that managerial discretion is associated 
with two costs: an overinvestments cost when managers invest in too many projects as 
a result of free cash flows, and an underinvestment cost when managers claim they 
cannot invest in all available positive NPV projects.  The study presents two ways of 
dealing with these costs.  Firstly, issuing debt decreases the overinvestment costs, as 
it requires managers to pay out funds when cash flow builds up.  However, this leads 
to underinvestment.  Secondly, an equity issue mitigates the underinvestment costs by 
increasing the cash flows available for investment but exacerbates the overinvestment 
problem.  Stulz (1990) therefore highlights the need for optimal financing strategies to 
moderate managerial discretion by controlling the company cash flows and capital 
structure. 
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Degryse and De Jong (2006) examine the investment cash flows decision of 132 
companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange between 1993 and 1998.  The 
aim of this paper is to determine whether managers are using managerial discretion to 
invest free cash flows leading to overinvestment or whether information asymmetry 
and the costs of external finance leads to underinvestment of free cash flows.  The 
study used Tobin’s Q to separate managerial discretion firms and information 
asymmetry firms.  Companies with a low Tobin’s Q are found to suffer from the 
managerial discretion problem.  However, the paper finds evidence that leverage and, 
in particular, bank debt mitigates managerial discretion.  Degryse and De Jong (2006) 
also report that corporate governance is an important factor as managers’ discretion is 
limited when there are adequate monitoring and internal control structures. 
 
Another way to reduce free cash flows and limit managerial discretion is pay dividends 
(Easterbrook, 1984).  Scordis and Pritchett (1998) state that monitoring and control 
mechanisms must be in place to reduce managerial discretion but this is associated 
with monitoring and bonding costs.  Scordis and Pritchett (1998) study the bonding 
costs in relation to policyholder dividends paid by managers of mutual life insurers.  
The study uses annual dividend data from 1985-1993 for 80 US mutual life insurers 
and presents empirical evidence that dividends are used as a bonding cost to mitigate 
managerial discretion as the level of policyholder dividends can be explained by the 
change in free cash flows. 
 
The managerial discretion that arises due to inadequate monitoring, as put forward by 
Williamson (1963), is one of the potentially large agency problems related to AIM, as 
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the limited regulation allows managers a great level of discretion over how it manages 
their company.  This is further compounded by the voluntary application of corporate 
governance.  Therefore, the first study will develop this theory and determine how the 
market reacts when managers use this discretion to make unnecessary and costly 
decisions such as Nomad changes.  Additionally, analysis will determine how the 
market reacts when a company hires a more reputable Nomad that provides superior 
monitoring and scrutiny, thus mitigating a managers discretion powers.  The final 
study will also examine managerial discretion by analysing whether better quality 
monitoring (reputable nomads) and internal controls increases the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Given that there is only a stipulation to disclose price-sensitive news, 
managers therefore are granted large discretion when it comes to how, and to what 
level, they communicate with their shareholders. 
 
2.5 Information Asymmetry 
 
Related to the agency problem is the idea that management holds more information 
about the company than its shareholders, leading to information asymmetries.  
Information asymmetry theory assumes that managers are privy to private, firm-
specific information before it is released to the market, which creates uncertainty and 
risk for investors (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  However, these 
asymmetries only last as long as the information remains private, once it is released to 
the market the uncertainty decreases.  The theoretical study of Holmstrom (1979) 
considers the potential moral hazard that arises when both principals and agents engage 
in risk-sharing projects.  Holmstrom (1979) stated that the lack of information 
available to investors could also initiate the agency problem as keeping or delaying 
2-20 
 
information from investors creates information asymmetries that, in turn, create 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders.  Companies that provide 
additional information by increasing disclosures and making timely announcements to 
shareholders will reduce any conflict that information asymmetry has caused.  
Armstrong et al (2010) states that agency problems are exacerbated when one party to 
a contract holds superior information over the other parties to the contract.  Attempts 
to reduce information asymmetries benefit both manager and investor as investors 
demand a premium for handling the information risk, which increases the cost of 
capital for management (Barry and Brown, 1984 & 1985; Merton, 1987).  
Kanagaretnam et al (2007) examines whether better corporate governance reduces 
information asymmetries around quarterly earnings announcements.  The study 
examines a sample of 2,027 firm day announcements of American companies and uses 
bid-ask spreads around the announcement of quarterly earnings as a proxy for 
information asymmetry.  Eight corporate governance variables are developed to 
ascertain the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information 
asymmetry.  The study finds significant evidence that higher levels of corporate 
governance are associated with lower information asymmetries between the 
companies and investors.  This is consistent with Ajinkya et al (2005) and Klein (2002) 
who find that companies with a more effective board enhance the quality and rate of 
information released.  This, in turn, indicates that information asymmetries will be 
lower.  Therefore, the above evidence suggests that poor corporate governance leads 
to lower levels of disclosure and, in turn, large information asymmetries.  Similarly, 
Klapper and Love (2004) who study corporate governance across 14 emerging 
markets, find that the level of corporate governance mechanisms in place at company 
level is associated with lower information asymmetry. 
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As previously mentioned, the AIM Rules only require the disclosure of price-sensitive 
news.  Coupled with the voluntary nature of Corporate Governance adoption, there is 
potential and opportunities for managers to exploit this regulatory gap and create 
information asymmetries through inferior communication with shareholders.  Extant 
literature has shown that a key way of mitigating such asymmetries is through 
Corporate Governance mechanisms.  The third study in this thesis examines whether 
there is a relation between better quality governance and the level of information 
asymmetries.   
 
2.6 Signalling 
 
Signalling theory underpins the concept that managers take steps to indirectly convey 
information to investors through strategies such as dividends, financial disclosures and 
stock repurchases.  In doing so, investors have more information about the welfare of 
the company so information asymmetries are reduced (Morris, 1987).  Mishra et al 
(1998) state that signalling is only a useful mechanism when there are information 
asymmetries as investors are able to accurately determine a company’s quality if they 
have access to all available information.  For signalling to be effective, two conditions 
must be fulfilled: ﬁrst, the signal must be sufﬁciently costly to distinguish the company 
from its competitors; and second, investors must be convinced that there is a positive 
relation between the signal and the company’s underlying quality (Stigler, 1961; 
Stiglitz, 1985).  Additionally, by voluntarily choosing to make costly disclosures to 
investors, managers are submitting themselves to more scrutiny and monitoring so 
signalling strategies may also be considered a bonding cost.  Gelb (2000) studies why 
managers make costly signals such as dividends and stock repurchases rather than 
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utilising cheaper signals such as the annual report and accounting disclosures.  Gelb 
(2000) hypothesises that releasing accounting information such as detailed forecasts 
or performance analysis will actually be more costly as they will be supplying 
competitors with valuable information.  To do this, the study uses 3,562 firm years 
from 1981-1993 for firms ranked in the annual Association for Investment 
Management and Research Corporate Information Committee (AIMR).  Gelb (2000) 
finds, consistent with his hypothesis, that companies who have more competitors and 
operate in a market segment with low barriers to entry will use dividends and stock 
repurchases to signal good news to investors to avoid releasing valuable accounting 
information to competitors. 
 
Another way for managers to signal the integrity of their company is with the 
appointments they make.  For example, choosing to engage a higher quality auditor 
will convey company quality as well as give an indication of company value, as a 
better quality auditor will invariably be more expensive.  Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, a better quality auditor also acts as a bonding mechanism given the increased 
scrutiny managers will be subject to under a more reputable auditor.  Bar-Yosef and 
Livnat (1984) examines whether auditor selection acts as a signal to investors 
regarding the company’s future cash flows.  The findings show that when a manager 
is optimistic about future cash flows, they will engage a larger, more reputable auditor 
indicating a signalling effect about the future prospects of the firm.  Firth and Tan-
Liau (1998) examine auditor selection around a company’s IPO using Singapore 
market data form 1980-1994.  The study reports that signalling through higher-quality 
auditor appointments allows entrepreneurs to distinguish between a good quality IPO 
and a bad quality IPO.  The results indicate that Big-eight auditors are engaged for 
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firms who are more risky but have a higher market value.  However, the evidence for 
these findings is weak and the legal environment is different to that of more developed 
countries, with much lower levels of litigation. 
 
More recently, Bewley et al (2008) investigated auditor switches around the time of 
the Andersen scandal.  The study states that while some companies switched away 
from Andersen promptly after Enron was declared bankrupt, others remained until the 
courts shut down Andersen.  Bewley et al (2008) examines 711 companies switching 
from Andersen to assess whether the companies that made early switches away from 
Andersen were signalling their firm’s quality to investors by being efficient financial 
reporters.  The study finds that those who made the early switches were more likely to 
make voluntary restatements of their financial statements when compared to the 
companies who delayed the dismissal of Andersen.  In addition, late switchers also 
had more restatements than the early switchers, indicating that these companies’ 
financial statements were lower quality than those who made an early switch. 
 
In addition to auditor selection, other appointments can be made to reduce information 
asymmetries and signal company quality to investors.  For instance, Wang and Lee 
(2012) study the market reaction to the voluntary and mandatory appointment of 
independent directors to the board and whether investors reacted to these two types of 
appointments differently.  To do this, a total of 290 voluntary and mandatory 
appointments were collected from the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 2002-2005.  
The findings are consistent with the results from auditor selection literature and show 
that voluntary appointments generate a positive market reaction since voluntary 
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appointments signal company integrity.  This signalling effect is also more prominent 
for companies suffering more severe agency problems.   
 
Signalling theory is explored in the first study.  AIM’s self-regulated approach raises 
concerns for investors with regards to the amount and quality of information disclosed 
as well as how managers are monitored: internally and externally.  This gives rise to 
the agency problem.  On the other hand, it is also difficult for managers to convey their 
quality given the lack of oversight of them.  However, by choosing to switch Nomad 
to a more reputable one, managers may be signalling information to shareholders.  This 
information might be regarding future cash flows, or a manager might want to convey 
information about their own quality, by subjecting themselves to more superior 
monitoring from a more reputable Nomad.  This will be examined in the first study 
when an event study is used to assess the market reaction around Nomad switches to 
more and less reputable Nomads. 
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2.7 Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Best Practice 
 
The general structure of a company whereby the management runs the company on 
behalf of the investors while the board of directors control the management, is not 
always efficient in practice.  Management self-interest and the lack of board influence 
lead to the possibility of the decision-making process not being aligned with the 
requirements of investors, contributing to further agency problems.  Corporate 
governance is the set of internal controls and policies that protect investors from 
management self-interest, mitigating the agency problem and impacting the way in 
which the company is controlled (Mitton, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Dey, 
2008).  When examining the agency problem, Chen et al (2011) find significant 
evidence that empire building is caused by agency problems, which is more 
pronounced for companies with weak corporate governance.  These findings indicate 
that incorporating quality corporate governance mechanisms mitigates agency 
problems. 
 
In the UK, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) publishes reports on good practice 
of corporate governance called the UK Corporate Governance Code (Sep, 2012).  The 
code provides companies with a framework of best practices and principles in relation 
to the structure of the board of directors, director remuneration and the board’s 
communication with its shareholders.  All companies with a Main Market listing are 
required under the Listing Rules to explain how they intend to comply with the code 
and justify parts of the code they have chosen not to follow.  The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (Sep, 2012) and supporting corporate governance literature state 
that best practices consist of employing non-executive directors to the board, splitting 
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the role of the CEO and the chair and implementing remuneration and audit 
committees.  
 
This section will examine the various types of corporate governance mechanisms.  The 
second study uses these variables to establish how compliant AIM companies are with 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and the QCA Guidelines for Smaller Quoted 
Companies, given that both of these codes are voluntary.  There will also be analysis 
of how compliance has changed following the adoption of AIM Rule 26, which 
increased the visibility of governance issues by requiring up-to-date information such 
as director profiles and the admission document.  The third study uses these corporate 
governance mechanisms to test whether they positively influence the level of voluntary 
disclosures made on AIM to see how effective these internal controls are at mitigating 
information asymmetries.  The following literature review provides the background 
and support for using these governance variables in the analyses mentioned above.  A 
chapter six and seven draws down and expands on this literature review by examining 
its relevance to the AIM market and supporting the hypothesis that are tested. 
 
2.7.1 The Role of the Board 
 
The role of the board of directors is to give advice and to monitor company 
management and set the strategic direction of the company (Mace, 1971; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992).  Kaplan and Minton (2006) also find that the board plays a 
disciplinary role as the study observes an increase of CEO dismissals made by the 
board in times of poor company performance.  The role of the directors is therefore 
directly related to the corporate governance of the company as they are expected to 
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monitor and discipline managers who fail to consider shareholder interests.  In relation 
to board structure, Akhtaruddin et al (2009) empirically examine the association 
between corporate governance and the level of voluntary disclosures made by 
Malaysian companies.  The study uses a sample of 105 companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia at the end of 2002.  OLS regression is used to determine the relation between 
voluntary disclosures and the various corporate governance variables.  The corporate 
governance variables include: board size, outside directors, ownership structure, 
family control, and audit committee.  The findings show that board size is positively 
related to the level of disclosure indicating that larger boards lead to greater 
transparency.  This, in turn, could suggest that larger boards are a corporate governance 
mechanism given that greater disclosure reduces the agency problem between 
managers and owners by reducing information asymmetries.  However, there are 
limitations to this study.  Malaysia is a developing country and as such, corporate 
governance and disclosure regulation is still in its infancy.  Therefore, the results may 
not be as sufficiently generalised as research undertaken on more-developed western 
markets.  However, the findings by Akhtaruddin et al (2009) are consistent with the 
findings from Chen and Jaggi (2000) who examine the association between outside 
directors and disclosures for a sample of 87 Hong Kong-based firms.  Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) state that there is a significant positive relation between the extent of disclosure 
and the number of outside directors on the board.  Similarly, Birnbaum (1984) who 
analyses the strategic decisions made by US technology companies finds that 
information asymmetries can be reduced by increasing board size.  
 
As well as board size, another aspect of board structure as a measure of a company’s 
corporate governance is the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board.  
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Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) find that NEDs are able to challenge strategies and 
decision made by the owner-managers who may not be acting in the best interests of 
other stakeholders.  Brunninge et al (2007) also find that weaknesses in management 
strategies can be overcome by employing more NEDs on the board.  Fiegener (2005) 
states that the presence of outside directors on the board is used for strategy 
development given that the owner-managers may not be competent to consider these 
aspects.  This is supported by Keck (1997) and Leonard and Sensiper (1998) who find 
that outside directors will have a wide variety of skills and expertise allowing them to 
make more informed strategic decisions.  Johannisson and Huse (2000) examine the 
role of directors and the factors that can influence the selection process of outside 
directors in small, family-run businesses.  To do this, two methodologies were 
undertaken.  First, a survey of 12 companies was carried out to support the idea that 
entrepreneurial companies avoid employing outside directors to the board.  In-depth 
interviews are also performed with two family-run firms to extend the research into 
the role of directors.  The results show that CEOs in family businesses do not 
completely avoid ‘outside’ directors, but they do not actively seek them either. 
 
In a more recent study, Duchin et al (2010) examine the effectiveness of outside 
directors.  Recent regulations such as, SOX (2002) have mandated that companies 
appoint a greater majority of outside directors to their board.  Using a sample of 
companies that have had to increase the number of outside directors since the creation 
of these new regulations, Duchin et al (2010) are able to assess the effect outside 
directors have on company performance.  Using a final sample of 2,897 companies 
between 1996 and 2005 they find that outside directors are significantly related with 
better performance when costs of acquiring information is low.  However, this 
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relationship is reversed when their cost of acquiring information is high.  Information 
costs are the costs of acquiring information about the company and is measured using 
analyst forecast, market-to-book ratios and intangible assets.  These findings suggest 
there are optimal conditions associated with the number of outside directors appointed 
to the board.  These findings are consistent with Byrd and Hickman (1992) who study 
the role of outside directors in conjunction with tender offer bids.  Their results show 
that there is a nonlinear relationship between abnormal stock returns and the number 
of independent outside directors indicating an optimal level of outside directors. 
 
 
2.7.2 Optimal Board Size  
 
The previous discussion around board structure proffers that a larger board alongside 
a greater proportion of outside directors reduces information asymmetries and agency 
problems.  However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) find that there is an 
optimal board structure and propose a ‘one size fits all’ approach when configuring 
the number of inside and outside directors to be appointed to the board.  Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) argues that boards do not function appropriately as directors rarely 
provide an adequate critique of top-level management policies or of the company’s 
performance.  The study finds that these failures are more profound when a board size 
increases.  They report that the optimal size of the board should not exceed ten 
although seven or eight directors are preferred.  Similarly, Jensen (1993) extends the 
theory of optimal board size by stating that large boards do not function efficiently and 
so should be kept small to allow appropriate monitoring of the CEO.  Jensen (1993) 
concludes that the only inside member of the board should be the CEO to ensure that 
outside directors can provide sufficient monitoring of the CEO and the company. 
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Empirical research has also found similar findings supporting an optimal board 
structure.  Yermack (1996) examines the theory that small boards operate most 
efficiently and have a greater company value.  The study uses a sample of 452 
companies taken from the Forbes rankings of the largest US companies to produce 
3,438 observations over eight years.  To assess the association between value and 
board size, least squares regression is used with Tobin’s Q as a proxy for value.  
Yermack (1996) finds a negative relation between company value and board size.  
Additionally, there is also a fall in operating and profitability ratio when the board size 
increases.   
 
Eisenberg et al (1998) consider the potential problems arising from an optimal board 
size when examining small companies.  Previous studies reported that larger boards 
adversely affected firm performance but little was reported about the inefficiencies of 
small boards and small companies.  Eisenberg et al (1998) use a sample of 879 small 
and medium sized Finnish companies.  The study finds that the same issues 
surrounding monitoring and communication reported by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) exist for small companies.  The study concludes that rather than a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach, board size should vary according to company size.   
 
More recently, Coles et al (2008) directly examines the ‘one size fits all’ assertion by 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992).  This study also uses Tobin’s Q to measure firm value and 
finds that the relation between value and size is u-shaped.  That is, optimal company 
value is achieved when the boards are either very small or very large.  The rationale 
for these findings is down to the firm-specific characteristics of the sample.  For 
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instance large, diversified, or highly levered companies will benefit from a greater 
advisory role from the board so will incorporate a larger board with more outside 
directors.  Equally, small companies will not benefit from engaging a large, costly 
board to monitor their activities hence a small board is more effective. 
 
2.7.2 The Audit Committee 
 
The audit committee is comprised of members from the board of directors and is 
responsible for monitoring the integrity of the company’s financial reporting as well 
as any disclosures made regarding company performance.  According to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Sep 2012), the audit committee should comprise at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors 
and have at least one member with relevant financial knowledge.  The audit 
committee’s main responsibility is to oversee and monitor the financial reporting 
process, ensuring transparency by mediating between the external auditor, the internal 
auditors, managers and directors (Saibaba and Ansari, 2011; Puri et al, 2010).  
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) assert that the presence of audit committees is 
associated with effective corporate governance.  Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and 
DeZoort (1998) also suggest that the members of the audit committee should be 
independent from the company and that at least one member should have accounting 
management expertise.  Menon and Williams (1994) state that committees that meet 
more frequently are better able to monitor the quality of information that is 
communicated to stakeholders.  With regards to SMEs, Kang et al (2011) studied the 
effectiveness of the audit committee for 288 small and medium sized companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange.  Three measures of the audit committee are used to 
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measure effectiveness: activity, size and independence.  The findings show that all 
three measures are significantly associated with lower levels of earnings management.   
 
2.7.3 The Remuneration Committee 
 
The remuneration committee is a subgroup of the main board of directors charged with 
the responsibility of determining the level of pay for all the company’s executives and 
senior management (Conyon and Peck, 1998).  According to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (Sep 2012), the remuneration committee should include at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors.  
In addition, the company chairman may also be a member, but not chair, of the 
committee if they were considered independent on appointment as chairman.  The 
presence of this committee is a strong corporate governance mechanism as without it, 
executives would be able to award themselves inflated salaries that are not in line with 
shareholders’ interests (Vafeas, 2003).  As stated by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (Sep 2012), the committee should ideally be made up of NEDs as any executives 
on the board will be deciding their own pay.  However, UK evidence suggests that this 
is not the case.  Main and Johnston (1993) concluded that in two fifths of cases, 
directors were appointed to their own remuneration committee and that the presence 
of a remuneration committee is associated with higher level of compensation.  
Similarly, Kovacevic (2009) studies remuneration committees from the Australian 
perspective and found recent regulation to improve transparency and disclosure led to 
an increase in executive pay.  Evans and Evans (2002) who examines CEO 
compensation of Australian companies also find that the presence of more NEDs on 
the remuneration committee does not have a significant effect on the level of CEO 
2-33 
 
compensation.  However, the study finds significant evidence of a positive association 
between pay of outside directors and the levels of CEO compensation. 
 
The recent financial crisis has ignited renewed interest in director remuneration and 
the effectiveness of the remuneration committee.  The Walker Report (2009) stated 
that the lack of independence on the remuneration committee contributed to the 
downfall of the finance sector.  Bebchuk et al (2002, 2003) propose the managerial 
power theory, which states that the remuneration setting process is inherently flawed, 
as managers are able to exert their power over the board and shareholders and 
effectively decide their own level of compensation.  Smith (2012) analyses executive 
pay in relation to remuneration committee independence and the managerial power 
hypothesis.  The study uses FTSE 350 between 1996 and 2008.  Despite prior research 
indicating the importance of independent directors, Smith (2012) finds no significant 
evidence of a relation between CEO pay and board independence.  Conyon et al (2011) 
also reject the theory of managerial power within the remuneration-setting 
environment. 
 
In addition to the structure of the remuneration committee, recent studies have also 
examined its effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism.  Liu and Taylor 
(2008) study the disclosure of directors’ remuneration in relation to corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Using 191 Australian listed companies between 2003 and 
2004, managers’ discretionary disclosures of their own remuneration are examined 
against corporate governance measures including: shareholder activism, company 
size, board composition and existence of a remuneration committee.  The results reveal 
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that the existence of a remuneration committee has no significant effect on the level of 
disclosure. 
 
2.7.4 The Nomination Committee 
 
The final, less familiar, committee is the nomination/corporate governance committee.  
This committee plays a central role in overseeing matters of corporate governance for 
the board, including devising and recommending governance principles and policies.  
It is also charged with developing the quality of nominees to the board and ensuring 
the integrity of the nominating process (Watson, 2004).  In addition, a nomination 
committee is required under the UK Corporate Governance Code and should contain 
a majority of independent non-executive directors.  Given the recent focus on board 
composition and diversity, the role of nominating/corporate governance committee has 
become a more popular feature within a company’s governance structure.  
Furthermore, Brown (2002) finds that the adoption of a nomination committee is 
related to greater stakeholder involvement in governance issues.  Ruigrok et al (2006) 
studies the determinants and effects of the nomination committee.  They find that the 
existence of the nomination committee is associated with a higher number of 
independent directors and foreign directors but not gender diversity.  The study also 
states that CEOs who also serve as Chairmen (CEO duality) are less likely to favour 
the nomination committee as it could reduce their influence on the selection of board 
members and changes in company policy.  Similarly, Chapple et al (2013) find that 
CEO duality reduces the effectiveness of the nomination committee.   
 
2.8 Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
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The literature regarding information asymmetries discussed in section 2.5 shows that 
better governance and better disclosure reduce information asymmetry and agency 
costs.  The third study examines the relation between corporate governance and the 
level of voluntary disclosure.  It would be expected that better governance would lead 
to greater disclosure and this section examines the literature supporting this 
connection.   Corporate disclosures help to bridge the gap between managers and 
investors as they provide investors with additional information and protection 
regarding how their investment is being handled (Akhtaruddin et al, 2009).  
Disclosures, therefore, are central to a company’s corporate governance structure 
(Baek et al, 2004).  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine the relationship between 
the board of directors, the audit committee and earnings forecast disclosures.  The 
study uses a sample of 275 companies that made 1,621 forecast disclosures between 
1995 and 2000.  The findings indicate that having more outside directors on the board 
and solely outside directors on the audit committee, lead to more accurate earnings 
forecast.  This is consistent with previous findings that companies who incorporate 
more corporate governance mechanisms are associated with better quality disclosures.  
Studies also report that better disclosure reduces cost of capital (Botosan, 1997), 
lowers the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998), and improves a company’s stock 
performance (Healy et al, 1999; Mitton, 2002).  
 
Ntim et al (2012b) study whether post-Apartheid South African companies voluntarily 
comply with and disclose the country’s corporate governance rules.  To do this, a 
corporate governance disclosure index was constructed and contained 50 provisions 
taken from the 2002 King Report using a sample of 169 companies between 2002 and 
2006.  The study finds that corporate governance compliance and disclosure improved 
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over the sample period.  Furthermore, board size, auditor size, the presence of a 
corporate governance committee, government ownership and institutional ownership 
were all found to have a positive relation with voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure.  More recently, Ettredge et al (2011) studies how company size, corporate 
governance quality, and bad news effects disclosures compliance.  The study uses 128 
US companies from 2002 to 2007 that have been issued comments letters from the 
SEC staff for failing to comply with disclosure requirements.  The study finds that 
companies that do not comply with the SEC disclosure rules have lower quality 
corporate governance but are not smaller than companies that comply with the 
disclosure requirements.  
 
As well as the previous findings that disclosures improve a company’s stock 
performance (Healy et al, 1999; Mitton, 2002), there is also evidence that better quality 
corporate governance does the same.  Cheung et al (2010) construct an index of 
corporate governance for a sample of the largest companies listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2005.  The ﬁndings indicate that family companies and 
concentrated ownership are associated with bad corporate governance.  The findings 
also show that the quality of corporate governance is very signiﬁcant in explaining 
future company stock returns.  Good quality corporate governance and improvements 
in corporate governance over time is associated with both higher stock returns and with 
lower risk.  These findings are consistent with previous findings on more developed 
markets such as Drobetz et al (2004) who develop a corporate governance index and 
analyse the performance of German companies against the level of disclosure.  The 
study finds a positive relation between performance and corporate governance.  
Similarly, Beiner et al (2006) construct a corporate governance index for Swiss 
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companies and ﬁnd that there is a positive association between corporate governance 
and performance. 
 
2.8.1 Corporate Governance and Isomorphism 
 
A final theory surrounding corporate governance is isomorphism.  Di Maggio and 
Powell (1983) introduced the idea of organisational homogeneity.  They describe three 
types of this isomorphism.  One that is particularly relevant to corporate governance 
compliance, examined in the second study of this thesis, is coercive isomorphism.  This 
is where organisations are pressured by other organisations, such as regulators, but 
also by cultural expectations within society to behave in a certain way.  This leads to 
a convergence in the behaviour and structure of the affected organisations.  Therefore, 
given this, it is possible that companies may look to their competitors for ideas when 
deciding on the strength and level of compliance with corporate governance regulation.   
 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) state that, in relation to corporate governance, 
isomorphism can be witnessed in the convergence of government practices of 
companies over different countries.  La Porta et al (2000) also find that this 
convergence of corporate governance practices at an international level is being 
observed more frequently.  Back at firm level, Useem and Zelleke (2006) examine 
how a company decides on the quality of their corporate governance structure.  The 
paper reports that due to the relation between corporate governance and company 
performance, companies tend to look to each other for direction on best practice.  This 
is made possible by the increasing visibility of companies by way of company websites 
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that detail much of a company’s financial information as well as governance 
information such as board structures and director profiles. 
 
UK Main Market companies are required to follow the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (formerly the combined code).  This regulation may, unintentionally, encourage 
collusion amongst companies and their competitors when deciding how to apply this 
code.  Furthermore, there will be pressure from investors/stakeholders on how the code 
is applied and knowledgeable investors may wish the company to follow the structure 
of their most established competitors.  The overall influence may lead to companies 
within the same industry to become homogeneous, and therefore experience 
isomorphism.  The experiences observed on AIM may be very different, where 
adoption of the code is voluntary.  As AIM companies are generally smaller than those 
of their Main Market counterparts, fully adoption the standards set out in the code may 
be prohibitive.  However, they are still subject to outside pressure and influence.  
Investors may not be willing to accept lower quality governance than more established 
competitors, so may put pressure on AIM companies to adopt comparable governance 
standards.  Furthermore, developments in the AIM rules have also created the potential 
of isomorphism.  AIM Rule 26 (Feb 2007) mandated that all companies keep an up-
to-date website containing details including: the admission document, director 
profiles, constitution documents, and a description of any board committees.  This rule 
meant that, for the first time, the governance of AIM companies was going to be visible 
to all shareholders and potential investors.  Such a development may encourage 
managers to upgrade/adopt better quality governance given their structures could now 
be easily be compared to Main Market competitors and even other AIM competitors.  
The theory of isomorphism is explored in the second study where an examination of 
2-39 
 
compliance is analysed before and after the application of AIM Rule 26, to establish 
whether governance has improved. 
 
2.9 Law and Finance 
 
As previously shown, agency problems can be mitigated by implementing internal 
controls and principles known as corporate governance.  There are also external 
functions that can be imposed to reduce agency problems such as the country’s legal 
system and the associated levels of monitoring and regulation.   
 
 
Prior Governance theory has shown that differences in legal systems can impact the 
effectiveness of corporate governance at firm level (Aguilera et al, 2008; La Porta et 
al. 2000). For example, “in common law nations, investors are willing to take more 
risks and use “arms-length” control mechanisms since they have legal remedies if 
board members and managers do not act in their best interest and maximise firm 
profitability” (Bruton et al, 2010).  This is particularly relevant to this thesis these, as 
common law countries like the UK are more flexible than their code law counterparts.  
This, coupled with the self-regulatory approach to regulation makes AIM a particularly 
interesting market platform.  As will be discovered in the next chapter, different global 
stock exchanges have tried to replicate AIM, with varying and limited degrees of 
success.   
 
2.9.1 Regulation 
 
Regulation can be imposed directly from the government, or from various regulatory 
bodies such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  In July 2012, the Kay Report 
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was published which analysed the UK equity markets and long-term decision-making.  
With regard to regulation, the report stated that even though there was increasing 
demand for more regulation in the equity markets, there was also doubt cast about the 
effectiveness of regulation.  The report also makes clear that regulation should only be 
imposed if it is in the best interests of market users (investors and companies) rather 
than intermediaries (e.g. asset managers and brokers).  The Kay Report states that 
regulation should only be implemented when in the best interests of both companies 
and investors and that any existing regulation that acts as a disincentive for market 
users should be reviewed. 
 
Existing literature also supports the influence of regulation in regards to reducing 
information asymmetries. Inchausti (1997) finds significant evidence that regulation 
positively influences the level of disclosure, reducing information asymmetries.  The 
findings support the view that regulation increases transparency and reduces 
information asymmetries that affect IPO valuations and is further supported by the 
findings by Horton et al (2013) and Hodgdon et al (2008). 
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2.9.2 The Agency Problem in the Absence of Regulation 
 
Given that the Kay Report (2012) states that regulation should be in the best interest 
of market users, it is necessary to analyse the effects of markets that have little or no 
regulation to see whether the companies perform in the same way or investors treat 
them differently.  Unregulated market platforms, such as AIM, are generally attractive 
to SMEs and growth companies due to the limited barriers to entry and the relaxed 
approach to on-going regulation.  Lardon et al (2012) study financial disclosures from 
companies listed on the Euronext Free Market.  To do this, company financial 
disclosures were gathered from 174 companies from the French Free market (174) and 
the Belgium Free Market (17).  The study finds that companies will disclose 
information when it is in their best interests.  These disclosing companies tend to be 
younger, have higher free float and better accounting performance.  Analysing AIM, 
Parsa and Kouhy (2008) find that AIM companies disclose information in the same 
way as companies on primary markets in respect to the disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting, in order to maintain their corporate reputation.   
 
The findings from Parsa and Kouhy (2008) indicate that AIM companies, influenced 
by maintaining their reputation, act in the same way as their Main Market counterparts.  
AIM is largely self-regulated and is not under the jurisdiction of the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), or required to follow the UK Corporate Governance Code, but 
rather, the private sector.  These private sector regulators are called Nominated 
Advisors (Nomads) and they have an advisory role as well as being the principal 
regulator.  Therefore, despite AIM operating in a common law country, they can 
circumvent traditional regulation and rely solely upon the monitoring provided by 
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Nomads.  This further highlights the importance of the role of Nomads, particularly 
their perceived reputation and the quality of services they provide.  Using the theory 
behind law and regulation, one of the main objectives of the second study is to 
determine how governance compliance changes following the rare intervention of the 
LSE by introducing AIM Rule 26.  This is a unique opportunity to discover how 
companies respond to the application of regulation, given there are no mandatory pre-
existing governance requirements.  Furthermore, the regulatory role of Nomads is 
developed by analysing whether a better quality Nomad/regulator positively influences 
the level of governance compliance. 
 
2.10 Market Discipline 
 
Although regulation acts as an external monitor of companies by curtailing behavior 
through principles and policies, it has been suggested that rather than relying solely on 
regulation, authorities place greater dependence on the market to discipline unruly 
companies (Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  Although largely directed at the banking 
market, the market discipline hypothesis allows investors to become monitors and 
supplement whatever regulation is already in force by depressing share prices and bond 
prices enough to ‘discipline’ the management and change the company’s behaviour 
(Flannery, 2001).  The theory has grown from prior evidence that has found investors 
are able to accurately assess a company’s true financial position (Flannery, 1998).  
However, Bliss and Flannery (2001) state that the market discipline hypothesis relies 
on the assumption that a company’s share price is an accurate signal of activities and 
performance of the company being monitored. 
 
Market discipline is another resource investors can utilise to reduce the agency 
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problem.  Market discipline is accomplished when investors selling securities result in 
depressed stock prices and higher cost of capital.  In periods where investors perceive 
high levels of information asymmetry, represented in the market by high bid-ask 
spreads, share prices will be lower, indicating that the market has intervened with the 
share prices in order to discipline managers (Fang et al, 2009; Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985).  Furthermore, Peria and Schmulker (2001) study market discipline of banks in 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico and find that when banks take excessive risks, depositors 
withdraw their deposits and require higher interests rates.  This course of action will 
have a direct effect on management compensation and reputation while destabilising 
any previous attempts management make at empire building.  Market discipline is 
difficult in practice as investors seek punishment for poor decision-making but 
exceeding the optimal level of discipline will depress stock prices more than the losses 
made from wayward managers.  However, this theory can be applied to the AIM in 
terms of the decision to switch a Nomad.  If a manager makes a switch to a less 
reputable Nomad or an unnecessary switch to a Nomad of equal rank, the market might 
perceive this as poor-quality managers.  Equally, it might be viewed as the managers 
signaling poor future performance, as they have to switch to a cheaper Nomad and to 
one that may not provide the same level of oversight as a more reputable Nomad.  Such 
switches may lead to market discipline, where investors view these switches as bad 
news and decide to sell their shares, depressing the stock price.  
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2.10 Summary 
 
The above literature review has provided an overview of the agency problem and its 
related theories.  More specifically, prior literature indicates that managers exercising 
their discretion by making unnecessary decisions, or managers not relaying 
information to investors in a timely way, contribute to the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979).  Furthermore, corporate governance, as a set of 
internal mechanisms such as the boards of directors, the audit and remuneration 
committees, are adopted by companies as a way to alleviate and mitigate any potential 
agency problems (Mitton, 2002; Dey, 2008).  The literature review has also 
highlighted potential gaps in the existing literature and further areas for study.  In 
particular, although there is extensive literature on director’s remuneration, little has 
been undertaken on the effectiveness of the committee who decide the level of this 
remuneration.  In addition, there is also the opportunity to examine agency theory and 
its associated theories in relation to unregulated markets, as limited analyses has been 
undertaken to discover the levels of information asymmetries and the quality of 
corporate governance structures in an unregulated market setting.  
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Chapter 3   AIM Background 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding the agency problem 
and other related concepts that are examined throughout this thesis.  In particular, the 
chapter highlights the potential opportunity to fill gaps in the existing literature by 
applying the Alternative Investments Markets (AIM) as the institutional setting for 
analysis.  The areas of research include, but are not limited to: regulation, managerial 
bonding, information asymmetry and corporate governance.   
 
As discussed in detail further on in this chapter, AIM takes a simplified and alternative 
approach to regulation with minimal barriers to entry and a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to on-going regulation.  AIM is largely self-regulated and is not under the 
jurisdiction of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) but rather, the private sector.  
These private sector regulators are called Nominated Advisors (Nomads) and they 
have an advisory role as well as being the principal regulator.  Given this, it is possible 
to analyse how companies overcome any agency problems when there is no 
requirement to disclose information to investors and corporate governance adoption is 
voluntary.  Over recent years, the AIM has taken steps to improve its formal regulation, 
which allows an examination to take place on how effective increasing regulation is in 
improving the quality of companies and how they communicate with investors.  
Furthermore, apart from the compulsory disclosure of price-sensitive information, all 
other disclosures on AIM are voluntary.  This, coupled with the fact that most AIM 
companies tend to be SMEs, and disclosing information is a costly strategy, 
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information asymmetries will, in theory, be more profound on this market.  Therefore, 
AIM provides a unique setting to analyse whether disclosure policies and corporate 
governance compliance affects a company’s information asymmetries and how this 
impacts on the wider agency problem.   
 
The above has provided a brief overview of AIM and its unique institutional setting.  
The remainder of this chapter will provide a detailed background of AIM, its 
regulation, the role of Nomads, and corporate governance issues affecting AIM.  This 
chapter will also include all of the extant literature that corresponds to this market, 
which will help highlight any gaps in the existing literature as well as corroborate and 
support the analysis that is undertaken in this thesis. 
 
3.2 Background 
 
In 1995, the Alternative Investments Market (AIM) replaced the Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM) to provide a trading platform for small and growing companies without 
incurring the strict listing procedures and costs associated with the Main Market.  AIM 
is owned by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and solely regulated and monitored by 
Nomads.  AIM has been growing steadily over the years and has now become the 
leading market for SMEs.  Table 3.1 shows 3,512 companies (correct at June 2014) 
that have listed on this market since its launch and more than £87 billion has been 
raised.  The table also highlights that although new admissions reached a peak in 2007 
they have since been in decline.  The market capitalisation of companies listing on 
AIM also peaked in 2007 at £97m and has subsequently been in decline.  However, 
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figures for 2013 and 2014 have shown an improvement at over £75m but this is still 
not close to the 2007 levels.   
 
AIM has also attracted companies switching from the Main Market, potentially 
highlighting that companies are keen to take advantage of the relaxed approach to 
regulatory enforcement.  In addition to the market switching, AIM is also gathering an 
international reputation with around 20% of its listed companies being registered 
outside the UK (AIM statistics [online], June 2014).  Furthermore, Vismara et al 
(2012) document that there is a greater proportion of companies migrating downwards 
from the Main Market to AIM than those migrating upwards.  This evidence also 
corroborates the findings in Table 3.1 that AIM is attracting larger listings with 
companies choosing to switch down from the Main Market.  Table 3.2 demonstrates 
how these admissions are distributed over the different industry sectors.  The table 
shows that the Financials sector has the greatest number of companies as well as the 
largest companies (based on market capitalisation).  This is closely followed by the 
Industry sector.  Interestingly, there are some 50 companies more in the Industry sector 
than in the Oil and Gas sector, yet the latter is almost double the size according to 
market capitalisations.  This suggests that the Oil and Gas companies that are listed on 
AIM are very large in size. 
 
AIMs success is evident given its rapid growth, migrations to the platform from the 
Main Market, and the worldwide replications of AIM (all discussed in the next 
section).  In addition to this, AIM is also attracting an increasing number of foreign 
listings.  For example, Doidge et al (2009) states that New York exchanges had 74% 
more foreign listings than the London exchanges in 1998; by 2005 they had only 59% 
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more foreign listings than London.  However, when AIM is omitted from this analysis, 
the results are very different.  Without AIM, the New York exchanges had 92% more 
foreign listings than London in 1998.  By 2005, they had 165% more foreign listings.  
These figures suggest that the attractiveness of London by foreign listings is due to the 
success of AIM.  Similarly, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) study the impact on 
Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) (SOX) on foreign listing behaviour.  The study finds that 
although US listings post SOX provide a bonding mechanism for companies as they 
have to comply with greater corporate governance regulation, small companies cannot 
afford the costs associates with these listings.  Instead, the study reveals that there are 
a set of companies that choose to list on the AIM rather than US exchanges due to the 
costs of incorporating SOX.  However, these companies are found to be smaller, less 
profitable and more likely to engage a lower quality auditor than the companies that 
already list on US exchanges. 
 
Another factor that might be attributed to AIM’s success and attractiveness is its 
location.  London is one of the main financial centres in the world with sophisticated 
technology, institutional investors and an array of foreign companies (Mendoza, 
2008).  These London characteristics might also explain why the other countries that 
have tried to replicate the AIM have not had the same level of success.  However, the 
idea that London is integral to the success of AIM companies is refuted by Amini and 
Keasey (2012).  This study examines the failure probability of UK Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) on the AIM.  The study purports that AIM is dominated by London-
based IPOs as well as companies in the Financials industry and that these two factors 
lead to higher probability of failure given the relative ease at with which these 
companies can list on AIM even though they may be small with limited experience.  
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The results show significant evidence that AIM companies experience higher failure 
rates the closer they are to London.  The study also reports the rationale behind these 
results could be that London-based companies are of lower quality and therefore more 
susceptible to failure.  Another reported reason is that financial companies in London 
engage in riskier projects/products than their regional counterparts, which 
fundamentally increases the risk of failure to that firm. 
 
Table 3.1  History of AIM Admissions 
Table shows the number of companies admitted to AM since its launch as well as the money raised from the IPO. 
Source: AIM statistics June 2014 [online], accessed11/6/2014. 
 
Table 3.2  Listings by Industry 
Equities Total Value (£) No of Shares No of Companies Capitalisation (£m) 
Oil & gas 422,761,904 4,480,171,641 131 10,894 
Basic Materials 182,965,299 5,987,883,229 178 5,229.1 
Industrials 298,818,303 494,242,124 193 10,371,6 
Consumer Goods 59,687,376 359,841,255 64 4,994.7 
Healthcare 154,985,499 605,987,990 67 5,306.8 
Consumer Services 1,000,099,690 10,338,563,558 113 11,479.6 
Telecommunications 265,651,634 549,383,856 15 2,545.0 
Utilities 14,799,662 441,195,174 15 1,241.3 
Financials 401,785,220 3,076,908,139 209 15,525.6 
Technology 531,673,233 2,241,672,009 114 8,727.9 
Total Equities 3,333,227,819 28,575,848,975 1,099 76,335.85 
Table displays the number and size of companies over each industry sector. Source: AIM statistics June 2014 
[online], accessed11/6/2014. 
Market	value	
(£m)
UK Internationa Total UK International Total New Further Total
19/06/1995 10 0 10 82.2
1995 118 3 121 2,382.4 120 3 123 71.2 25.3 96.5
1996 235 17 252 5,298.5 131 14 145 521.3 302.3 823.6
1997 286 22 308 5,655.1 100 7 107 341.5 350.2 691.7
1998 291 21 312 4,437.9 68 7 75 267.5 317.7 585.2
1999 325 22 347 13,468.5 96 6 102 333.7 600.2 933.9
2000 493 31 524 14,935.2 265 12 277 1,754.1 1,338.3 3,092.4
2001 587 42 629 11,607.2 162 15 177 593.1 535.3 1,128.4
2002 654 50 704 10,252.3 147 13 160 490.1 485.8 975.8
2003 694 60 754 18,358.5 146 16 162 1,095.4 999.7 2,095.2
2004 905 116 1021 31,753.4 294 61 355 2,775.9 1,880.2 4,656.1
2005 1,179 220 1,399 56,618.5 399 120 519 6,461.2 2,481.2 8,942.4
2006 1330 304 1,634 90,666.4 338 124 462 9,943.8 5,734.3 15,678.1
2007 1347 347 1,694 97,561.0 197 87 284 6,581.1 9,602.8 16,183.9
2008 1233 317 1,550 37,731.9 87 27 114 1,107.8 3,214.5 4,322.3
2009 1052 241 1,293 56,632.0 30 6 36 740.4 4,861.1 5,601.6
2010 967 228 1,195 79,419.3 76 26 102 1,219.4 5,738.1 6,957.6
2011 918 225 1,143 62,212.7 67 23 90 608.8 3,660.3 4,269.1
2012 870 226 1,096 61,747.7 47 24 71 707.1 2,448.7 3,115.8
2013 861 226 1,087 75,928.6 77 22 99 1,187.2 2,728.1 3,915.4
2014	to	May 875 224 1,099 76,335.9 42 10 52 1,498.3 1,501.0 2,999.3
Launch to date 2,889 623 3,512 38,299.0 48,805.3 87,064.3
Number	of	companies Money	raised	£mNumber	of	admissions
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3.2.1 AIM Replications  
 
AIM’s achievements have resulted in a number of markets across the world replicating 
some of its characteristics, although these platforms are yet to experience the same 
level of success.  For example, Mercato Expandi was formed in Italy in 2003.  It 
intended, like AIM, to attract the listing of smaller companies through less stringent 
procedures.  However, in July 2007 the London Stock Exchange (LSE) acquired the 
Italian Stock Exchange and as a result the Mercato Expandi was transformed into AIM 
Italy.  Similarly, the Euronext introduced the Alternext in 2005 to attract small and 
medium enterprises (SME’s) by simplifying regulation and lowering cost barriers to 
entry to allow these SMEs easier access to the equity market1.  As of December 2013 
there are still only 184 listed companies on the Alternext with a market capitalisation 
of €8,325bn.  This is substantially lower that the AIM with much smaller companies 
listings on it.   
 
More recently, in 2009, the joint venture between the LSE and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) saw the introduction of Tokyo AIM, which replicates the London 
AIM’s system of control with similar features, such as Japanese Nominated Advisors 
(J-Nomads).  Despite the success of the UK AIM, Tokyo AIM went two years without 
any listings until Mebiopharm joined on 15 July 2011.  However, in March 2012, the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) decided to acquire LSE’s 49% stake in Tokyo-AIM and 
make the platform a wholly owned subsidiary of the TSE.  Tokyo-AIM was then re-
named the TOKYO PRO Market and currently has eight companies listed on it (June 
2014).  Although the attempts to replicate AIM have garnered little success, the fact 
                                                        
1 As of April 2007, now part of NYSE group after merger. 
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that other countries have tried to adopt similar trading platforms highlights the success 
and attractiveness of AIM.  Furthermore, given that AIM is a more established market 
for SMEs, it stands to reason that international listings would choose AIM rather than 
its own country’s counterpart as AIM’s reputation is more established with more 
available investors/equity finance. 
 
3.2.2 AIM Migrations  
 
Alongside the rapid expansion of the AIM, company migration from the Main Market 
down to AIM has also been documented in recent studies.  Jenkinson and Ramadorai 
(2008) examine the consequences of companies switching between two markets with 
different regulatory regimes – AIM and the LSE Main Market.  The study states that 
between 1995 and 2006, 267 companies switched down to AIM and 73 switched up to 
the Main Market.  The substantial migrations down to AIM highlights the 
attractiveness of listing on a market with minimal regulation.  Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai (2008) go on to analyse the performance of companies making such 
migrations.  Intuitively, negative announcement returns would be expected as 
investors should prefer higher level of regulation and in times of scandals such as 
Enron or economic crisis, regulation is often increased.  The most prominent example 
of this is the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).  As expected, the 
announcement effect for companies switching down to AIM were significantly 
negative (around -5%).  However, the operating performance over the 2-year period 
after the switch is significantly positive indicating that managers choosing to migrate 
to the lesser-regulated market segment are actually acting in the best interest of the 
shareholders.  Similarly, Campbell and Tabner (2014) also examine the effects of 
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migrations between AIM and the Main Market between 1995 and 2010 with special 
attention paid to the agency risk premium.  The study finds the same negative 
announcement day returns as well as the positive performance earned after the switch 
down is made.  Campbell and Tabner (2014) suggest that the reason for this positive 
post-switch reaction is the reward to investors for bearing the increased risks and 
agency costs associated with listing on AIM due to the less regulated nature of this 
market compared to the Main Market. 
 
3.2.3 Criticisms of AIM 
 
Survival Rates 
 
In 2007, Roel Campos, the commissioner at the US securities and exchange 
commission (SEC) said, “I'm concerned that 30% of issuers that list on AIM are gone 
in a year.  That feels like a casino to me and I believe that investors will treat it as 
such”.  In response, the London Stock Exchange stated that the number of companies 
that go into liquidation per year is less than 2%.  Espenlaub et al (2012) examined the 
survival rates of AIM listed companies from their IPO to see whether the rates differed 
from other markets and whether regulatory levers made a difference to a company’s 
survival.  To do this, survival analysis is used on a sample of 918 admissions from 
1995-2004.  The results show that the median survival time is 76 months, which is 
consistent with the US and Canadian survival rates they use as a benchmark.  In 
addition to survival rates, Espenlaub et al (2012) also examines the effect of regulatory 
levers such as Nomad reputation, public float, size and age on survival rates.  The 
findings are all statistically significant, except for public float, and indicate that 
stronger regulation has a positive effect on survival rates.  The results from Espenlaub 
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et al (2012) and the statement from the LSE provide evidence refuting the claims made 
by Roel Campos that AIM suffers from high levels of delisting.  Furthermore, this is 
the only AIM study that examines the effect of regulation and the significant results 
provide motivation to study regulation on AIM more directly.  There is a need to 
examine whether there is an improvement in the disclosure/quality of companies or 
whether companies already act accordingly due to outside pressure from investors or 
Main Market competitors. 
 
Size and Thin Trading 
 
One concern thought to jeopardise the longevity of AIM is the perceived illiquidity of 
the shares listed.  Litvinstev (2009) reports that AIM’s insufficient trading volume and 
low market capitalisations could make shares illiquid.  However, Figure 3.1 illustrates 
the market values of companies listed on AIM compared to those listed on the Main 
Market2.  As expected, a greater proportion of the largest companies are listed on the 
Main Market but a greater proportion of the mid-sized companies are actually listed 
on AIM, suggesting that the upper-end of AIM market may not be as thinly traded as 
Litvinstev (2009) argues.  In addition, it has also been suggested that smaller 
companies listed on AIM are more liquid than they would be if they were listed on the 
Main Market, as their shares are not as thinly traded on AIM (Litvinstev, 2009).   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Distribution of Companies by Market Value 
                                                        
2 Appendix 3.1 provides an updated table for this data but does not include the Main Market comparison.  The 
distribution is similar and shows that most a greater proportion of companies have a MV between £10 and £25 
million.  
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The figure illustrates the distribution of company size for both Main Market and AIM listed companies.  The 
number above each bar represents the number of companies at each Market value range Source: AIM statistics 
December 2012 [online], accessed18/1/2013. 
 
3.3 AIM Regulation 
 
The main attraction and integral to the success of AIM is the relaxed approach the 
market takes to regulation.  AIM is an exchange-regulated market which allows AIM 
to function differently to other markets as they do not have to follow the EU directives 
on Listing Rules and are not regulated directly by the FCA (Espenlaub et al, 2012).  In 
addition, this unique regulatory structure means AIM is also exempt from The Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).  This exemption allows AIM to operate 
outside the EU’s desire towards regulatory harmonisation.  In fact, the AIM has very 
few listing requirements and the costs associated with listing are lower than other 
markets (Litvinstev, 2009).  Mendoza (2008) estimates the costs associated with listing 
on AIM compared to the costs of listing on the NASDAQ.  He estimates that a $50m 
listing costs around $3,426,300 on AIM compared to $4,472,000 on the NASDAQ.  
This disparity becomes even greater when Mendoza estimates the on-going costs of 
these listings.  Due to the greater compliance costs associated on the regulated 
NASDAQ, the on-going costs are approximately $2,017,500 per annum compared 
with just $147,300 per annum on AIM.   
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Table 3.3 demonstrates the differences between the listing requirements of AIM and 
the Main Market.  The requirement to engage a Nomad at all times on AIM appears to 
be the strictest requirement as there are almost no other barriers to entry given that no 
minimum free-float, market cap or trading records are required (Leitterstorf et al, 
2008).  This contrasts significantly with the Main Market where such limitations are 
put in place.  The simplicity of these listing procedures significantly reduces the length 
of the admission process to around 3-6 months, increasing the attractiveness of AIM 
(Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2010).  The reduced regulatory burden also allows SME’s 
the opportunity to raise capital through an IPO by avoiding a costly primary market 
listing.  In addition, relaxed admission procedures and low listing costs may have 
increased the success of AIM by attracting companies that would otherwise have been 
unsuitable for the Main Markets.  
  
Table 3.3  Regulatory Differences Between the Main Market and AIM 
Admission Process AIM Main Market 
1.Free Float No minimum percentage of 
shares to be in public hands 
Minimum 25% shares in public hands 
2. Trading Record No trading record requirement Three-year trading record required 
 
3. Admission Document Admission documents not 
checked by Exchange or UKLA 
Admission documents inspected by the 
UKLA 
4. Nomad Requirement Nominated adviser required at all 
times 
Sponsors needed for certain transactions 
5. Market Capitalisation No minimum market 
capitalisation 
Minimum market capitalisation of 
£700,000 
Table shows the difference in listing rules between the AIM and the Main Market. Source: Joining AIM Guide, 
[online], accessed 18/1/13. 
 
 
AIM does have enforceable regulation but is limited to three forms: AIM Rules for 
Companies (May 2014), AIM Rules for Nomads (May 2014) and AIM Disciplinary 
Procedures (May 2014).  The AIM rules are principle-based regulation rather than the 
more formal rules-based regulation.  This allows companies greater discretion when 
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deciding how to interpret regulation and allows companies to explain the rules they do 
not intend to follow and why they have chosen not to follow them, or rather a ‘comply 
or explain’ approach (Litvinstev, 2009; Espenlaub et al, 2012).  
 
Despite being a largely self-regulated platform, AIM has had to introduce certain 
external regulations such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
order to internationally harmonise accounting systems and make companies more 
transparent (Christensen and Walker, 2007).  EU companies initially implemented the 
IFRS system in 2005.  However, this was not required for the AIM listed companies 
until 1st January 2007 when AIM firms were required to produce their accounts in 
accordance with IFRS.  The adoption of IFRS has made disclosure requirements more 
demanding than those previously applied by UK Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).  AIM companies now have to follow stricter accounting policies 
and their interim and final reports must now be consistent over all periods to allow 
appropriate comparison.  For example, the IFRS conceptual framework uses the term 
‘probable’ evidence for the recognition of assets and liabilities whereas the UK GAAP 
uses ‘sufficient.’  This implies that there will be greater recognition and disclosure of 
intangible assets under the IFRS.  The adoption of the IFRS marked the first time AIM 
companies were required to follow externally and compulsory mandated regulation.  
 
 
3.3 Nominated Advisers 
 
One of the unique features of the AIM market is the advisory service provided by 
Nominated Advisers (Nomads).  A Nomad’s role is to ensure that all AIM quoted 
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companies comply with all the necessary listing requirements.  Nomads use their 
considerable discretion to judge whether a firm meet the appropriate standards to be 
listed.  These Nomads also decide whether they wish to accept a firm as a client or 
even delist a client if it compromises the integrity of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) (Livinstev, 2009).  The Nomad must also maintain this advisory role after their 
client has listed by ensuring the company adheres to the AIM Rules for Companies 
(Arcot et al, 2007).  The latest version of the AIM rules for Companies was published 
in May 2014 and contains 45 rules that each company must follow, with each Nomad 
responsible for ensuring that this is the case.  These AIM Rules replaced the previous 
version from 2010 and provided updates on AIM Rule 11 on the Disclosure of price 
sensitive information.  The changes updated the terminology to be more in line with 
that of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 so that disclosure practices now 
reflect general market practice.  The other main change is to AIM 26, whereby a 
company must now provide details of its corporate governance arrangement where it 
does not adopt either the Combined Code or the QCA Guidelines for Smaller Listed 
Companies.  Other key rules include, AIM Rule 1 that states all AIM companies must 
retain a Nomad and failure to secure a Nomad will lead to the immediate suspension 
of the company’s shares.  After one month without a suitable Nomad replacement, the 
company’s listing is then cancelled.  Consequently, it is important for companies to 
choose an appropriate Nomad, who will aid the company’s goals and objectives and 
thus avoid unnecessary Nomad switches that could be costly to the company. 
 
3.4.1 Nomad Regulation and Discipline 
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The monitoring and advisory role of Nomads requires them to follow the set of rules 
provided by the LSE to ensure that the needs of investors are protected and the integrity 
of the exchange is maintained.  The latest AIM Rules for Nomads were published in 
May 2014.  The rules outline the responsibilities of Nomads and the disciplinary action 
they will face if they fail to carry out their role appropriately.  Rule 16 states that all 
Nomads must act with “due skill and care”.  Rule 29 goes further, stating that any 
Nomad in violation of the rules will be disciplined accordingly.  This includes fines, 
censure, or removal of the Nomad from the register.  Furthermore, Rule 21 asserts that 
Nomads must be independent from the companies they represent and that the burden 
of proof is with the Nomad to demonstrate their independence or any conflict of 
interest.  The practice of due diligence and the requirement for independence 
highlights the risky nature of being a Nomad and implies that investors have the right 
of recourse to seek compensation for any failure made by a Nomad that directly affects 
an investor’s financial position.  To date, there have been three recorded incidents of 
Nomad breaches that have resulted in censure or fine.   
 
This first occurred in October 2007 when the Nomad, Nabarro Wells & Co were fined 
£250,000 and publicly censured as they were in breach of the Nomad Rules.  
Specifically, the LSE took this action against Nabarro Wells because: 
 
 Their systems and controls did not satisfy the Eligibility Criteria for Nomads; 
 They failed to act with due skill and care; 
 They failed to undertake the necessary level of due diligence to assess the 
appropriateness of certain companies for admission to AIM; and 
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 They failed to make due and careful enquiry into whether certain AIM 
companies’ admission documents complied with the AIM rules. 
 
On 22nd June 2009, the LSE issued a disciplinary notice to Blue Oar Securities (now 
Astaire Securities) as they were in breach of both the AIM rules for companies and the 
AIM rules for Nomads after failing to act with due diligence by not appropriately 
assessing the company Worthington Nicholls before helping it to float in 2006.  Once 
listed, Blue Oar Securities then helped the company issue an array of misleading 
trading statements which helped the company’s shares leap from the 50p offer price to 
a peak of 194p.  However, within a few months, a profit warning was issued and the 
shares crashed to 19p.  They consequently incurred a public censure and a fine of 
£225,000 (Aggregated Regulatory News Service, ARNS, 2009).   
 
Most recently, on 21st December 2011, the Nomad, Seymour Pierce was censured and 
fined £400,000 for failing to execute due diligence when considering the 
appropriateness of two companies requesting to list on AIM between 2010 and 2011.3   
 
 
The AIM disciplinary committee (ADC) found that Seymour Pierce: 
 
 Did not provide proper advice and guidance to an AIM company in respect of 
its obligations to make announcements without delay, specifically relating to 
its changing financial situation and liabilities; 
                                                        
3 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/aim-
notices/aim-notice-ad11.pdf 
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 Did not satisfy its obligation to the LSE to undertake adequate due diligence 
and to properly assess the appropriateness of a company seeking admission to 
AIM. 
 
3.4.2 Nomad Eligibility 
 
As the Nomad is the principal regulator they too have to follow a set of criteria in order 
to be eligible for Nomad status.  For example, they must be a firm rather than an 
individual; have practised corporate finance (i.e. provided corporate finance advice as 
their principal business) for a minimum of two years and performed a minimum of 
three relevant transactions within that period; and they must employ at least four 
qualified executives (Nomad Rule 2).  There are also annual fees payable to the LSE 
in order to maintain Nomad status, the amount depending on the number of companies 
represented.  Nomad rules 7 and 13 set out the details of the initial application fee and 
on-going fees to be paid.  The specifics of these fees are shown in Table 3.4.  The table 
demonstrates that the annual fees paid by Nomads range from £11,500-£34,400 
depending on the number of companies they oversee.   
 
The on-going Nomad fees payable to the LSE might inhibit smaller firms from being 
able to continue as a Nomad or limit the number of clients they are able to supervise 
as smaller Nomads may not be in a position to have these costs absorbed by their 
clients through the fees they charge.  That is, a small Nomad might have to increase 
their fees to a point where the client may be better-off hiring a large Nomad that might 
be more reputable.  Furthermore, while this set of eligibility criteria and associated 
costs might be restrictive for small companies wishing to seek Nomad status, it is 
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relatively unchallenging for large companies such as KPMG and Deloitte.  This may 
raise concerns regarding the level of oversight provided by Nomads although these 
larger companies may have more reputational concerns providing them with incentives 
to deliver stronger regulatory and advisory oversight. 
 
Table 3.4  Nomad Fees 
Number of Companies Fee 
(Application fee) £20,000 
0-5  £11,500 
6-15  £17,200 
16-39 £22,900 
40+ £34,400 
Table shows the annual fees Nomads are charged to maintain their Nomad status.  The fees are calculated 
depending on the number of companies they represent.  Source: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-
and-advisors/aim/publications/fees/aim-fees-2011-2012.pdf  
 
 
3.4.3 Nominated Brokers 
 
While a Nomad acts in an advisory capacity and implements the rules set out by the 
LSE, Nominated Brokers (NomadBro) provide additional brokering services over and 
above their Nomad function.  They evaluate the level of interest in the company’s 
shares at the IPO and subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  A company may 
consequently have the same Nomad and Broker as long as they can prove that 
safeguards are implemented to ensure independence and eliminate any conflicts of 
interest.  In addition, the NomadBro will act as a financial adviser to the company, 
guiding companies on market and investment opportunities.   
 
As with Nomads, AIM companies are required to employ a NomadBro at all times or 
risk suspension/cancellation.  Interestingly, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2010) conducted 
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interviews with, among others, two Nomads who also acted as NomadBros.  The 
interviews revealed that these Nomads place more importance on the brokerage 
services they offered their clients than the advisory Nomad services.  
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Appendix 3.1 Updated Figure 
 
  
Figure 3.2  Distribution of Companies by Equity Market Value 
 
More up-to date version of Figure 3.1 but it does not include the Main Market comparison.  Source: AIM 
statistics June 2014 [online], accessed11/6/2014. 
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Chapter 4 The Nomad Reputation Index 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines different aspects of corporate governance in relation to the AIM 
market, with the overriding arc being to extend the knowledge into the role of Nomads.  
These unique advisers provide a joint advisory service and regulatory service.  Nomads 
provide a central role into the success of the AIM market through their oversight and 
supervisory powers granted to them by the LSE.  Therefore, their perceived reputation 
might provide key insights into the role they play on AIM and with the interactions 
they have with the companies they represent.   
 
Espenlaub (2012) introduces the concept of Nomad reputation, which was found to be 
significantly related to survival rates.  Given this, a manager could switch to a higher 
quality Nomad to bond themselves to investors, as by inference management will be 
paying more for superior and better quality monitoring.  Most recently, Gerakos et al 
(2011) studies the post-listing performance of AIM companies.  The study examines 
whether AIM firms are able to use the choice of Nomad and auditor as a bonding 
mechanism, using past Nomad performance and whether the Nomad also acts as the 
market-maker as the two measures for Nomad reputation.  The results are insignificant 
for market-maker influence but there is significant evidence that companies perform 
better when they hire a Nomad who has positive previous experience in listing 
companies that went on to perform relatively better than other companies.  Although 
there has been little prior literature pertaining to the role of Nomads, the findings so 
far indicate that performance is improved when a firms hires an experienced Nomads 
while a reputable Nomads is positively related to the survival rate of the firm.   
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This chapter develops the concept of Nomad reputation by Espenlaub et al (2012) and 
constructs a more inclusive index, aggregating different proxies for reputation.  
Analysis and evidence in support of the index is provided in the next chapter, where 
annual returns around the announcement of Nomad switches will be analysed to see 
whether a switch to a more reputable Nomad experiences a positive market reaction, 
supporting the idea and importance of Nomad reputation.  The reputation index that is 
constructed to test whether Nomad reputation is an important examination of AIM and 
whether reputable Nomads can positively influence the quality of corporate 
governance structures of the firms they represent. 
 
The index used in this thesis extends the work by the Espenlaub et al (2012) index.  
Table 4.1 sets out the seven variables in the index alongside the 5 variables in the 
Espenlaub et al (2012) paper for comparison.  This study does not use Espenlaub et 
al’s (2012) variables specifically referring to company IPO as this is not relevant to 
this study.  Furthermore, Age of Nomad and Nomad Return on Assets were found to 
be heavily skewed in favour of large banks and long-standing accounting firms who 
did not represent a large portion of the sample clients.  Explanations of the seven 
variables in this study will be described in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1  Nomad Reputation Factors 
Reputation Index  Espenlaub et al (2012) 5-factor Index 
Number of Clients per Nomad Number of issues the Nomad backed a year prior to the IPO 
Sustained Nomad Proceeds of issues they backed in year prior to IPO 
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Net Losers Nomad Credit Score in year of IPO 
Net Gainers Nomad firm return on assets 
MV of Nomad Clients Age of Nomad 
Credit Score  
Reporting Lag  
Table compares the variables used to measure Nomad reputation in this thesis, compared to Espenlaub et al (2012) 
 
In order to assess whether a company has made a switch to a more or less reputable 
Nomad, the 72 Nomads are split into quintiles.  The median is 36.5, and there are 
around 15 Nomads in each section.  This allows comparison to see whether the switch 
is up, down or lateral.  Table 4.2 presents the results of the ranking system for each of 
the seven variables in the index.  For brevity, it displays the Nomad ranking for the 
Top 15 Nomads and the Bottom 15 Nomads within the sample.  Although in different 
positions, the Nomad rankings are highly associated with many Nomads appearing 
more than once throughout the seven variables.  Brewin Dolphin and Seymour Pierce 
Ltd appear in the top 15 in all seven variables.  On the other end of the scale, Mirabaud 
Securities plc appears in the bottom 15 in every category.   
 
As well as testing for switch-up and switch-downs within the ranking categories, 
switches up to the top 5-Nomads will be tested to see whether the reaction is stronger 
for a more concentrated group of reputable Nomads.  The motivation for this analysis 
is that Espenlaub et al (2012) found that the reaction was stronger when testing the top 
five within each category and the results get weaker when more Nomads are added to 
the ranking system.  Therefore, analysis for concentration of the most reputable 
Nomads will also be explored in Chapter Five.  Furthermore, as well as testing the 
market reaction to switches within each ranking category, analysis will be carried out 
to test the reaction to switches when testing against a combined equally weighted 
aggregate rank of all seven reputation variables.  The results for the aggregate ranking 
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system are shown in Table 4.3.  The ranking strongly reflects the results from the 
individual variables with Seymour Pierce Ltd and Brewin Dolphin at the top of the 
ranking. 
 
Once the combined aggregate Nomad reputation index is examined and verified, this 
index will be used in Chapter six and seven in order to assess the corporate governance 
role of Nomads.  More specifically, how a reputable Nomad motivates Corporate 
Governance Compliance, and whether they influence the level of voluntary disclosure 
of the firms they represent. 
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Table 4.2  Nomad Reputation Index: Top-15 and Bottom-15 
 
RANK 
 MV RANK  Sustained Nomads Net Losers Net Gains 
No. of Clients per 
Nomad 
Reporting Lag Credit Score 
1 Brewin Dolphin Brewin Dolphin WH Ireland Ltd. 
Teather & 
Greenwood 
Seymour Pierce Ltd. 
Teather & 
Greenwood 
Seymour Pierce Ltd. 
2 Investec Bank  plc Seymour Pierce Ltd. Brewin Dolphin 
Astaire Securities 
plc 
Brewin Dolphin Brewin Dolphin 
Arbuthnot Securities 
Ltd. 
3 Seymour Pierce Ltd. KBC Peel Hunt Seymour Pierce Ltd. FinnCap KBC Peel Hunt 
Numis Securities 
Ltd. 
Brewin Dolphin 
4 
J.P. Morgan Securities 
Ltd 
Shore Capital 
Stockbrokers 
Cenkos Securities 
plc 
Seymour Pierce Ltd. 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
Seymour Pierce Ltd. 
Kaupthing Singer & 
Friedlander 
5 Numis Securities Ltd. 
Canaccord Adams  
Ltd. 
Shore Capital 
Stockbrokers 
Cenkos Securities 
plc 
Teather & 
Greenwood 
KBC Peel Hunt 
Brown, Shipley & 
Co. Ltd. 
6 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
Numis Securities Ltd. 
Arbuthnot 
Securities Ltd. 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
Arbuthnot 
Securities Ltd. 
Arbuthnot 
Securities Ltd. 
Altium Capital Ltd. 
7 Collins Stewart 
Charles Stanley 
Securities 
Nomura Code 
Securities Ltd. 
Arbuthnot 
Securities Ltd. 
Numis Securities 
Ltd. 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
Numis Securities 
Ltd. 
8 Teather & Greenwood Collins Stewart Strand Hanson Ltd. 
Panmure Gordon 
(UK) Ltd. 
Astaire Securities 
plc 
Investec Bank  plc WH Ireland Ltd. 
9 KBC Peel Hunt 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
Zeus Capital Ltd. Brewin Dolphin Collins Stewart 
Cenkos Securities 
plc 
Collins Stewart 
10 
Panmure Gordon (UK) 
Ltd. 
Daniel Stewart & Co 
plc 
Altium Capital Ltd. 
Daniel Stewart & 
Co plc 
Cenkos Securities 
plc 
Altium Capital Ltd. 
Hawkpoint Partners 
Ltd. 
11 Cenkos Securities plc Grant Thornton 
Evolution Securities 
Ltd. 
HB Corporate FinnCap 
Astaire Securities 
plc 
Shore Capital 
Stockbrokers 
12 
Arbuthnot Securities 
Ltd. 
WH Ireland Ltd. FinnCap 
Numis Securities 
Ltd. 
Canaccord Adams  
Ltd. 
Charles Stanley 
Securities 
Cenkos Securities 
plc 
13 WH Ireland Ltd. 
Arbuthnot Securities 
Ltd. 
John East and 
Partners Ltd. 
Canaccord Adams  
Ltd. 
Panmure Gordon 
(UK) Ltd. 
FinnCap 
Dawnay, Day C.F 
Ltd 
14 Altium Capital Ltd. 
Hanson Westhouse 
Ltd. 
KBC Peel Hunt Investec Bank  plc 
Charles Stanley 
Securities 
Oriel Securities Ernst & Young 
15 
Shore Capital 
Stockbrokers 
Investec Bank  plc 
Beaumont Cornish 
Ltd. 
WH Ireland Ltd. Investec Bank  plc Arden Partners plc Oriel Securities 
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Table 4.2  Nomad Reputation Index: Top-15 and Bottom-16 (Continued) 
 
RANK 
 MV RANK  Sustained Nomads Net Losers Net Gains 
No. of Clients per 
Nomad 
Reporting Lag Credit Score 
58 Dawnay, Day C.F Ltd. Liberum Capital Ltd. KPMG corporate 
Merrill Lynch 
International 
Dresdner Kleinwort KPMG corporate 
Panmure Gordon 
(UK) Ltd. 
59 Singer Capital Markets 
Marshall Securities 
Ltd. 
Liberum Capital 
Ltd. 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
Marshall Securities 
Ltd. 
Libertas Capital C.F Zeus Capital Ltd. 
60 Marshall Securities Ltd. 
Matrix Corporate 
Capital LLP 
Marshall Securities 
Ltd. 
Nabarro Wells & 
Co. Ltd. 
Cairn Financial 
Advisers Ltd. 
Liberum Capital 
Ltd. 
Nomura Code 
Securities Ltd. 
61 Blomfield C.F Ltd. 
Merrill Lynch 
International 
Matrix Corporate 
Capital LLP 
Orbis Equity 
Partners Ltd. 
Ernst & Young 
Marshall Securities 
Ltd. 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
62 
Goodbody 
Stockbrokers 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
Merrill Lynch 
International 
Ruegg & Co HSBC bank 
Merrill Lynch 
International 
Fairfax I.S. PLC 
63 Liberum Capital Ltd. Morgan Stanley 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Merrill Lynch 
International 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
Marshall Securities 
Ltd. 
64 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Nabarro Wells & Co. 
Ltd. 
Morgan Stanley 
Bridgewell 
Securities Ltd. 
Orbis Equity 
Partners Ltd. 
Morgan Stanley 
Nabarro Wells & 
Co. Ltd. 
65 
Orbis Equity Partners 
Ltd. 
Orbis Equity Partners 
Ltd. 
Nabarro Wells & 
Co. Ltd. 
Brown, Shipley & 
Co. Ltd. 
GMP Securities 
Europe LLP 
Nabarro Wells & 
Co. Ltd. 
RBC Capital 
Markets 
66 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
RBC Capital Markets 
Orbis Equity 
Partners Ltd. 
Dawnay, Day C.F 
Ltd. 
Goodbody 
Stockbrokers 
Orbis Equity 
Partners Ltd. 
Smith & 
WilliamsonC.F Ltd. 
67 Ernst & Young Ruegg & Co Piper Jaffray Ltd Durlacher Ltd KPMG corporate Piper Jaffray Ltd 
Matrix Corporate 
Capital LLP 
68 
GMP Securities Europe 
LLP 
Singer Capital 
Markets 
Ruegg & Co Ernst & Young 
Liberum Capital 
Ltd. 
Ruegg & Co 
Hanson Westhouse 
Ltd. 
69 
Cairn Financial 
Advisers Ltd. 
Teather & Greenwood 
Singer Capital 
Markets 
HSBC bank 
Mirabaud Securities 
LLP 
Smith & 
Williamson C.F Ltd. 
Insinger 
70 davy Corp Williams De Broe 
Smith & 
Williamson C.F Ltd. 
Insinger De 
Beaufort 
Ruegg & Co Strand Hanson Ltd. Libertas Capital C.F 
71 ING C.F Zeus Capital Ltd. Williams De Broe KPMG corporate 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Williams De Broe HSBC bank 
72 Ruegg & Co 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Williams De Broe 
Bridgewell 
Securities Ltd. 
Westwind Partners 
(UK) Ltd. 
Bridgewell 
Securities Ltd. 
The table displays the top 15 and bottom 15 Nomad rankings for each on the seven measures of Nomad reputation.  The numbers beside the Nomad name is Nomad identification number 
within the sample.
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Table 4.3  Aggregate Ranking System 
Rank Nomad Rank Nomad 
1 Seymour Pierce Limited 37 Dowgate Capital Advisers Limited 
2 Brewin Dolphin 38 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 
3 Arbuthnot Securities Limited 39 Zeus Capital Limited 
4 Numis Securities Limited 40 Dawnay, Day Corporate Finance Limited 
5 KBC Peel Hunt 41 Deloitte Corporate Finance 
6 Cenkos Securities plc 42 Hichens, Harrison & Co. plc 
7 WH Ireland Limited 43 Fairfax I.S. plc 
8 Evolution Securities Limited 44 Dresdner Kleinwort 
9 Teather & Greenwood 45 Matrix Corporate Capital LLP 
10 Altium Capital Limited 46 Durlacher Limited 
11 Collins Stewart 47 Blomfield Corporate Finance Limited 
12 Shore Capital Stockbrokers 48 Morgan Stanley 
13 Investec Bank plc 49 Libertas Capital Corporate Finance 
14 Canaccord Adams Limited 50 Williams De Broe 
15 Charles Stanley Securities 51 Bridgewell Securities Limited 
16 FinnCap 52 Smith & Williamson Corporate Finance Limited 
17 Daniel Stewart & Co plc 53 Merrill Lynch International 
18 Panmure Gordon (UK) Limited 54 Ernst & Young 
19 Arden Partners plc 55 Fox-Davies Capital Limited 
20 Astaire Securities plc 56 Singer Capital Markets 
21 Strand Hanson Limited 57 Liberum Capital Limited 
22 J.P. Morgan Securities Limited 58 Cairn Financial Advisers Limited 
23 Ambrian Partners Limited 59 Davy Corp 
24 Oriel Securities 60 Piper Jaffray Limited 
25 Grant Thornton 61 Goodbody Stockbrokers 
26 Nomura Code Securities Limited 62 Insinger 
27 John East and Partners Limited 63 KPMG Corporate 
28 Beaumont Cornish Limited 64 HSBC Bank 
29 HB Corporate 65 Nabarro Wells & Co. Limited 
30 Hoare Govett Limited 66 GMP Securities Europe LLP 
31 Noble & Company Limited 67 ING Corporate Finance 
32 Hanson Westhouse Limited 68 Marshall Securities Limited 
33 Jefferies International Limited 69 Orbis Equity Partners Limited 
34 Hawkpoint Partners Limited 70 Ruegg & Co 
35 RBC Capital Markets 71 Mirabaud Securities LLP 
36 Brown, Shipley & Co. Limited 72 Westwind Partners (UK) Limited 
The table displays the aggregate ranking of all seven reputation variables over two columns.  The ID number is the Nomad 
identification number within the sample. 
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4.2 Reputation Index 
 
The following tables in this section provide further explanations on each of the seven 
ranking categories within the Nomad Reputation Index.  Given that the focus of the 
first study is on providing evidence supporting the Nomad Reputation Index through 
the use of examining Nomad switches, the remainder of this chapter will also include 
descriptive stats on the number of switches to and from reputable Nomads, to reduce 
repetition and cross-posting.  Although further explained in Chapter five, given the 
gap in the literature pertaining to Nomad Reputation, the literature supporting the use 
of these variables are found in auditor literature as they have similar characteristics, 
with regard to the assurances they provide the LSE, that make for appropriate 
theoretical comparisons. 
 
4.2.1 MV of Nomad Clients 
 
The first variable in the Nomad Reputation Index is the Market Value (MV) of each 
of the companies the Nomad represents.  This is an average of the year-end MV over 
the whole four-year sample period.  The MV category will give an indication of 
Nomad size and therefore a sign of reputation as large Nomad firms might be 
considered more reputable (Lin et al; 2009, Knechel et al; 2007).  Table 4.4 displays 
the results for the top and bottom ten Nomads in the MV ranking system.  Panel A 
shows that most switch-ups were made in the 06/07 financial year and reduced over 
the rest of the four-year sample period.  However, the number of switch-downs 
actually increases over the sample period.  This may be due to Nomad fees as Chen et 
al (2007) finds that the market has begun to look more favourably to switching down 
to less reputable auditors in order to be exposed to lower fees.  The sample reasoning 
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might equally be applicable to Nomad switches.  It should be noted that with only a 
total of seven switch-downs, this is not enough for adequate analysis.  Adequate 
analysis can be undertaken on switch-ups as there are 128 observations suitable for 
analysis.  Further analysis will also be carried out on the top-five switch-ups to see 
whether the reaction is stronger for a more concentrated group of reputable Nomads. 
 
Table 4.4  Direction of Switches for MV Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 49 39 20 20 128 
Lateral Switches - 8 8 12 28 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 1 1 2 3 7 
Lateral Switches - 2 - - 0 
Total Switches 50 50 30 35 165 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for MV rank.  Switches are 
made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
4.2.2 Sustained Nomad 
 
The second measure of Nomad reputation is by the sustained Nomads.  This is a rank 
of Nomads who represent the highest proportion of companies that make no switches 
over the four-year sample period.  That is, they represent the most clients that don’t 
switch to another Nomad throughout the four years.  This could highlight firm quality, 
as the Nomad is willing to stay with that company throughout the company’s listing 
on AIM.  It could also mean the firm is more compliant with the AIM rules as the 
Nomad is held responsible for any departure from the rules and would therefore resign 
if a company did not conform entirely.  On the other hand, continued Nomad tenure 
may be a sign of Nomad quality as any company that is unhappy with the way their 
Nomad conducts their business would dismiss or switch them.   
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Similarly to the previous category, Table 4.5 displays the results for top- and bottom-
ten Nomads in the sustained Nomad ranking system.  It shows how many switches 
were made to Nomads that are in the sustained Nomads ranking category.  Panel A 
shows that most switch-ups were made in the 06/07 financial year and reduced over 
the rest of the four-year sample period with 21 in year two, 20 in year three and 22 in 
the final year.  There are also a total of 72 switch-downs in this category, which is 
adequate for analysis and will be tested to see whether the market reacts more severely 
to switch-downs.   
 
Table 4.5  Direction of Switches for Sustained Nomad Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 47 21 20 22 110 
Lateral Switches - 3 9 7 19 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 11 24 17 20 72 
Lateral Switches - 4 2 7 13 
Total Switches 58 52 48 56 214 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Sustained Nomad 
rank.  Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
4.2.3 Net Losers 
 
The third variable in the sample is the proportion of net losers.  This is the percentage 
number of AIM companies a Nomad loses each year and then averaged for all four 
years to produce the overall net losers ranking index.  A Nomad who retains the most 
companies over the four-year sample period is ranked number one in the index and the 
Nomad who loses the most companies is ranked at the bottom of the index.  Table 4.6 
shows the results for the top and bottom 15 switch-ups/downs for the net losers ranking 
system.  Similar to the previous two categories, there are more switch-ups than switch-
downs and most of the switch-ups occur in the 06/07 financial year.  Furthermore, the 
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number of switch-downs decreases over the four years from 16 down to two in the 
final year.  The number of lateral switches in both Panel A and B show an increase in 
such switches suggesting that more companies over the years, in both sub-sets, were 
making more side-ways switches to Nomads of equal reputation. 
 
Table 4.6  Direction of Switches for Net Losers Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 39 23 26 27 115 
Lateral Switches - 1 5 6 12 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 16 23 6 2 47 
Lateral Switches - 3 4 10 17 
Total Switches 55 50 41 45 191 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Net Losers rank.  
Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
4.2.4  Net Gainers 
 
As well as net losers, the fourth variable accounts for the total number of switches 
made to each Nomad by including a net gainers index.  The data collection reveals that 
many companies switched to specific Nomads.  For instance there were a greater 
number of switches to particular Nomads highlighting the presence of popularity 
switching.  The results from these findings are displayed in Table 4.7.  In total, AIM 
companies switch between 72 different Nomads during the sample period.  The table 
indicates that some Nomads are preferred over others.  The top ten Nomads each 
experience a minimum of 17 switches to their firm.  Teather and Greenwood appears 
to be the most popular with 36 switches made to their firm followed by Astaire 
Securities with 34.  Nine Nomads did not experience any switches to their firm and 
these Nomads are ranked at the bottom of the ranking system. 
Table 4.7  Frequency of Switches between Individual Nomads 
Rank Nomad Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Total 
1 Teather & Greenwood 5 18 13 0 36 
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Rank Nomad Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Total 
2 Astaire Securities plc 12 2 4 16 34 
3 FinnCap 3 7 12 11 33 
4 Seymour Pierce Limited 10 3 6 7 26 
5 Cenkos Securities plc 9 5 5 5 24 
6 Evolution Securities Limited 12 1 2 7 22 
7 Arbuthnot Securities Limited 8 1 8 4 21 
8 Panmure Gordon (UK) Limited 3 14 1 2 20 
9 Brewin Dolphin 5 5 2 5 17 
10 Daniel Stewart & Co plc 4 3 6 4 17 
11 HB Corporate 5 3 0 7 15 
12 Numis Securities Limited 5 4 3 2 14 
13 Canaccord Adams Limited 2 3 5 3 13 
14 Investec Bank plc 3 3 5 2 13 
15 WH Ireland Limited 2 3 2 4 11 
16 Altium Capital Limited 1 2 4 3 10 
17 Ambrian Partners Limited 2 1 6 1 10 
18 Strand Hanson Limited 2 2 2 4 10 
19 Collins Stewart  6 1 2 0 9 
20 Arden Partners plc 1 1 5 1 8 
21 Fairfax I.S. PLC 0 0 5 3 8 
22 J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd 1 0 1 6 8 
23 Beaumont Cornish Limited 2 2 2 1 7 
24 Charles Stanley Securites 2 1 3 1 7 
25 Matrix Corporate Capital LLP 0 1 3 3 7 
26 Dowgate Capital Advisers Limited 0 1 4 1 6 
27 John East and Partners Limited 0 3 2 1 6 
28 Smith & Williamson  1 1 2 2 6 
29 Zeus Capital Limited 0 1 3 2 6 
30 Grant Thornton  0 3 2 0 5 
31 Hanson Westhouse Limited 1 2 2 0 5 
32 KBC Peel Hunt 2 1 1 1 5 
33 Nomura Code Securities Limited 2 2 0 1 5 
34 Singer Capital Markets 0 0 0 5 5 
35 Dawnay, Day Corporate Finance Limited 3 1 0 0 4 
36 Jefferies International Limited 3 0 0 1 4 
37 Noble & Company Limited 1 1 2 0 4 
38 RBC Capital Markets 0 2 2 0 4 
39 Shore Capital Stockbrokers 1 2 1 0 4 
40 Fox-Davies Capital Limited 1 0 2 0 3 
41 Hoare Govett Limited 2 0 1 0 3 
42 Oriel Securities 2 1 0 0 3 
43 Blomfield Corporate Finance Limited 0 2 0 0 2 
44 Cairn Financial Advisers Limited 0 0 0 2 2 
45 Hawkpoint Partners Limited 1 0 1 0 2 
46 Hichens, Harrison & Co. plc 1 1 0 0 2 
47 ING Corporate Finance  2 0 0 0 2 
48 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 0 2 0 0 2 
49 Morgan Stanley 2 0 0 0 2 
50 Piper Jaffray Ltd 0 0 0 2 2 
51 Deloitte Corporate Finance 0 1 0 0 1 
52 Dresdner Kleinwort  1 0 0 0 1 
53 GMP Securities Europe LLP 0 0 1 0 1 
54 Goodbody Stockbrokers 1 0 0 0 1 
55 Libertas Capital Corporate Finance 1 0 0 0 1 
56 Liberum Capital Limited 0 0 0 1 1 
57 Marshall Securities Limited 0 1 0 0 1 
58 Merrill Lynch International 0 0 1 0 1 
59 Mirabaud Securities LLP 0 0 0 1 1 
60 Nabarro Wells & Co. Limited 1 0 0 0 1 
61 Orbis Equity Partners Limited 0 1 0 0 1 
62 Ruegg & Co 0 0 1 0 1 
63 Westwind Partners (UK) Limited 0 0 1 0 1 
64 Bridgewell Securities Limited 0 0 0 0 0 
65 Brown, Shipley & Co. Limited 0 0 0 0 0 
66 Davy Corp  0 0 0 0 0 
67 Durlacher Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 
68 Ernst & Young 0 0 0 0 0 
69 HSBC Bank 0 0 0 0 0 
70 Insinger 0 0 0 0 0 
71 KPMG corporate 0 0 0 0 0 
72 Williams De Broe 0 0 0 0 0 
Table shows the total number of switches to each of the Nomads listed above.  The Nomads with the most switches 
to their firm are ranked highest. 
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Table 4.8 shows the results for the top and bottom 15 switch ups/downs for the net 
Gainers ranking system.  Once again, there are more switch-ups than switch-downs 
and most of the switch-ups occur in the 06/07 period.  Furthermore, the number of 
switch-downs decreases over the four years from three down to one in the third year.  
The number of lateral switches in Panel A increases suggesting that more companies 
over the years were making more side-ways switches to Nomads of equal reputation.  
However, there are no observed lateral switches for the bottoms ten Nomad and the 
number of switch-downs is too small for testing in an event study. 
 
Table 4.8  Direction of Switches for Net Gainers 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 67 33 24 28 152 
Lateral Switches - 11 6 15 32 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 3 1 1 - 5 
Lateral Switches - - - - 0 
Total Switches 70 45 31 43 189 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Net Gainers rank.  
Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
4.2.5 Number of Clients per Nomad 
 
The fifth variable to explain Nomad reputation is the Number of Clients per Nomad 
ranking.  This is a ranking of the average number of clients each Nomad represents 
over the four-year sample period.  It takes into consideration the fact that some 
companies retain their Nomad for more than one year as well as Nomads having more 
companies switch to and from their firms in the four years.  The Nomad who represents 
the most companies is ranked at the top of the index while the Nomad who represents 
the least is at the bottom of the ranking.  The top and bottom 15 Nomads for the client 
per Nomad ranking are shown in Table 4.8 in the previous section.   
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Table 4.9 shows the results for the top and bottom 15 switch ups/downs for the Number 
of Clients per Nomad ranking system.  There are more switch-ups than switch-downs 
and most of the switch-ups occur in the 06/07 period.  The number of switch-downs 
increases over the four years although there is still only a total of seven observations, 
which is too small to run analysis against.  The number of lateral switches in Panel A 
increases from one to 11 in the third year indicating an increasing preference of side-
ways switches to Nomads of equal reputation.  However, there are no observed lateral 
switches for the bottom ten Nomads. 
 
Table 4.9  Direction of Number of Total Clients per Nomad Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 62 38 24 42 166 
Lateral Switches - 1 11 4 16 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 1 1 3 2 7 
Lateral Switches - - - - 0 
Total Switches 63 40 38 48 189 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Total Clients per 
Nomad rank.  Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the 
quintile. 
 
4.2.6 Nomad Credit Score 
 
The penultimate variable in the Nomad Ranking System is the Nomad Credit Score.  
This score is the QuiScore and is downloaded from Fame.  It is a measure of the 
probability of company failure in the year following the date of calculation.  The score 
ranged from 0-100 with 100 being the best score with minimal chance of firm failure.  
Therefore, in the Nomad Credit Score, the Nomads with the highest score are ranked 
first and vice versa.  Table 4.10 presents the results for the top and bottom 15 switch 
ups/downs for the Nomad Credit Score ranking system.  There are more switch-ups 
than switch-downs and most of the switch-ups occur in the 06/07 period.  The number 
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of switch-downs increases in the third year but drops back down to three in the final 
year and there are only three lateral observation in the bottom 15 category indicating 
a small sample size in Panel B.  Finally, there are a total of 11 lateral switches in Panel 
A and most of these occur in the third year.   
 
Table 4.10  Direction of Switches for Nomad Credit Score Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 39 19 20 21 99 
Lateral Switches - 3 5 3 11 
Panel B: Bottom 15      
Switch-Downs 3 3 7 3 16 
Lateral Switches - 2 1 - 3 
Total Switches 43 27 33 27 130 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Nomad Credit 
Score rank.  Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
 
4.2.7 Reporting Lag 
 
The second hypothesis asserts that companies might choose to switch to a more lenient 
Nomad, who may be willing to overlook how carefully the AIM rules are implemented 
and followed.  This could be seen as a form of opinion shopping as the management 
of these companies may choose to change their Nomad to one known to be considered 
less reputable and less likely to challenge the company for not complying with the 
AIM rules.  Given that one of the unique features of AIM is the considerable discretion 
regarding the six-month period that companies get to release their results, timeliness 
of their reporting may be a suitable proxy to measure the leniency of certain Nomads.  
It would be expected that more lenient Nomads would represent companies that have 
a greater reporting lag, while stricter Nomads will supervise companies that report 
more timeously. 
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To see whether there is such a relationship between reporting lag and Nomads, the 
median reporting lag was calculated for the entire sample.  This was found to be 91.5 
days, which is also almost half the total amount of days required by the LSE under the 
AIM Rules.  Furthermore, the three month median also corresponds to the time 
allowed for firms listed on the Main Market.  Firms are now grouped into early (<91 
days) and late (>91 days), and for comparison, a group of late reporters (>183 days) 
along with another section of the sample companies that have subsequently been 
delisted are included for comparison, but not incorporated into the reporting lag 
analysis.  The Nomads are then grouped in order of the number of companies they 
supervise which will also indicate Nomad size.  The first category is the Nomads who 
only represent one AIM company and these categories then increase by size of Nomad, 
the largest being the Nomad who supervises more than 10 companies.   
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the results when Nomad size is plotted over the early and late 
lags.  The histogram clearly shows that the largest Nomads (who supervise >10 
companies) represent companies who report their final results in the earliest quintile 
and none of these companies incur suspensions by reporting over the 183-day limit 
(the histogram in Figure 4.1 shows a gap in the >183 category as none of the larger 
companies are suspended).  The other categories are quite evenly distributed although 
the two smallest Nomads are the only categories to supervise companies that are 
subsequently suspended due to late reporting.  When looking at the size of Nomad that 
represents the companies that are then cancelled from AIM, it is clear that the results 
are in reverse order according to size.  That is, the smallest Nomads exhibit a greater 
number of supervisee cancellations while the largest Nomads incur relatively few.  
There appears to be a negative relationship with the size of Nomad and the length of 
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the reporting lag.  It might also be concluded that larger Nomads are more rigorous 
than smaller Nomads when enforcing the AIM rules.  This supports the use of the 
reporting lag variable index, as larger Nomads are stricter than smaller Nomads, 
making them more reputable. 
  
Figure 4.1  Total Distribution of Nomads Over Different Reporting Lags 
 
Nomad Size is plotted over different reporting lag quintiles.  The largest Nomad with over 10 companies report 
earlier than other Nomads.  The distribution of cancelled companies is also reported.  It shows that more companies 
are cancelled when represented by small Nomads and there are no large Nomads that incur suspension at the >183 
day mark. 
 
Although proxy for strict vs. lenient Nomads in the second hypothesis, the reporting 
lag will form part of the Nomad Reputation Index.  It will be carried out individually 
to assess the validity of the second hypothesis and also as part of an aggregate rank for 
Nomad reputation.  It is applicable to Nomad reputation as a stricter Nomad might be 
perceived as more reputable by investors given that they will encourage companies to 
comply comprehensively with the AIM rules which will, in turn, protect the needs of 
investors.  Table 4.11 presents the results for the top and bottom 10 switch-ups/downs 
for the reporting lag ranking system.  There are more switch-ups than switch-downs 
and most of the switch-ups occur in the 06/07 period and halves by the fourth year to 
30 switches.  The number of switch-downs fluctuates over the sample period but 
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reaches its peak in the fourth year with eight switches.  In Panel A the number of lateral 
switches increases from one to 11 in the third year, indicating a preference to stay with 
the top 15 most reputable Nomads. 
 
Table 4.11  Direction of Switches for Reporting Lag Rank 
Panel A: Top 15 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 TOTAL 
Switch-Ups 62 42 29 30 163 
Lateral Switches - 1 11 5 17 
Panel B: Bottom 15     0 
Switch-Downs 6 7 5 8 26 
Lateral Switches - - 1 - 1 
Total Switches 68 50 46 43 207 
Table shows the results for the direction of switches in the highest and lowest quintile for Reporting Lag rank.  
Switches are made up into that quintile, down into that quintile, and laterally within the quintile. 
 
Finally, Table 4.12 displays industry statistics for the most popular year-end.  
Unsurprisingly, December is the most popular year-end for AIM companies, across all 
industry sectors, followed by June and then March.  Around 40% of all industries 
document a December year-end with the exception of Utilities who observe nearly 
75% December year-ends.  However, this is due to the relatively small amount of 
companies available in the utilities industry. 
 
Table 4.12 Year-end Frequency 
Industry Group 
No. of 
Companies 
Most Common 
Year End 
No. of Companies with that 
year end 
BMATR 59 31-Dec-06 25 42% 
CNSMG 38 31-Dec-06 14 37% 
CNSMS 78 31-Dec-06 32 41% 
HLTHC 43 31-Dec-06 17 40% 
INDUS 108 31-Dec-06 46 43% 
OILGS 48 31-Dec-06 21 44% 
TECNO 71 31-Dec-06 29 41% 
TELCM 8 31-Dec-06 3 38% 
UTILS 8 31-Dec-06 6 75% 
Table reports the number of companies with December year-ends over the different industry sectors. 
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APPENDIX 4.1  List of Nomads 
 
1 Altium Capital Ltd. 
2 Ambrian Partners Ltd. 
3 Arbuthnot Securities Ltd. 
4 Arden Partners plc 
6 Astaire Securities plc 
7 Beaumont Cornish Ltd. 
8 Blomfield Corporate Finance Ltd. 
10 Brewin Dolphin 
11 Bridgewell Securities Ltd. 
12 Brown, Shipley & Co. Ltd. 
13 Cairn Financial Advisers Ltd. 
14 Canaccord Adams Ltd. 
15 Cenkos Securities plc 
16 Charles Stanley Securities 
18 Collins Stewart 
20 Daniel Stewart & Co plc 
21 Dawnay, Day Corporate Finance Ltd. 
22 Davy Corp 
23 Deloitte Corporate Finance 
24 Dowgate Capital Advisers Ltd. 
25 Dresdner Kleinwort 
26 Durlacher Ltd 
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Chapter 5  Nomad Reputation  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The background provided in the previous chapter highlights the key role Nomads play 
in the success of the companies they represent, as well as the AIM as a whole.  Their 
monitoring role as the principal regulator makes them a key corporate governance 
mechanism that helps mitigate the agency problem.  This theory is supported by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who state that monitoring and bonding must be undertaken to 
limit the actions of the management and keep the principal-agent relationship aligned.  
The corporate governance role played by Nomads also leads to a potential bonding 
mechanism between managers and shareholders.  Similar to auditors, Nomad firms are 
different sizes and have different levels of experience.   
 
In addition to Nomad switching playing a bonding role for managers, it is possible that 
managers also seek to signal information to investors when adopting these switching 
strategies.  Once again, using auditor literature to support this theory, Bar-Yosef and 
Livnat (1984) find that when a manager is confident about future cash flows, they will 
engage a larger, more reputable auditor indicating a signalling effect about the future 
prospects of the firm.  This can also be applied to Nomads, as if the company is 
performing well and the management is confident about the internal governance 
structures it has employed, the manager may be more willing to make a costly switch-
up to a more reputable Nomad.  In doing so, they will be subject to greater monitoring 
and scrutiny which will provide a signal of company quality to investors. 
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However, a manager may not always make a Nomad switch to a more reputable 
Nomad.  It is also possible that managers might decide to make a downward switch to 
a less reputable Nomad.  Given that corporate governance adoption is voluntary and 
regulation is limited, this leads to considerable managerial discretion for AIM 
managers to make decisions.  As highlighted in chapter one, Williamson (1963) states 
that inadequate monitoring and control of management allows considerable scope in 
the operational running of the company.  This discretion can lead to managers making 
wealth-destroying decisions that are not in the best interests of investors.  One such 
decision might be to lower the quality of their external monitoring by hiring a less 
reputable Nomad.  If investors view such a switch as a mistake, it is possible for 
investors to punish this perceived poor decision-making using market discipline, by 
selling a portion of their shares to depress share prices enough to curtail management’s 
behaviour.   
 
As well as the role of Nomads, another important consideration is the informal and 
flexible approach to regulation.  AIMs structure raises questions about AIM quoted 
companies’ ability to incorporate suitable and sufficient quality corporate governance 
mechanisms given the cost involved with implementing such measures.  Although 
governance codes are voluntary, they are encouraged to adopt them (Mallin and Ow-
Yong, 2012; Leitterstorf et al, 2008).   
 
Given that there is incentive to incorporate quality corporate governance structures, 
the monitoring role provided by Nomads becomes increasingly important to protect 
the interest of shareholders and the reputation of the market as a whole.  This study 
examines this role by creating a Nomad reputation index, which is used to test how the 
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market responds to Nomad switching.  This, in turn, allows determination of whether 
switching-up to a more reputable Nomad is seen as a positive bonding mechanism by 
the market.  Similarly, it will also provide evidence as to whether the market 
disciplines companies for making an unnecessary switch-down to a less reputable 
Nomad.  The ranking is also concentrated to the top-5 Nomads, in order to establish 
whether the market perceives a hierarchy of Nomads, as they do with auditors, while 
also corroborating the finding of Espenlaub et al (2012) who use the top-5 Nomads to 
correspond to the most reputable.   
 
Taking into consideration the above literature pertaining to Nomads, this study makes 
the following contributions.  Firstly, it will directly examine the relation between the 
choice of Nomad and company performance using event study methodology.  The 
results provide significant evidence of a market reaction to Nomad switches when 
there is a switch-up to a more reputable Nomad.  To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first study that analyses the market reaction to Nomad switches when considering 
Nomad reputation.   
 
The findings in this study show that the market responds favourably when there is a 
switch to a reputable Nomad, which places emphasis on the importance of careful 
Nomad selection.  Secondly, this study extends the idea of Nomad reputation presented 
by Espenlaub et al (2012) and creates an inclusive Nomad reputation index, used to 
rank the Nomads in terms of their calculated reputation.  The index is based upon the 
aggregate of seven different reputation factors including: number of clients, market 
value and Nomad credit score.  The Nomad reputation index takes inspiration from 
Espenlaub et al (2012) in terms of the credit score variable but does not include their 
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other variables, which relate more specifically to IPO proceeds.  Instead this index 
encompasses a wider variety of variables making it more comprehensive and suitable 
for this particular study and for future replication.  Finally, this study introduces the 
idea of ‘lenient Nomads’ whereby managers may hire a lenient Nomad who might be 
prepared to overlook the careful adherence to the AIM rules.  This action is detrimental 
to shareholders as non-compliance, to the small amount of regulation that AIM 
imposes, can reduce their reputation, or on occasions, result in the company being 
suspended or even cancelled.  
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5.2 Literature Review & Hypotheses 
 
5.2.1 Nomad Changes and Comparison with Auditor Literature 
 
To date there has been very little research carried out on the AIM market and the role 
of Nomads despite Nomads being an integral component to AIM’s success.  Espenlaub 
et al (2012) studies IPO survival within the AIM and finds that Nomad reputation is a 
statistically significant factor contributing to the success of the issuing company.  The 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2010) study carried out interviews with directors, institutional 
investors and Nomads to determine the ethical and corporate governance implications 
when investing on the AIM.  Their findings show that the role of Nomads is 
fundamental to the success of AIM with many companies depending on their Nomad 
for advice on implementing a suitable corporate governance structure.  In an earlier 
study, Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) study the admission documents of the first 241 
companies to join AIM, to assess the level of corporate governance disclosure using 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (then known as the combined code) as a basis for 
analysis.  The study finds that companies not raising new capital at admission have 
significantly weaker corporate governance structures, and companies who hire a 
Nomad, who also acts as their broker, pay greater attention to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code.  
 
This limited body of literature highlights an opportunity to further study the idea of 
Nomad reputation reported in Espenlaub et al (2012), and the importance of their role 
within the AIM, by analysing their role further and in respect to Nomad changes.  
However, discussion of Nomad switches is difficult without prior literature to consult.  
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Although engaged to perform two different functions within the firm, the theoretical 
rationale for choosing to switch to a more reputable auditor should be consistent with 
the decision to switch Nomad.  As discussed in chapter two, the presence of 
information asymmetries causes a lack of trust between the principal and agent 
requiring the need of governance mechanisms, such as the audit, to reduce the 
asymmetry and associated agency costs.  External audit reinforces trust and confidence 
in financial reporting.  Clinch et al (2012) examines audit quality and information 
asymmetries between traders and find that Big-4 auditors are associated with lower 
information asymmetries. Prior literature also confirms that switches to Big-4 auditors 
are seen positively by investors (Fan and Wong, 2005; Yosef and Livnat, 1984).  Given 
the relaxed approach to regulation on AIM, there is potential for large asymmetries as 
there is a low disclosure burden for firms.  Therefore, like the choice of auditor, the 
choice of Nomad might also be key in improving information asymmetries given their 
supervisory and monitoring role. 
 
Although, Nomads and auditors are employed to carry out two different functions, 
their governance role and characteristics are similar.  For example, both must be 
independent from the company they represent, and while auditors must provide 
reasonable assurances to company stakeholders that the financial statements they audit 
are free from material misstatements, Nomads must also provide similar guarantees to 
the LSE with regards to the appropriate application of the AIM Rules for companies.  
This similarity of role may explain why the most reputable Nomad firms also provide 
audit services.  The behavioural and economic factors behind the decision to choose 
one auditor over another may be extrapolated to decisions over the choice of Nomad.  
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Therefore, this study will compare the expected effects and causes of Nomad changes 
with those arising from actual auditor switches/ resignations/dismissals.  
 
There are many reported explanations as to why a company might change their auditor 
and some are equally applicable to Nomad changes on the AIM market.  Moreover, 
not all of these reasons are necessarily harmful to the company’s shareholders.  
Williams (1988) and Beattie and Fearnley (1995) contend that auditor switches are 
prompted by a variety of influencing factors such as: fees, opinion shopping, litigation 
risk, auditor quality, agency conflicts and information suppression.  It is clear that 
some of these rationales may even enhance the position of the shareholder.  Shopping 
around for cheaper fees and moving up to a perceived higher quality auditor should be 
considered as legitimate reasons to switch auditor, whereas ‘opinion shopping’ is 
likely to be harmful to shareholders’ long-term interests.  Similarly, shopping around 
for cheaper Nomad fees or switching to a more reputable Nomad should also be viewed 
as a positive strategy in the market.  More specifically, there are intuitive reasons why 
a manager might switch up to a more reputable Nomad, or down to a less reputable 
Nomad.  However, theoretical support for these arguments does not exist.  Therefore, 
the following section will explore these intuitive explanations for Nomad switches and 
apply auditor literature for support. 
 
5.2.2 Nomad Size 
 
Auditor switching has been well studied and become increasingly popular in recent 
years due to the Enron scandal and subsequent demise of the former Big Five auditor, 
Arthur Anderson.  One of the main reported theories behind such switching is auditor 
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reputation.  There are different components to an auditor’s perceived reputation.  One 
of the most significant is size.  The largest international auditing firms (The Big-4) are 
considered to be pre-eminent in the market as their size and internationally 
recognizable brand name mean they have more capital and resources to undertake 
better quality audits (Becker et al, 1998; Beatty, 1989; DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 
1988).  Dopuch and Simunic’s (1982) paper on competition in the auditing profession 
concluded that investors make judgements regarding the quality of different auditors 
based on product differentiation whereby large audit firms are considered to be more 
credible as they have greater resources at their disposal.  Therefore, switches to these 
firms would be a key signal of company quality and a positive market reaction should 
be observed.  This argument is supported by Knechel et al (2007) who find significant 
evidence to support a directional theory: that when company switches to(from) a Big-
4 auditor, the market reacts positively(negatively) to the announcement.  However, 
there are documented inconsistencies with the above findings.  Nichols and Smith 
(1983) find no statistically significant evidence to a positive(negative) reaction to 
switch-ups(switch-downs). 
 
In more recent studies, Chen et al (2007) studies the market reaction when switching 
down from the Big-4.  The paper finds that since the demise of Arthur Anderson the 
market reaction has been positive towards downward switches despite the perception 
that smaller firms provide inferior auditing services.  The main documented reason for 
this is a reduction in fees, and the reaction is even greater when larger companies 
choose to make a downward switch to a small auditor.  Weiss and Kalbers (2008) 
studies auditor changes but separates the sample to observe whether the effects of 
switches are different between small and large companies.  The study finds that 
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switches are treated differently according to company size: the changes in small 
companies returns around the period of an auditor change were not significant, while 
the subset of large companies were.  Lin et al (2009) explore the market reaction to 
and from the top-ten largest auditors in China.  Consistent with prior literature, they 
find that the market reacts positively when companies switch to a top-ten auditor as 
the company is signalling to the market that they are financially well positioned.  
However, Chan et al (2011) Nichols and Smith (1983) and Schwartz and Soo (1996) 
find no significant evidence that the market responds to changes to and from the Big-
4.   
 
The above literature confirms that a change to a large auditor is received positively in 
the market.  The same theory can be applied to Nomad switches.  Given the central 
role that Nomads play in supervising and monitoring the companies they represent, an 
investor might prefer the appointment of a more popular Nomad that is already proven 
its success in supporting many other companies.  The Nomads with the most clients 
could be considered as superior over those who only represent a handful of firms as 
popularity could signal quality, in the same way as a switch to a Big04 auditor.  
Therefore, the market should positively react to the switch to such Nomads.  This study 
uses a sample of 464 AIM companies over a four-year period represented by a set of 
73 Nomads.  Of these 73 Nomads, the top ten represented 55% of the entire sample’s 
market value.  This concentration among the top-ten Nomads highlights a distinctive 
set of ‘large Nomads’.   
 
As alluded to in Chapter four, the market value of Nomad firms is heavily skewed 
towards established accounting and finance firms whole only represent one or two 
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clients each.  However, this is not representative of the size of the Nomad services 
provided by other firms.  Therefore this first hypothesis will use the number of clients 
the Nomad represents as well as the market value (MV) of the clients as a proxy for 
Nomad size.  Intuitively, it would be expected that Nomad firms with the greatest 
number of clients, along with consideration of those representing the largest clients, 
would be a good indicator of the size of a Nomad.  The analysis undertaken will 
examine the market reaction to a switch to a Nomad who has the most clients and a 
switch to a Nomad who represents the largest clients, with a positive reaction expected 
for both.  The two proxies for large Nomads are represented in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1θ:  A switch up to a ‘Large Nomad’ will experience abnormal returns = 0. 
H1: A switch up to a ‘Large Nomad’ will experience abnormal returns > 0.  
 
5.2.3 Strict vs. Lenient Nomads 
 
Another motivation behind auditor switching concerns management opinion shopping.  
For instance, a company might shop around for an auditor more willing to allow certain 
accounting practices that would show the company in a more favourable light, 
especially where the previous auditor has issued a qualified opinion (DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998).  This is supported by Davidson III (2006), who finds evidence 
that companies who receive a modified opinion are more likely to choose a non-Big-
Six auditor in order to receive an unqualified opinion from a lower quality auditor.  
However, Chow and Rice (1982) and Smith (1986) dispute this, as neither find any 
evidence of a change in auditor opinion after the switch was made.  Krishnan and 
Stephens (1995) also report that there is no difference between the leniency of auditors 
5-93 
 
before and after a switch, while Johnson and Lys (1990), who investigate management 
opportunism theories, find no evidence that this is the case in practice.  Furthermore, 
Lu (2006) concludes that there are no benefits to opinion shopping due to the negative 
market reaction that is experienced when a switch is announced.   
 
However, Lennox (2000) finds that although the audit opinion after opinion shopping 
does not always get better, the report they would have been given had they not made 
the switch would have been worse.  Further supporting the opinion-shopping 
proposition is the Chan et al (2006) paper which analyses auditor switches between 
local (small) auditors and non-local (large) auditors in China.  They find that changes 
to a local auditor occurred when the incumbent auditor issued a qualified opinion and 
these companies then received a clean report by the local auditor suggesting the 
successful utilisation of opinion shopping.  This indicates that companies can 
participate in effective opinion shopping.   
 
There is clearly some doubt over the extent to which auditor opinion shopping actually 
takes place in the market for auditors.  Despite this, opinion shopping may still be valid 
with regard to Nomads.  A company expecting a qualified audit opinion might switch 
to a less reputable auditor go get a more favourable opinion.  Similarly, an AIM 
company that is struggling to comply with all the AIM rules to the standards of their 
appointed Nomad may consider changing to a less reputable Nomad to release the 
regulatory burden.  From a Nomad perspective, a Nomad who is seeking more clients 
may be equally motivated to engage in a company that is not able to fully comply with 
the AIM Rules. 
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Therefore, in the second and third hypothesis it will be ascertained whether AIM 
companies will be less conservative with regards to implementing the AIM rules when 
they switch Nomad to look for a more lenient and flexible Nomad.  AIM companies 
have a wide discretion as to when they publish their final results: six months compared 
to three on the Main Market.  A strict Nomad might promote the prompt publication 
of their clients’ financial results to make them more aligned with the disclosure quality 
of their Main Market competitors; while a lenient Nomad might be more inclined to 
allow a client to take the full six months.  That is, the reporting lag will be longer for 
a company that changes to a more ‘lenient’ Nomad when compared to the shorter 
reporting lag of companies who switch to a ‘strict’ Nomad.  It would be expected that 
the market should react positively to a stricter and better quality monitor; while 
discipline companies that switch down to a more lenient Nomad who does not provide 
the same quality of oversight.  This in turn, leads to potential agency conflicts as 
lenient Nomads are not able to provide the same quality control of their clients despite 
being the principle regulator.  Consequently, the hypotheses will be: 
 
H2θ: A switch to a strict Nomad will earn abnormal returns = 0. 
H2: A switch to a strict Nomad will earn abnormal returns > 0.  
H3θ: A switch to a lenient Nomad will earn abnormal returns = 0. 
H3: A switch to a lenient Nomad will earn abnormal returns < 0. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, Nomads will be ranked according to the median 
reporting lag.  A set of ‘strict’ and ‘lenient’ Nomads will be constructed by ranking 
the Nomads according to the reporting lag of the companies they represent.   
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5.2.4 Nomad Switches and Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory (reported in section 2.3-2.4) extends the auditor literature to provide 
further support for the Nomad reputation hypothesis.  One of the main agency 
problems arising on AIM is the large managerial discretional allowed to them through 
the self-regulatory environment of the market.  As highlighted in chapter two, 
Williamson (1963) states that inadequate monitoring and control of the management 
allows considerable scope in the operational running of the company.  This discretion 
can lead to managers making wealth-destroying decision that are not in the best 
interests of investors.  Such discretional powers can lead to managers making costly 
decisions that damage shareholder wealth (Stulz, 1990).  One such decision could be 
to make an unnecessary and costly Nomad switch to an equal or lower quality Nomad 
(if a Nomad has the same perceived reputation, then there is no benefit in switching).  
However in response to this, shareholders can employ managerial discipline by 
deliberately depressing the stock price to reflect the cost of the negative decision being 
made (Flannery, 2001; Peria and Schmukler, 2001) (detailed in section 2.10).  Given 
this, if a company makes a switch to a Nomad of less or equal rank, it would be 
expected that the market would response negatively as a form of managerial discipline.   
 
For this part of the analysis, the aggregate Nomad reputation index will be used.  This 
is an equally weighted average of all seven Nomad reputation variables.  The fourth 
hypothesis is detailed below: 
 
H4θ: Companies making switches to equal or lesser Nomads will earn abnormal 
returns = 0. 
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H4: Companies making switches to equal or lesser Nomads will earn abnormal 
returns <0. 
 
However, not all managers will use their discretion in such a negative and value-
destroying way.  Given the aforementioned agency problem, managers can provide 
their shareholders with guarantees regarding their behaviour and ensure they don’t 
expropriate funds by investing in value-damaging projects.  Such assurances and 
mechanisms are bonding costs (section 2.3.1).  These are costs that aim to reduce the 
agency problem.  One form of bonding is through the monitoring provided by the 
external auditor.  Fan and Wong (2005) state that companies are more likely to engage 
a Big-Five auditor when there are severe agency problems.  In doing this, managers 
bond themselves to their firm by employing a larger, more expensive auditor, who is 
perceived to be more reputable.   
 
As well as increased monitoring, hiring an expensive Big-Five auditor is also a 
bonding mechanism as the cost itself consumes the company’s resources, thus 
ensuring they cannot be misappropriated by management (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  This is further supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who state that 
monitoring and bonding must be undertaken to limit the actions of the management 
and keep the principal-agent problem relationship aligned.   
 
Therefore, the hiring of an expensive, reputable Nomad should also supply the same 
level of bonding as the external auditor as they are levying greater quality monitoring 
on managers.  Given this, the final hypothesis is: 
 
H5θ: Companies who switch to a reputable Nomad will earn abnormal returns =0. 
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H5: Companies who switch to a reputable Nomad will earn abnormal returns >0. 
 
5.2.5 Dismissals and Resignations 
 
Although an examination into the market reaction of dismissals and resignation would 
be applicable and of interest for AIM companies, there have been no reported 
announcements of actual Nomad dismissals and only 15 observations of Nomad 
resignations, which is too small to allow appropriate analysis to be undertaken. 
 
Summary 
Given the comparable nature of Nomads and auditors, especially with regard to their 
monitoring and due diligence roles; the above literature highlights areas of study into 
Nomads that have not yet been carried out.  First, the motive behind the various kinds 
of Nomad switches.  Second, the effects of the changes is documented to assess 
whether abnormal returns are earned around the announcement of a change and 
whether the market reacts in different ways depending on the actual Nomad involved. 
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5.3 Data Selection 
 
5.3.1 AIM Companies 
 
The study will analyse all Nomad switches over a four-year period starting in April 
20064.  International companies are eliminated from this study as, despite an increasing 
number of admissions since AIM’s launch, there were still on 304 international 
companies listed on AIM in 2006.  Moreover, these companies tend to be cross-listed 
on markets in their home-nation: influenced and subject to their own countries legal 
system, rules and governance codes.  To do this, DataStream is used to generate a list 
of UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange AIM.  
 
This list, accessed on the 26th August 2011, produced a total of 1,134 live and dead 
firms.  The portfolio was then filtered:  37 companies did not have a UK ISIN as a 
result of which country of origin could not be established; 115 financial firms, 
including investment entities, were also excluded.  To avoid potential problems 
regarding thin trading and low liquidity (as daily stock price data is being used), 507 
firms were removed where market capitalisation was less than £5m, or where there 
was no trading activity around the announcement date being examined.  One further 
company was deleted for not having a year-end prior to the 1st January 2006.  This 
leaves a final sample of 475.  Of these remaining 475 firms, a further 16 companies 
were deleted either because data was missing from NexisUK and other sources, the 
firms were suspended in the year before the 2006/2007 year end, or they had been 
misclassified by DataStream, for example, being on the Official list rather than AIM 
                                                        
4 A list of all Nomads can be found in Appendix 4.1 
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at January 2006.  Firms listing on the AIM following this date were not included so 
that the study used an ex-ante sample rather than an ex-post sample.  The final sample 
comprised 459 firms.   
 
Table 5.1 displays the total number of observations available from the 459 companies 
over the four-year sample period.  Therefore, this study uses a final sample of 1,836 
testable observations. From here NexisUK was used to collect announcements on all 
Nomad switches and resignations.  With regards to Nomads, according to the LSE 
website there are currently 60 Nomad and 140 Brokerage companies representing AIM 
companies.  In this study, over the four-year sample period, there are a total of 72 
different Nomads.  At the time of collation there were 78 Nomad firms and a list of all 
Nomads can be found in Appendix 1.  From the data collection, there were a total of 
563 Nomad switches, after removing cancelled companies and those who had 
announcements around the event window.  Finally, there are 258 firms with more than 
one switch and 137 firms with just a single switch over the sample period.  This leaves 
a total of 395 Nomad switches to test against. 
 
Table 5.1  Final Sample of AIM Companies 
 Firm Years 
Initial sample (1,134 companies, 2006-2010) 4,536 
Less unsuitable companies -2,636 
Less Unavailable data in NexisUK  -64 
Final Sample (459 companies, 2006-2010) 1,836 
Total Number of Switches 563 
Switches removed due to confounding events 56 
Cancelled Switches 113 
Number of firms with Multiple Sample Point 258 
Number of firms with Single Sample Point 137 
Final testable Switches 395 
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5.4 Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Research Design 
 
In the first instance an event study method will be used to determine if there is any 
market reaction to Nomad switches.  This will further aide analysis to see whether 
certain Nomad changes are seen as more/less favourable than others, allowing them to 
be ranked in order of preference and indicating any presence of Nomad quality.  A 
suitable model will be used to calculate the abnormal returns of these firms; the results 
will then be grouped into different event windows to capture returns before and after 
the date the actual switch was made. 
 
5.4.2 Use of Event Study 
 
An event study method is appropriate for this study as, by design, it investigates the 
relationship between share prices and economic events (Strong, 1992).  There are 
various ways to calculate abnormal returns but as this study uses daily returns data 
there can be potential problems.  Daily returns are less likely to be normally distributed 
than monthly returns; market model parameter estimation can be more biased with 
daily prices and variance estimation around announcements (Brown and Warner, 
1985).  These issues will affect the power and accuracy of the findings from the model 
used.  One method for calculating normal returns is the Fama French three-factor 
model.  Extant literature has found that stocks expected returns are positively related 
to their market-to-book and inversely to size.  Given this, models such as the market 
model will be biased as they only take into consideration one factor, the market beta 
(Fama and French, 2004; Subramanian et al, 2006).  However, UK evidence suggests 
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that this method fails to explain much of the cross section of returns when using UK 
data.  In a study by Gregory et al (2009), Fama-French and momentum factors are 
generated with the intention of becoming publically available for use and are 
comparable to the data issued by Kenneth French’s US website.  The study also 
supports the earlier findings of Michou et al (2007) by concluding that such factor 
models are unable to adequately describe risk in UK data.  These findings are further 
substantiated by the more recent study by Gregory et al (2013) which tests the Fama-
French models further and still finds evidence that these factor models do not 
appropriately explain the cross section of returns when using UK data.   
 
Another applicable event study method considered is the market model.  Brown and 
Warner’s (1985) analysis of daily stock returns found that the Market Adjusted 
Returns Model overcomes problems surrounding variance estimation around 
announcement and bias in the parameter estimation and the OLS market model.  This 
is corroborated by the findings in Dyckman et al (1984), which also favours the market 
model, as the study concludes that daily returns are not affected by non-normality of 
the data.  Given the above evidence, the first method used in this study will be the OLS 
market model as it is more suitable when controlling for daily returns and UK data.  
However, an extension of the Fama-French three-factor model will also be undertaken 
to test firm-specific characteristics not covered by the market model. 
 
A further issue to take into considerations when using event studies is that of 
confounding events.  The longer the window, the more likely it becomes that other 
events will affect the stock price and cloud the results of an event study. The shorter 
the window, the less likely it is that confounding events will occur. A study by Brown 
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and Warner (1985) has been used to justify the use of longer windows. However, 
Brown and Warner demonstrate that their justification is appropriate only if 
confounding events are truly random, which is plausible if and only if the sample size 
is large.  As event studies are designed to isolate the financial impact of a particular 
event. When the event window is long, more than three trading days, the method can 
easily generate spurious results.  This study uses the following event windows (-20, 
+7) (-20, -3) (-1, +1) (0, 0) (-1, 0), 0 being the day of the actual nomad switch.  
Therefore, given what we have ascertained about confounding events, the main focus 
is in the three event windows immediately surrounding the announcement day.  Pre 
and post announcement windows provide useful information about the liquidity of the 
firms used in the sample and the length of time the market takes to respond to 
announcements.  However, caution should be taken as significant abnormal returns in 
longer widows could pertain to a different event/announcement. 
 
The returns for each of the companies are gathered from DataStream to allow 
comparison of the companies who make Nomad switches.  The abnormal returns of 
the companies are calculated using the OLS Model regression to see whether the 
results are statistically significant.  The regression uses excess returns and is calculated 
using the following model: 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  [𝛼 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡]       (5.1) 
 
Where: 
 = Abnormal returns of the    
company i at time t. 
 = Returns of the company i at 
time t 
ti
AR
ti
R
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R  = Market returns using FTSE 
Allshare index 
α and β =  OLS parameters 
 
The returns of the company are calculated as )/ln( 1 ititti PPR  and the market returns 
as R )/ln( 1 ttmt II .  Where, ln is the natural logarithm, itP  is the price of the firm at 
time t and 
1itP  is the price one day before time t.  Similarly, tI  is the price of the index 
at time t and 
1tI  is the price of the index one day before time t.  α and β are estimated 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) over an estimation period before the event period.  
The estimation period is 100 days, which is the period advised for daily return studies 
in Armitage (1995).  α is the excess return on the stock and β is the coefficient of firm 
return on the market return.  The risk free rate of return is deducted from
ti
R  and R mt .  
The risk free rate is established by calculating the returns of UK T-bills and converting 
the annual figure into daily trading risk by assuming 250 trading days per year.  The 
FTSE 100 volume is downloaded and compared to the dates in the returns and any 
non-trading days are discarded (weekends/public holidays).   
 
To control for thin trading, the 𝛽 is adjusted using the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
method. Strong (1992) states that OLS estimates of the market model parameters are 
biased and inconsistent, resulting in biased estimates of abnormal returns leading to 
mis-specified test statistics. To take on account this problem, Scholes and Williams 
(1977) provide a method to remove a greater deal of bias from beta. The method 
requires the running three regressions to obtain the lag, match and lead betas as 
follows: 
𝛽𝑆𝑊 =  
(𝛽−1+ 𝛽0+ 𝛽+1)
(1+2𝜌1)
       (5.2) 
mt
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Where, 𝛽−1 + 𝛽0 +  𝛽+1 are the lag, match and lead security betas, respectively. 𝜌1 is 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the market index: 
𝜌𝑚𝑡 =  
𝜎(𝑟𝑚𝑡+1,𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝜎(𝑟𝑚𝑡+1)𝜎(𝑟𝑚𝑡)
        (5.3) 
Where, 𝜎(𝑟𝑚𝑡+1, 𝑟𝑚𝑡) is the covariance estimate, and 𝜎(𝑟𝑚𝑡) is the standard deviation 
of returns for day t. 
 
The average abnormal returns for the whole sample are then generated over the 
different event windows with the maximum event period (-20, +7) days over the 
announcement period.  This is then cumulated to capture the full effect of the 
announcement and allows comparison with the period leading up to the actual event 
(Strong, 1992).  This is carried out using the following equation to work out the 
cumulated average abnormal returns: 
CAR  = AR         (5.4) 
Where CARitis cumulated average abnormal returns and ARitis the average abnormal 
returns already calculated for the set of companies.  The CAR is calculated over the 
different event windows.  The mean abnormal return, AR, is then calculated at each 
event date which can then be cumulated to find the CAR for different event windows 
to allow comparisons between the different nomad firms. 
 
  
it 

T
t 1
it
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Robustness Checks: Rank Test 
 
Ahern (2009) states the power of the t−test to detect abnormal performance is the 
lowest of all the test statistics, on average, and displays considerable bias.  Corrado 
(1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992), and Campbell and Wasley (1993) all document 
that the non-parametric rank and sign tests outperform the t-test, both in terms of power 
and speciﬁcation.  Seth Armitage (1995) confirms that the Corrado rank test has been 
proven to be superior to other alternatives in event study methodology and will be used 
as a robustness check in this study.  Estimation and event period errors are ranked for 
each share and the average rank of all errors is subtracted from the rank of the event 
day error.  Therefore, positive abnormal returns on the event day is reflected in a higher 
than average rank for that day’s error, producing a positive average difference across 
all shares for that day. The test statistic is calculated by dividing this average difference 
by the standard deviation of average differences over the estimation and event periods.  
The first step is to transform each firm’s abnormal returns in ranks (Ki) over the 
combined period that includes the estimation and the event window (Ti): 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑙 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑙)        (5.5) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑙 > 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑠 → 𝐾𝑖𝑙 > 𝐾𝑖𝑠       (5.6) 
 
 
The test then compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the expected 
average rank under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns (𝐾𝑖 = 0.5 + 𝑇√2). The 
test statistic for the null hypothesis is: 
 
𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐾𝑖0−?̅?𝑖)
𝑁
1=1
𝑆(𝐾)̅̅̅̅
        (5.7) 
 
Where, 
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𝑠(?̅?) = √
1
𝑁
∑
1
𝑁2
∑ (𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 −?̅?𝑖)
2𝑇
𝑡=1       (5.8) 
 
In addition, the t-test for the CAR is: 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
1
𝑁
√(𝑇2−𝑇1+1)
 ∑ ∑
𝐾𝑖𝑡−((𝑇+1)/2))
𝑆(𝐾)
𝑇2
𝑇1
𝑁
𝑖=1       (5.9) 
 
 
   
Robustness Checks: Standardisation 
 
Armitage’s (1995) study into the various event study methodologies finds that 
performance of the OLS market model is enhanced when the abnormal returns are 
standardised by the regression’s standard errors.  Standardising is also a means of 
normalising residuals that may otherwise be non-normally distributed (Patell, 1976).  
Furthermore, Peterson (1989) also states that standardisation is necessary in order to 
reflect any statistical error in the calculation of the predicted returns.   
 
This study will use the methodology and notation presented by Armitage (1995).  
Standardised errors (𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡) are calculated by dividing each share’s abnormal error (𝑒𝑖𝑡) 
by the estimation period standard error of regression (𝑠𝑖), which generates the standard 
error from which t-tests can be carried out.  According to Armitage (1995), the 
standardised errors result in greater comparability with regard to significance: if a 
share is more volatile, the normal return has to be higher in order to reach a certain 
level of significance.   The standardised test statistic is reported alongside the non-
parametric Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) rank test. 
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Standardised Error (𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡): 
 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡  = 𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑖⁄                (5.10) 
where: 
 𝑠𝑖 =  ([1 𝑇 − 2⁄ ] ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡1 )             (5.11) 
 
𝑒𝑖𝑡  represents each company’s daily residuals.  T represents the number of daily 
observations in the estimation period.  In order to test whether there has been any 
significant abnormal return earned, a t-test is also carried out.  The test statistic is: 
  
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  ∑ 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 √𝑁⁄
𝑁
𝑖=1              (5.12) 
 
where, 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the standard error and √𝑁 is the square root of the number of 
observations. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Kothari and Warner (2004) state that it is also necessary to analyse whether there are 
abnormal returns earned around the period of the event window by aggregating the 
residuals into different Average Cumulative Error windows ( 𝐴𝐶𝐸 ).  Examining 
different event windows surrounding Nomad switches will first, show whether there 
are any abnormal returns before the announcement is made which might indicate that 
the event is anticipated. Using Armitage (1995) methodology and notation, the 𝐴𝐶𝐸 
is derived as follows: 
 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐷 =  ∑ 𝐴𝐸𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
       (5.13) 
Where, 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐷  is the average cumulative errors, 𝐴𝐸𝑡 is the average error at time t, and 
D is the number of event days in the event window.  In the previous analysis, 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐷  
is referred to as Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), and this will be how it’s 
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referred to in this study.  The test statistic for 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐷 is the sum of the daily test statistics 
over the event window divided by √𝐷.   
 
 
Additional Analysis: Multiple Regression  
 
A multiple regression analysis will be carried out under different conditions (i.e. 
Switch-ups/lateral) taking into account different company characteristics as thus far, 
only the characteristics of the Nomads have been considered.  The characteristics of 
AIM companies tend to be different than those on the Main Market.  For instance, 
given that the AIM markets itself as an international market for smaller growing 
companies, listed companies therefore tend to be smaller, thinly traded, and still in 
their growth phase.  Hence, in order to take these company characteristics into 
consideration, a model that extends the Fama-French three-factor model is used.  The 
model controls for AIM company characteristics over a sample period of 250 trading 
days before and after the switch is made.  This should, therefore, be a robust version 
of the Fama-French three-factor model given that it extends and controls for additional 
variables and company characteristics such as omitted variable bias and thin trading. 
 
𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑉𝑀𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑀𝐺𝑡−1 +
 𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝐸𝐷−1 +  𝛽10𝐸𝐷0 +  𝛽11𝐸𝐷+1 +  𝛽12𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡       (5.14) 
 
The above regression model will estimate the least squares coefficients and control for 
company size and firm style by using Fama-French factors found in their three-factor 
model.  The SMB (small minus big) is obtained by measuring the geometric difference 
between the FTSE UK Small Cap Style Index and the FTSE UK Large Cap Style 
Index.  SMB is designed to determine the additional return investors receive by 
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investing in firms with relatively small market capitalisations.  A negative SMB 
indicates that large companies outperformed the small companies and vice versa.  
Similarly, the VMG (value minus growth) factor is measured by calculating the 
difference between the FTSE UK Growth Style Index and the FTSE UK Value Style 
Index.  VMG computes the ‘value premium’ provided to investors for investing in 
companies with high book-to-market values over those with low book-to-market 
values.  A positive VMG in a month indicates that value stocks outperformed growth 
stocks in that month.  A negative VMG in a given month indicates the growth stocks 
outperformed.   
 
There are also event day dummies, 𝐸𝐷−1, 𝐸𝐷0, 𝐸𝐷+1, which controls for the presence 
of clustering, where there is an announcement made on the same day by multiple firms 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  The event dummies capture abnormal earned the day before, the 
day of, and day after the switch is made.  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 represents the trading volume of the 
AIM companies, which will indicate market interest in these companies and whether 
higher volume might explain any returns earned.  The returns of the company are 
calculated as )/ln( 1 ittt PPR  and the market returns as  
R )/ln( 1 ttmt II .  𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market return using the FTSE Allshare index. Finally, 𝛼 
is the intercept (firm’s daily abnormal return), and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term. 
 
One of the main issues when analysing stock returns on the AIM market is thin trading 
as AIM companies are small and tightly held which results in low volume of trading 
for these companies and can lead to bias in the returns earned.  Therefore, to mitigate 
this problem, all the coefficients in the model are lagged in order to moderate the thin 
trading bias as in the Dimson (1979) paper.   
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Table 5.2 displays the cross-sectional sample means of the coefficients for the 
independent variables described in equation 5.9 over aggregate top-15 switch-ups, top-
5 switch-ups and lateral switches.  The intercept is negative and significant (at 1% 
level) for all three types of switches; indicating that the companies in this study all 
underperform the benchmark after controlling for the all factors.  However, the test 
statistic is more negative for the Top-15 Nomads and the lateral Nomad switches 
suggesting that companies that switch up to a more reputable Nomad are 
underperforming those companies that make unnecessary Nomad switches.  VOL is 
significantly positive at the event day but significantly negative in its corresponding 
lag.  This indicates a significant increase in trading on all types of switches at the time 
of the announcement.  Market excess returns and its lag are also significantly positive 
across all windows.  VMG is significantly positive for the switch-ups measures 
suggesting value companies are outperforming at the time of the switches.  
Conversely, the VMG is significantly negative at the time of the lateral or downward 
switch.  SMB and the corresponding lag are significantly positive for all types of 
switches.  Finally, the event day dummies and the lagged returns do not produce 
significant results. 
 
For the data analysis in the next section, the CARs will be documented alongside the 
t-test, standardised t-test and the Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) rank test. 
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Table 5.2  Sample Means of Least Squares Coefficients for Model 2 
  
Aggregate top-15 Switch-
ups 
Aggregate top-5 Switch-
Ups 
Aggregate Lateral 
switches 
Independent Variables 
Mean Coefficients and t-
stats. n=127 
Mean Coefficients and t-
stats. n=49 
Mean Coefficients and 
t-stats. n=89 
vol-1 -1.7098 -0.9557 -1.1838 
 (-5.89)*** (-3.63)*** (-3.79)*** 
vol 5.3993 4.3957 5.0326 
 (13.75)*** (11.92)*** (11.94)*** 
MRK -1 0.1672 0.1588 0.2332 
 (13.53)*** (7.42)*** (14.118)** 
MRK 0.7616 0.7987 0.3322 
 (21.06)*** (14.16)*** (18.49)*** 
VMG -1 -0.1666 -0.2146 0.1594 
 (-3.09)*** (-2.35)** (5.03)*** 
VMG 0.2388 0.2577 -0.0444 
 (5.62)*** (3.72)*** (-2.29)** 
SMB -1 0.1036 0.1115 0.3783 
 (4.80)*** (2.96)*** (17.69)*** 
SMB 1.0748 1.1375 0.1846 
 (14.86)*** (10.09)*** (5.20)*** 
ED +1 -0.0022 -0.0064 -0.0026 
 (-0.56) (-0.94) (-0.78) 
ED -1 0.0050 0.0069 0.0029 
 (0.92) (0.92) (0.63) 
ED 0 -0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0018 
 (-0.0038) (-1.53) (-0.25) 
Return -1 0.0040 0.0064 0.0479 
 (0.78) (0.75) (7.82)*** 
intercept -1.29 -0.0038 -0.0019 
 -22.91*** -13.88*** -12.57*** 
The table displays the independent variables, sample means of least squares coefficients and test statistics 
explaining the dependent variable (abnormal returns) for aggregate: switch-ups, top-5 switch-ups and lateral 
switches.  Means are winsorised at 1% to remove spurious outliers.  The abbreviations are as follows: Volume 
(VOL), bid-ask spread (BAS), value minus growth (VMG), small minus big (SMB), and event day abnormal return 
(ED).  The symbols ***, **, *, denotes significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively for the t-
statistics in parenthesis. 
 
  
5-112 
 
5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
With the abnormal returns calculated it is now necessary to start testing the hypotheses.  
H1 states that Nomad reputation may be a key determinant of Nomad switching.  This 
hypothesis specifically uses Nomad size as a proxy based on the auditor switching 
literature.  However, this study will extend this measurement of reputation by building 
up a Nomad reputation index of seven different measurements of reputation and 
ranking the Nomads accordingly within each of the seven indices, as well as an 
aggregate equally weighted measurement of all seven factors, to produce an overall 
Nomad reputation ranking system.  In their study of IPO survival in the AIM market, 
Espenlaub et al (2012) construct an index of five variables representing Nomad 
reputation in order to test whether Nomad reputation increases the survival rates of 
companies listing on AIM.  The study finds that Nomad reputation is a significant 
factor in company survival when a top-five Nomad represents the company at IPO.   
 
5.2  General Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates the frequency of Nomad changes over each industry sector for the 
four-year sample period.  This highlights the presence of any relationship between the 
number of announcements and the industry group in which they were made.  The table 
indicates that the consumer services (CNSMS) sector and the industrial sector 
(INDUS) produced the highest number of switches.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
the telecommunications (TELCM) sector has the lowest number of switches at seven, 
although there are only eight companies in this sector.  Given that the total number of 
changes is 564 and the number of companies in the sample is 459, there are some 
companies who make more than one switch over the 4-year sample period.  The table 
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also indicates that the number of announcements made may correspond to the number 
of companies in each sector as the more announcements made, the greater the number 
of companies in each sector. 
 
In addition to the industry sector, other characteristics, such as the year in which the 
announcements are made, are explored.  Panel B provides more descriptive statistics 
on the relationship between the announcements of Nomad changes, the year in which 
they were made, and whether they were made by live or cancelled companies.  The 
table shows a general decrease in the number of changes made over the sample period 
as the 06/07-year had the highest number of switches at 152.  However, the 08/09 
financial year shows a slight increase in the number of switches.  The fall in 
observations from 06/07 to 07/08 may be due to the introduction of the compulsory 
adoption of the IFRS, as companies could be in greater need of maintaining their 
Nomad while they prepare their company for the change in accounting standards.   
 
Overall, the table does not support a relationship between the number of switches and 
the year in which they were made.  However, the table does demonstrate that more 
live companies make switches than cancelled companies (where live companies are 
the companies that are still trading at the end of the sample period, and cancelled/dead 
companies are those that stop trading in the last year of the four-year period), 
indicating that Nomad switches may not be an indication of bad news as suggested in 
the third hypothesis.  Furthermore, Panel B shows the number of resignations made in 
each year.  There are a total of 18 resignations over the sample period and a great 
proportion of these were made in the 09/10 financial year.  Despite no resignations in 
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the 07/08 periods, there is a general increase in the number of resignation made over 
the entire period.  
 
Table 5.3  Frequency of Notifications and Industry Sectors 
Panel A: Number of switches made over each industry group. 
Industry No. Of Companies % of total No.  Of Switches 
BMAT 59 12.42% 76  (16.56%) 
CNSMG 38 8.06% 38  (8.28%) 
CNSMS 78 17.21% 107  (23.31%) 
HLTHC 43 9.37% 60 (13.07%) 
INDUS 108 23.53% 116  (25.27%) 
OILGS 48 10.46% 61  (13.29%) 
TECNO 71 15.47% 88  (19.17%) 
TELCM 8 1.74% 7  (1.53%) 
UTILS 8 1.74% 11  (2.40%) 
Total: 459  564  (100%) 
Panel B: Frequency of switches made per year 
Year 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 
 Cancelled Live Cancelled Live Cancelled Live Cancelled Live 
Switching 
Companies 
24 104 28 83 28 97 21 93 
Non-switching 
 
75 331 71 348 71 334 78 345 
No. of 
Resignations 
1 1 0 0 1 3 9 3 
Total 100 436 99 431 100 434 108 441 
The table shows the distribution of Nomad switches of the different industry sectors in Panel A.  Panel B shows 
the distribution of switches over each of the 4-year sample period while also stating whether the companies who 
made the switches are still trading after the four years (live) of switches made by companies that were subsequently 
cancelled in the last year of the sample period. 
 
It is also necessary to report the distribution of Nomad switches based on firm 
characteristics.  Figure 5.1 displays the number of Nomad switches over different size 
categories.  It shows that live companies have the highest market cap and that most 
live switches occur when companies have a market cap of around £50m.  Most dead 
companies that make Nomad switches (prior to cancellation) tend to be smaller 
companies with a market cap of <£20m.  The figure also illustrates the size of 
companies that announce resignations and highlight that they are smaller, around the 
<£10m point.  There are also no resignations for companies with a market cap above 
£100m.  The overall trend also indicates that large companies in all categories make 
fewer Nomad switches than smaller companies suggesting that small companies may 
have more to gain from changing their Nomads, e.g. because of lower fees.  Therefore, 
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there might be a relationship with firm size and whether switching companies are 
eventually cancelled or not. 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Distribution of Size among Switching Companies 
 
The figure illustrates the distribution of company size for live, and cancelled companies and companies who 
announce Nomad resignations.  Where live switches are companies that are still trading at the end of the four years 
and cancelled companies being those that are cancelled in the last year of the sample period but make Nomad 
switches in the three years they are still active. 
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5.6 Results 
 
5.6.1 Aggregate Results for the Top-15 Nomads from Event Study 
 
Before discussion of the analysis, it is worth noting the different quintiles the ranks 
are organised into (Q1-Q5).  Q1 is the top-15 Nomads and Q5 is the lowest for both 
the aggregate and disaggregated indices.  As most of the total switches took place in 
this first quintile, this is where the focus of analysis is based.  Therefore, in analysis of 
the top switch-ups and lateral switches; lateral switches correspond to the lateral 
switches and switch-downs made in Q1.  In the section for the combined quintiles (Q2-
Q5) the switch-up are any switches to a more reputable Nomad in these for quartiles.  
Similarly a switch-down is to any switch made to a Lower ranked Nomad.  Combining 
these quintiles was necessary as there were not enough observations for individual 
quintile analysis. 
 
The first set of analyses undertaken examines the abnormal returns earned when 
switches are made to Nomads ranked in the top-15 (quintile 1) of the aggregate Nomad 
ranking system, and are presented in Table 5.4 (using equation 1).  These switches are 
the total switch-ups, the top-5 switch-ups and the top-15 lateral switches of the 
aggregate equally weighted Nomad ranking.  Panel A reports the top-15 switch-ups 
over the event windows.  The results show that the pre-announcement window (-20, -
3) is significantly negative at the 5% level indicating these companies were 
underperforming prior to the Nomad switch-up.  This is supported by the standardised 
t-test but not the rank test.  The other event windows are not statistically significant.  
Espenlaub et al (2012) studied the reputation of the top-5 Nomads and included the 
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top-10 for robustness.  They found that the evidence was stronger for the top-5, 
suggesting that nomad reputation is concentrated to the top-5 Nomads.  Given this, the 
top-5 Nomads in the ranking are also considered to see whether the results are stronger 
for the more concentrated reputable Nomads.  The results show that the announcement 
window (0,0) is significantly positive at the 5% level and indicates when companies 
switch to a top-5 Nomad the market reacts positively.  This finding is further supported 
by the non-parametric rank test. 
 
Panel C displays the abnormal returns earned when a company changes from a top-15 
Nomad to another top-15 Nomad i.e. they make a lateral switch.  The table shows that 
only the (-7, +7) event window is statistically significant as, 3.82% CAR is earned and 
this is significant at the 10% level for the t-test and at the 1% level for the rank test.  
Given that the pre-announcement window is negative these results indicate that the 
abnormal returns earned in the (-7, +7) window are a delayed reaction to the change 
in Nomad.  Overall, the results from the aggregate top-15 changes suggest that a 
switch-up in the combined Nomad Reputation Index is a sign of good news and this is 
more pronounced for the concentrated top-5 where the event window is positive and 
statistically significant.  This confirms the first hypothesis that a switch up to a more 
reputable Nomad will earn positive abnormal returns in the market.   
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Table 5.4  Aggregate Results 
 CAR TSTAT St-test Rank AR TSTAT 
Panel A: Total Switch-Ups 
 n=127 
(0,0) 0.30% 0.98 0.36 -0.84 0.30% 0.98 
(-1,0)  0.12% 0.28 0.57 -0.12 0.10% 0.32 
(-1,+1) 0.02% 0.04 0.69 0.14 0.01% 0.02 
(-20,-3) -2.65% -2.14** -2.24** -0.42 -0.17% -0.54 
(-20,+7) -2.30% -1.40 -1.65* -0.48 -0.08% -0.27 
(-7,+7) 0.25% 0.21 0.73 -0.34 0.02% 0.05 
Panel B: Top-5 Switch-ups 
 n= 49 
n=49 (0,0) 0.86% 1.99** 0.49 1.69** 0.86% 2.05 
(-1,0)  0.83% 1.38 0.71 0.24 0.27% 0.65 
(-1,+1) 0.51% 0.69 0.67 -0.28 0.18% 0.43 
(-20,-3) 0.38% 0.38 1.79* 0.64 0.02% 0.05 
(-20,+7) 0.05% 0.03 2.06** 0.75 -0.01% -0.03 
(-7,+7) 0.32% 0.19 1.50 0.58 0.01% 0.03 
Panel C: Total Lateral Switches 
n=89 
(0,0) -0.47% -0.75 -0.36 0.44 -0.54% -0.89 
(-1,0)  -0.61% -0.69 -0.57 0.76 -0.37% -0.61 
(-1,+1) -0.35% -0.32 -0.69 0.81 0.15% -0.24 
(-20,-3) -1.95% -0.71 -1.65 1.30 -0.09% -0.15 
(-20,+7) 2.24% 0.68 1.24 3.23*** 0.09% 0.14 
(-7,+7) 3.88% 1.60* 1.73* 3.76*** 0.26% 0.43 
The table shows the results for switches made to Nomads ranked in the top 15 of the aggregate ranking.  Panel B 
shows the results for the switches ranked in the top-5 and Panel C displays the abnormal returns earned for lateral 
switches.  * ** *** marks significance at the 10%, 5% and 15 level, respectively.  TSTAT is the test statistic, St-
test is the standardised test statistic, and Rank is the non-parametric rank test. 
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Results for Combined Aggregate in Quintiles 2-5s 
 
The results from the descriptive statistics highlighted a potential problem with regard 
to sample size.  That is, in all of the seven measures of reputation in the index, there 
are not enough switch-down observations to allow appropriate analysis.  Therefore, 
the switch-ups, switch-downs and the lateral switches for the other four quintiles (2-
5) have been combined to allow analysis of abnormal returns earned on each event.  
Table 5.5 displays the results.   
 
Panel A shows the total switch-ups of the combined analysis.  Only the pre-
announcement window produces statistically significant returns, which are positive.  
However, the other event windows in this analysis are not significant.  Possible 
rationales for the pre-announcement window being significantly positive prior to a 
switch-up might be that these companies were out-performing the market and could 
therefore afford to hire a more reputable Nomad.  This also provides support for the 
fifth hypothesis that switch-ups are associated with positive abnormal returns as 
managers are willing to make a costly switch to a reputable as a bonding mechanism.  
The additional monitoring as well as the reduced amount of funding the managers now 
have to expropriate, results in a positive market reaction.   
 
Panel B show the results for the combined switch down, where both the post-
announcement windows (-20, +7) and (-7, +7) are significantly negative.  This 
indicates that when a switch downwards is made, the market reacts negatively to the 
news, which is consistent with the fourth hypothesis that companies switching to a less 
reputable Nomad will experience negative abnormal returns.  This also supports the 
theory that when managers make decisions perceived to be costly/unnecessary, the 
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market disciplines this action by depressing the share price.  For the lateral switches, 
shown in Panel C, there are no significant abnormal returns earned over any event 
window suggesting the market does not perceive the lateral switches to be an 
unnecessary expense.  Overall, these results do support a directional theory proposed 
by Knechel et al (2007) as downward switches produce a negative reaction while a 
switch-up produces positive abnormal returns. 
5-121 
 
Table 5.5  Combined results for aggregate ranking (Nomads outside top-15) 
 CAR TSTAT AR TSTAT 
Panel A: Switch-ups 
n=72 
(0,0) -0.59% -1.09 -0.59% -1.09 
(-1,0)  0.78% -1.03 0.39% -0.73 
(-1,+1) -1.01% -1.08 -0.34% -0.62 
(-20,-3) 4.78% 2.04** 0.27% 0.49 
(-20,+7) 4.94% 1.73* 0.18% 0.33 
(-7,+7) 1.19% 0.57 1.58% 2.93 
Panel B: Switch-downs 
n=78 
(0,0) -0.32% -0.59 -0.32% -0.59 
(-1,0)  -0.76% -0.99 -0.38% -0.70 
(-1,+1) -1.31% -1.39 -0.44% -0.80 
(-20,-3) -3.82% -1.75 0.77% 1.42 
(-20,+7) -5.30% -1.84* 0.53% 0.98 
(-7,+7) -4.13% -1.96* -0.11% -0.20 
Panel C: Lateral Switches 
n=195 
(0,0) -0.39% -0.51 -0.39% -0.51 
(-1,0)  -0.47% -0.44 -0.24% -0.31 
(-1,+1) -0.19% -0.14 -0.06% -0.08 
(-20,-3) 3.21% 1.02 0.18% 0.23 
(-20,+7) 2.19% 0.54 0.08% 0.10 
(-7,+7) 1.84% 0.62 0.12% 0.16 
The table shows the results for switches made to Nomads ranked in the rest of the ranking table by combining the 
switch-ups/down and lateral switches of quintile 2,3,4,5 in the aggregate ranking.  Panel A shows the results for 
switch-ups, Panel B displays the switch-downs and Panel C display the results for the lateral switches.  * ** *** 
marks significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Results for Individual Nomad Reputation Index 
 
As well as the aggregate ranking, it is also necessary to assess the abnormal returns 
earned for each of the seven measures of Nomad reputation.  Table 5.6 displays the 
results.  Looking at the lateral switches in Panel C first, only the post announcement 
(-7, +7) for ‘Net gainers’, ‘sustained Nomads’ and ‘MV’ are statistically significant.  
This suggests there is weak evidence that the market reacts positively when a switch 
to a Nomad with the same reputation is made.  As stated by Espenlaub et al (2012), 
the results for the concentrated top-5 Nomads, in Panel B, are stronger than the top-15 
as at least one window in all seven measures contains evidence of significant abnormal 
returns being earned.  The strongest results are observed for the Sustained Nomads 
and the Nomad Credit Score.  Both the pre and post-announcement windows is 
statistically significant for Sustained Nomads highlighting that a switch up to the five 
most reputable is seen as a sign of good news in the market.  For Credit Score, the 
three announcement windows are significant and are so at the 1% level for the (0, 0) 
windows.  This substantiates the previous findings from Knechel et al (2007) and Lin 
et al (2009) that companies hiring a Nomad with a good reputation will earn positive 
abnormal returns.   
 
Panel A displays the abnormal returns earned for the top-15 (Q1) switch-ups.  The 
results show that the pre-announcement window (-20, -3) is negative across all 
windows and statistically significant for Total Clients and Reporting Lag.  The CAR 
turns positive following the switch-up, and significant for Sustained Nomads and Net 
Gainers at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  Overall, the findings in this analysis 
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are that companies who switch-up to a more reputable Nomad experience positive 
abnormal returns.  
 
With the index disaggregated, it is possible to examine the other hypothesis with 
regard to Nomad size and Nomad leniency.  The proxies for Nomad size are ‘total 
clients’ and ‘MV’.  For total switch-ups these measures both produce negative 
abnormal returns, which are significant at the 5% level for the pre-announcement 
window.  This indicates that these companies were significantly underperforming prior 
to the Nomad change.  As the change is made the abnormal returns become less 
negative although are not statistically significant.  However, the results for the switch-
ups made to Nomads ranked in the top-5 document positive abnormal returns in all 
windows although, only significantly so at the (-7, +7) window for both measures, 
there is in addition weak evidence, at 10%, of a positive reaction on the announcement 
date (0, 0) of a switch in the ‘total clients’ measure.  These findings, therefore, confirm 
the first hypothesis (1a) that companies that switch to a large Nomad experience 
positive abnormal returns.  However, there is no evidence supporting hypothesis 1b 
that companies who do not switch-up to large Nomads experience negative returns.  
Both proxies for Nomad size experience negative abnormal returns in the pre-event 
window, which then becomes positive once the change is announced.  However, these 
findings are not statistically significant across any window. 
 
The last column reports the results for the reporting lag variable, which is the proxy 
for ‘strict’ and ‘lenient’ Nomads.  The results for total switch-up (to a strict Nomad) 
indicate that companies, once again, are underperforming before the switch.  There is 
significance at both pre-announcement windows (-20, -3) and (-20, +7).  However, 
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when the switch is made there is a positive reaction on the announcement date, but this 
reverts back to negative in the post-announcement windows.  It should also be noted 
that these announcement and post-announcement windows are not statistically 
significant.  Panel B displays the results for a switch up to a top-5 strict Nomad.  The 
findings indicate that even though the companies perform positively in all event 
windows, when a switch up is made, there are significant (at 5% level) abnormal 
returns earned in the (-7, +7) window.  This confirms the second hypothesis that a 
switch to a strict Nomad is associated with positive abnormal returns.   
 
 
Table 5.6b in Appendix 5.1 displays the corresponding non-parametric rank test, based 
on Corrado (1989) and Corrado and Zivney (1992).  Apart from being less significant, 
the results from the rank test are broadly consistent with the findings discussed above.  
However, the only significant result found in relation to the actual event windows 
immediately surrounding the Nomad switch is the Reporting Lag.  There is a positive 
association at the, 10% level, that a switch to a stricter Nomad is associated with 
positive abnormal returns.  The other windows experiencing significant, and positive 
rank test results all appear in the post announcement windows, highlighting a possible 
delayed reaction to the Nomad switches.   
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Table 5.6  Nomad Reputation Index Results (Disaggregated) 
Event 
Window 
SUSTAINED NET GAINERS NET LOSERS TOTAL CLIENTS MV CREDIT SCORE REPORTING LAG 
CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT 
Panel A:  TOTAL TOP-15 SWITCH-UPS          
(0,0) 0.04% (0.11) -0.08% (-0.26) -0.39% (-1.06) 0.03% (0.10) 0.03% (0.09) 0.15% (0.37) -0.10% (-0.35) 
(-1,0) 0.01% (0.03) -0.38% (-0.85) -0.50% (-0.95) -0.24% (-0.60) -0.20% (-0.46) 0.17% (0.30) -0.43% (-1.08) 
(-1,+1) 0.05% (0.08) -0.46% (-0.85) -0.26% (-0.40) -0.26% (-0.55) -0.11% (-0.21) 0.26% (0.38) -0.40% (-0.82) 
(-20,-3) -1.50% (-1.00) -1.23% (-0.98) -0.02% (-0.02) -2.53% (-2.30)** -1.92% (-1.55) -1.25% (-0.79) -2.49% (-2.20)** 
(-20,+7) 1.18% (0.59) 0.62% (0.38) -0.11% (-0.05) -0.90% (-0.62) -0.21% (-0.13) -0.93% (-0.44) -1.61% (-1.08) 
(-7,+7) 2.62% (1.81)* 2.36% (1.93)** 0.40% (0.27) 1.07% (1.00) 1.35% (1.13) 0.12% (0.08) 0.79% (0.72) 
Panel B:  TOP-5 SWITCH-UPS          
(0,0) 0.36% (0.67) 0.21% (0.59) 0.19% (0.35) 0.31% (0.80) 0.31% (0.80) 0.98% (1.81)* 0.38% (1.04) 
(-1,0) 0.77% (1.00) -0.06% (-0.13) 0.46% (0.59) -0.03% (-0.05) -0.03% (-0.05) 0.82% (1.08) 0.16% (0.32) 
(-1,+1) 1.23% (1.31) -0.19% (-0.31) 0.63% (0.67) 0.35% (0.51) 0.35% (0.51) 1.48% (1.58) 0.24% (0.38) 
(-20,-3) 1.95% (0.90) -1.74% (-1.23) 2.66% (1.23) -0.10% (-0.07) -0.10% (-0.07) 0.37% (0.17) -0.26% (-0.18) 
(-20,+7) 5.96% (2.08)** -0.37% (-0.20) 5.03% (1.75) 2.31% (1.12) 2.31% (1.12) 3.20% (1.12) 2.24% (1.16) 
(-7,+7) 5.41% (2.58)** 1.26% (0.92) 3.68% (1.76) 3.79% (2.51)** 3.79% (2.51)** 3.38% (1.61) 3.80% (2.69)*** 
Panel C:  TOTAL LATERAL SWITCHES          
(0,0) -0.32% (-0.58) -0.33% (-0.59) -0.53% (-0.54) 0.02% (0.09) -0.11% (-0.30) -0.67% (-0.49) -0.20% (-0.58) 
(-1,0) -0.22% (-0.37) -0.57% (-0.73) -0.48% (-0.63) -0.15% (-0.25) -0.37% (-0.35) -0.74% (-0.50) -0.28% (-0.40) 
(-1,+1) -0.01% (-0.02) -0.44% (-0.44) 0.10% (0.08) -0.02% (-0.07) 1.14% (0.78) -0.25% (-0.24) -0.26% (-0.33) 
(-20,-3) -2.80% (-1.02) -0.87% (-0.35) 1.07% (0.35) -2.19% (-1.09) -1.05% (-0.69) -2.06% (-0.65) -2.35% (-1.09) 
(-20,+7) 3.31% (0.84) 2.43% (0.91) 2.21% (0.81) 1.40% (0.40) 3.05% (0.96) 0.02% (0.05) 0.46% (0.18) 
(-7,+7) 4.28% (2.16)** 4.67% (2.08)* 1.57% (0.80) 2.20% (1.46) 4.25% (1.82)* 1.57% (0.54) 3.07% (1.55) 
The table displays the results for the abnormal returns earned over different event windows for each of the seven measures of Nomad reputation.  Panel A displays the results for the 
total switch-ups made to Nomads ranked in the top-15 of the individual rankings, Panel B shows the results for the switches ranked in the top-5 and Panel C displays the abnormal 
returns earned for total lateral switches.  *, **, ***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5-126 
 
Results from Multiple Regression Analysis (Model 2) 
 
In addition to the market model event study, an alternative return-generating model 
(equation 5.14) is used to control for firm-specific characteristics not covered by the 
market model.  As before, the results for the aggregated Nomad reputation ranking are 
presented alongside the results from the seven individual variables that the ranking 
system comprises. As with the previous analysis, additional non-parametric test 
statistics are reported.  These tests are the standardised t-test and the Corrado (1989) 
rank test.  These provide further robustness as it does not follow the assumption that 
the data is normally distributed.  Table 5.7 displays the results for the abnormal returns 
earned around different event windows for Nomad switches ranked in the top-15 and 
the top-5 of the aggregated Nomad ranking.   
 
The results from the aggregate top-15 switches show that significant negative 
abnormal returns are earned in the pre-announcement window, while the 
announcement windows, apart from (0,0) are all significantly positive.  These results 
indicate that a switch-up is perceived as good news in the market and supports the first 
hypothesis that companies switching to a reputable Nomad will experience positive 
abnormal returns as found for auditing in the auditing literature of Dopuch and 
Simunic (1982) and Knechel et al (2007).  However, although the findins in this 
analysis are supported by the standardised t-test, the rank test no not significant for 
any window. 
 
As expected, there are no abnormal returns earned when a lateral switch is made, as 
the switch is not perceived as a positive or negative signal.  In contrast to the market 
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model, which reported that switches to Nomads ranked in the top-5 experienced 
greater positive returns due to concentration in the Nomad ranking, there are no 
abnormal returns earned apart from in the switch-up (0, +20) window.  Although this 
event window may indicate some delayed positive reaction to a switch-up, the results 
are weak as the other event widows are not significant.  The findings in this table also 
provide evidence supporting the seven individual factors in the index as the 
statistically significant event windows are all strongly significant and therefore, 
endorse the use of the factors as well as the use of the aggregated index.  
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Table 5.7  Aggregate Results for Top-15 and Top-5 Nomads 
 AGGREGATE TOP-15 
 SWITCH-UPS LATERAL SWITCHES 
   CAR T-STAT St-test Rank  CAR T-STAT St-test Rank 
         
(-20, -3) -5.17 -3.40*** -2.56*** -0.43 -2.75 1.41 0.36 0.49 
         
(0, 0) -0.10% -0.07 -0.27 -1.00 0.28 0.55 0.41 -0.25 
         
(-1,0) 0.62% 1.14 3.25*** 1.53 0.11 0.15 -0.21 -0.04 
         
(-1, +1) 0.13% 0.19 2.46*** 1.46 0.69 0.82 0.12 -0.09 
         
(-7, +7) -4.01% -0.99 0.19 -0.49 -2.90 -1.12 -0.27 -0.20 
         
(-20, +7) -0.50% -0.34 -1.57* -0.35 -2.68 -1.42* 0.14 -0.06 
         
 
 
AGGREGATE TOP-5 
 SWITCH-UPS LATERAL SWITCHES 
  CAR T-STAT St-test Rank  CAR T-STAT St-test Rank 
(-20, -3) -4.73% -0.95 -1.08 -0.48 -2.92% -0.60 -1.10 0.41 
         
(0, 0) -0.51% -0.41 -0.45 -0.84 0.42% 0.39 0.48 0.38 
         
(-1,0) -0.96% -0.54 -1.44 -0.15 0.84% 0.49 0.11 0.23 
         
(-1, +1) -0.58% -0.27 -1.59 0.18 0.01% 0.00 0.29 0.00 
         
(-7, +7) -3.92% -0.59 -0.24 -0.54 4.11% 0.63 0.33 0.43 
         
(-20, +7) -0.20% -0.04 -0.92 -0.37 -2.24% -0.69 -0.46 -0.48 
The table displays the results for the abnormal returns earned over different event windows for the aggregate ranking of the 
Nomad Reputation Index for Nomads ranked in the top-15 and the top-5.  *, **, ***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  TSTAT is the test statistic, St-test is the standardised test statistic, and Rank is the non-parametric 
rank test. 
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Table 5.8 displays the results for the seven individual variables in the reputation index 
for Nomads ranked in the top-15 and top-5 as well as the lateral switches made.  The 
findings are largely consistent with the findings in the aggregate regression.  Panel A 
displays the results from the switch-up made to Nomads ranked in the top-15.  The 
pre-announcement window (-20, -3) is negative in all seven categories and is 
significantly negative in four.  The three strongest categories are sustained Nomads 
market value and number of clients.  These categories experience significantly positive 
abnormal returns in the post-announcement windows further indicating that a change 
to a more reputable Nomad is a signal of good news.  The two strongest categories 
also indicate that Nomad size is the most important component of Nomad reputation 
which supports the first hypothesis (1a) and confirms the auditing literature of Knechel 
et al (2007) that companies switching up to a big-four auditor experienced positive 
abnormal returns. 
 
 
The category, Reporting Lag, is also used as a proxy for ‘opinion shopping’ as reported 
in the second hypothesis.  DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) state that a company 
might shop around for a more lenient auditor who will be more willing to issue a clean 
audit report.  A similar situation might exist between Nomad switches.  Companies 
might want to shop around to see whether they can appoint a more lenient Nomad who 
might overlook the strict implementation of the AIM rules.  This study uses the 
reporting lag as a proxy for Nomad leniency.  Nomads ranked in the top-15 of Table 
5.8 are the Nomads who are the strictest and therefore will be rigorous in making sure 
the companies they represent announce their final results on a timely basis.  The 
hypothesis asserts that when a switch-up to a strict nomad is made, positive abnormal 
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returns will be earned.  The results show that the two longest preannouncement 
windows, (-20, +7) and (-20, -3) are both significantly negative at 5% indicating that 
these companies were underperforming before the switch to a strict Nomad.  
Consistent with the second hypothesis, both the announcement windows (0) and (0, 
+1) earn positive abnormal returns at the 10% and 5% level.  The findings support the 
theory that the market reacts positively to the employment of stricter Nomad 
companies as they earned positive abnormal returns on the announcement window. 
 
Panels B repeats the above analysis for Nomad’s ranked in the top-5 to assess whether 
the concentration of Nomad reputation is found in the robust analysis.  The findings 
show that the sign (+/-) are the same as the Top-15, but there is not the same level of 
significance observed.  For instance, Net Gainers is the only significant observation in 
the pre-announcement window for switch-ups, whereas there were five before.  
However, there is still strong evidence to support the first hypothesis that Large 
Nomads are associated with positive abnormal returns as the event day windows, (0, 
+1) are significantly positive.  There is also no evidence to support the second 
hypothesis relating to strict Nomads, as these event windows do not produce any 
significant results after the switch is made.  Although the pre-event window (-20, +7) 
both provide significant evidence (at 10% level) that companies switching to a strict 
Nomad were underperforming in the period preceding the switch.   
 
The results, in Panel C, for the lateral move made in the top-15 switches are, as 
expected, weaker than the switch-ups; with only Net Gainers and Reporting Lag 
providing any statistical significance (at 10% level).  These results do show however 
that the results over the event window and (0) are all negative and significantly so in 
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six out of the seven categories.  This indicates that the market reacts negatively to side-
ways switches.  This may be due to the Nomads already being ranked in the top 
category for reputation and, therefore, the absence of any perceived benefits to 
switching to another Nomad of equal ranking.  Investors might even perceive such 
lateral switches as a superfluous and costly initiative as they will not be receiving 
better quality product given the Nomad is of equal ranking.  These findings are 
consistent with the fourth hypothesis that lateral switches are associated with negative 
returns and that when managers use their discretion to make costly and unnecessary 
changes, the market disciplines them by depressing the stock price.  
 
Appendix 5.2 displays the robustness checks for the disaggregated results.  The results 
support the findings above with less significance found across most windows under 
the rank test.  However, all pre-announcement windows are negative.  Market Value 
and Sustained Nomads also report positive abnormal return in the event and (-7, +7) 
event windows for a switch up to a top-15 Nomad.  This supports the hypothesis that 
Nomad size and reputation are important components in the choice of Nomad. 
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Table 5.8  Disaggregated Results from Multiple Regression 
EVENT 
WINDOW 
SUSTAINED NET GAINERS NET LOSERS TOTAL CLIENTS 
CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT 
Panel A:  TOP-15 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -2.27% (-1.01) -2.08% (-2.04)* -1.74% (-0.64) -4.04% (-2.45)** 
(0,0) -0.37% (1.69)* 1.67% (0.57) -1.71% (-0.20) 3.63% (1.72)* 
(-1,0) -0.70% (2.54)** 2.85% (1.87)* -2.82% (-0.80) 1.18% (1.63)* 
(-1,+1) -0.47% (1.86)* 1.63% (0.79) -1.64% (-0.91) 1.50% (2.10)* 
(-7,+7) -0.48% (1.26) -1.82% (-0.32) 2.21% (0.18) -1.47% (-1.04) 
(-20,+7) -2.53% (-0.44) -2.87% (-1.29) -2.66% (-0.97) -2.02% (-2.21)** 
Panel B:  TOP-5 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -1.40% (-0.02) -3.17% (-1.94)* -2.84% (-1.34) -2.24% (-1.17) 
(0,0) -0.30% (-0.02) -0.76% (-0.03) -4.76% (-0.40) 3.26% (0.32) 
(-1,0) -1.70% (-0.06) 1.24% (0.04) 1.94% (0.94) 2.82% (1.59) 
(-1,+1) -1.45% (-0.05) 2.37% (1.26) -0.01% (0.00) 1.96% (0.37) 
(-7,+7) -1.79% (-1.03) -1.74% (-1.45) -1.81% (-0.23) -2.18% (-0.50) 
(-20,+7) -4.46% (-0.05) -3.81% (-1.75)* -1.13% (-1.60) -1.31% (-1.43) 
Panel C:  TOP-15 LATERAL SWITCHES 
(-20,-3) 1.78% (0.82) -1.13% (-0.54) -1.71% (-0.24) -1.07% (-0.29) 
(0,0) -0.40% (-0.75) -1.68% (-0.68) -1.49% (-0.54) -0.46% (-0.86) 
(-1,0) -0.42% (-0.54) -1.47% (-1.82)* 2.06% (1.52) -1.21% (-0.89) 
(-1,+1) -0.80% (-0.85) 1.28% (-1.31) 1.41% (1.02) -1.85% (-1.15) 
(-7,+7) -0.68% (-1.33) -1.70% (-1.33) -0.40% (-0.01) -1.41% (-1.55) 
(-20,+7) 0.15% (0.20) -1.80% (-1.59) -1.44% (-0.50) -2.08% (-1.65)* 
 
EVENT 
WINDOW 
MV CREDIT SCORE REPORTING LAG 
CAR St-test CAR TSTAT CAR TSTAT 
Panel A:  TOP 15 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -5.4% (-3.01)*** -4.23% (-1.74)* -3.88% (-0.59) 
(0,0) 0.32% (0.47) 0.03% (0.05) 0.29% (0.18) 
(-1,0) 0.72% (1.81)** -0.17% (-0.20) -0.16% (-0.07) 
(-1,+1) 0.13% (0.71) 0.37% (0.35) -0.50% (0.18) 
(-7,+7) -4.01% (-0.32) -0.28% (-0.12) -0.71% (0.36) 
(-20,+7) -0.25% (-2.20)** -3.28% (-1.20)* -3.10% (-2.11)* 
Panel B:  TOP 5 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -2.71% (-1.11) -1.99% (-0.26) -2.98% (-0.08) 
(0,0) 0.35% (0.58) 0.11% (0.06) 0.10% (-0.51) 
(-1,0) 0.08% (0.09) -0.36% (-0.13) 0.24% (0.05) 
(-1,+1) 1.13% (1.07) 0.42% (0.13) 0.30% (-0.04) 
(-7,+7) 0.93% (0.39) -0.09% (-0.01) -1.53% (-0.06) 
(-20,+7) -1.63% (-0.51) -2.44% (-0.24) -2.54% (-0.09) 
Panel C:  TOP 15 LATERAL SWITCHES 
(-20,-3) -3.13% (-1.03) -4.02% (-0.66) -2.98% (-0.42) 
(0,0) -0.20% (0.27) -0.66% (-0.72) 0.10% (0.06) 
(-1,0) -0.28% (-0.26) -1.14% (-0.18) 0.24% (0.10) 
(-1,+1) -0.07% (-0.06) -1.13% (-0.27) 0.30% (0.10) 
(-7,+7) -2.79% (-0.94) -1.30% (-0.59) -1.53% (-0.22) 
(-20,+7) -3.75% (-0.95) -2.10% (-0.81) -2.54% (-0.27) 
The table displays the results for the abnormal returns for each of the seven measures of Nomad reputation.  Panel A 
displays the results for the total switch-ups made to Nomads ranked in the top-55 of the individual rankings, Panel B shows 
the results for the lateral switches for the top-15 and panels C and D reports the switch-ups and lateral switches for Nomads 
ranked in the top-5, respectively.  *, **, ***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 5.3 graphically illustrates the CAR earned over the even period (-20, +20) using 
the standardised abnormal returns as this more normally distributed.  The chart clearly 
demonstrates that the companies switching to a stricter Nomad earned positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement date, which continued in the days following 
the announcement.  The chart also highlights that these companies were 
underperforming in the pre-announcement period further showing that the switch to a 
stricter Nomad was perceived as a good signal.  This confirms the second hypothesis 
that companies switching to strict Nomads are received favourably in the market 
because the Nomads will be stricter in their role and ensure that managers adhere to 
the AIM rules and disclose all price sensitive information on a timely basis.  
 
Figure 5.3  Reporting Lag (-20, +20) for Top-15 Switch-Ups 
 
The above figure displays the CAR earned over the event window (-20, +20) for the reporting lag index factor.  
This chart provides evidence for the second hypothesis, which states that companies that switch to stricter Nomads 
will earn positive abnormal returns.   
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5.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter examines whether Nomad reputation is an important factor when 
companies decide to switch their Nomad.  Given that Nomads are the principal 
regulator and adviser to companies listed on AIM, their reputation and ability to carry 
out this function should therefore be an important component behind Nomad choice.  
Looking specifically at Nomad switches, a positive relationship with earning 
performance and switch-ups to a reputable Nomad is expected.  Moreover, a similar 
positive relationship is expected to occur when analysing company performance 
against a switch to ‘strict’ Nomads.  Using auditor-switching literature as inspiration 
for the motives behind Nomad Switching, a Nomad Reputation Index using seven 
measures of reputation has been developed.  This index forms the basis for analysis of 
abnormal returns around the time of a Nomad Switch using both the market model 
(equation 5.1) and an alternative return generating Fama-French-style (equation 5.9).  
This is the first study to analyse Nomad reputation and create a comprehensive, 
aggregate index of all Nomads based on seven reputational measures.  Furthermore, 
this is the first study to examine how the market reacts to hiring a Nomad who is 
perceived to be ‘strict’ or ‘lenient’ using an examination of company reporting lags. 
 
The first part of the analysis examines whether, like the big-4 in auditing literature, 
switches to a large Nomad is related to positive abnormal returns based on the number 
of clients the Nomad represented and the MV of their clients.  In addition, analysis is 
also undertaken to see whether changes out with the top-15 experience negative 
abnormal returns.  The findings from both models provide significant evidence that 
when a company switches to both top-15 and top-5 Nomads is associated with positive 
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abnormal returns, consistent with hypothesis 1a.  The findings also suggest that these 
companies were underperforming prior to the switch as they experience negative 
abnormal returns.  This suggests managers have actively sought to hire a more 
reputable Nomad.  Furthermore, the findings from these two size measures experience 
the most statistically significant observation suggesting that Nomad size is the most 
important variable in determining Nomad reputation. 
 
The second hypothesis considers the effects of switches made to Nomads who are seen 
to be stricter and therefore more closely regulate the companies they represent.  This 
study uses the reporting lag as a proxy for measuring strict Nomads as AIM companies 
have six months in which to publish their final accounts so stricter Nomads should, in 
theory, encourage their clients to publish the accounts as soon as possible within the 
six-month period.  This should benefit investors by reducing agency costs and 
therefore produce a positive market reaction.  Model 2 supports the second hypothesis 
and the parallel auditing theory proposed by DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) that 
positive abnormal returns are earned when there is a switch to a perceived ‘strict’ 
Nomad, as the reporting lag proxy shows positive abnormal returns earned over the 
announcement windows when a switch to a Nomad ranked in the top-15, based on 
their client companies’ reporting lag, is made and these results are significant at the 
5% level. 
 
The final part of the analysis investigates whether switches to a reputable Nomad earn 
positive abnormal returns.  The findings from the market model show that companies 
switching upwards are underperforming before the switch and then earn significant 
positive abnormal returns once the switch is announced.  The results are stronger when 
5-136 
 
the switch is made to a Nomad ranked in the top-5 of each measure as well as the 
aggregate measure.  This suggests that there is an element of concentration within the 
ranking and that the Nomads ranked in the top-5 are seen as the most reputable in the 
market as the results are statistically stronger.  The results from the more robust 
multiple regression also indicate that a company switching to a top-15 Nomad 
significantly underperformed before the switch and then earned positive abnormal 
returns once the announcement was made.  These findings support the findings of 
Knechel et al (2007) and Lin et al (2009) that switching up to a more reputable auditor 
produces positive abnormal return.  This in turn may illustrate a type of managerial 
bonding as managers make the costly decision to provide shareholders with assurances 
regarding their behaviour through greater/more reputable monitoring. 
 
However, there is no evidence to support the Nomad concentration reported in Model 
1, as there were no significant abnormal returns when switches solely to top-5 nomads 
were made.  This may be due to the second model being more robust and therefore 
capturing more firm-specific information about the returns earned within the top-5 
Nomads.  Both model results are consistent when analysing the lateral switches.  This 
is when a switch is made sideways within the top-15 Nomad ranking.  The results 
show that no abnormal returns are earned and in some cases, significantly negative 
abnormal returns are generated upon the announcement of a lateral switch.  This 
reaction might reveal that investors view such switches as unnecessary and costly 
given that there is no perceived benefit to switching to a Nomad of equal rank.  
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Appendix 5.1 
 
Table 5.6b  Non-Parametric Nomad Reputation Index Results 
(Disaggregated) 
 
Sustained 
Net 
Gainers 
Net 
Losers 
Total 
Clients 
MV 
Credit 
Score 
Reporting 
Lag 
Panel A: Total Top-15 Switch ups     
(0,0) 0.11 -0.26 -1.06 0.10 0.09 0.37 -0.35 
(-1,0) 0.03 -0.85 -0.95 -0.60 -0.46 0.30 -1.08 
(-1,+1) 0.08 -0.85 -0.40 -0.55 -0.21 0.38 -0.82 
(-20,-3) -1.00 -0.98 0.02 -2.30 -1.55 -0.79 -2.20** 
(-20,+7) 0.10 0.380 -0.05 -0.62 -0.13 -0.45 -1.08 
(-7,+7) 1.813 1.935 -0.27 1.01 1.13 0.08 0.72 
Panel B: Top-5 Switch-Ups     
(0,0) 0.67 0.59 0.35 0.80 0.09 1.81 1.57* 
(-1,0) 1.00 -0.13 0.59 -0.05 0.46 1.08 0.32 
(-1,+1) 1.31 -0.31 0.67 0.51 -0.21 1.58 0.38 
(-20,-3) 0.90 -1.23 1.23 -0.07 -0.55 0.17 -0.18 
(-20,+7) 2.08** -0.20 1.75* 1.12 0.12 1.116 1.160 
(-7,+7) 2.58*** 0.92 1.76* 2.52** 1.13 1.61* 2.69** 
Panel C: Total Lateral Switches     
(0,0) -0.32 -0.33 0.25 0.09 -0.30 -0.86 -0.32 
(-1,0) -0.14 -0.63 0.53 -0.25 -0.43 -0.65 -0.24 
(-1,+1) -0.00 -0.43 0.06 -0.07 0.97 -0.19 -0.22 
(-20,-3) -0.02 -0.31 0.31 -1.09 0.28 0.68 0.13 
(-20,+7) 0.88 0.87 0.81 0.40 0.74 0.05 0.17 
(-7,+7) 1.45* 1.67** 0.79 1.46 1.32 0.58 1.56 
The table displays the results for the coefficients for the rank test against abnormal returns earned over 
different event windows for each of the seven measures of Nomad reputation.  Panel A displays the results 
for the total switch-ups made to Nomads ranked in the top-15 of the individual rankings, Panel B shows the 
results for the switches ranked in the top-5 and Panel C displays the rank test total lateral switches.  *, **, 
***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 5.2 
 
Table 5.8b  Disaggregated non-parametric stats Results from Multiple Regression 
EVENT 
WINDOW 
SUSTAINED NET GAINERS NET LOSERS TOTAL CLIENTS 
Rank St-test Rank St-test Rank St-test CAR St-test 
Panel A:  TOP-15 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -1.67** (-1.01) -1.73* (-2.13)** -1.25 (-0.64) -1.64* (-2.99)*** 
(0,0) -1.00 (1.69)* 0.72 (1.12) -0.03 (-0.20) 1.20 (1.79)* 
(-1,0) -0.32 (2.54)** 1.37 (1.92)** -0.04 (-0.80) 1.54 (3.47)*** 
(-1,+1) 0.29 (1.86)* 1.00 (1.02) -0.04 (-0.91) 1.48 (2.22)* 
(-7,+7) -1.34 (1.26) -0.04 (-0.43) -0.01 (0.18) 0.23 (-0.36) 
(-20,+7) -2.55** (-0.44) -1.21 (-1.43) -0.38 (-0.97) 1.47 (-2.21)** 
Panel C:  TOP-5 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) 2.40 (-0.10) -1.66* (-2.32)** 1.12 (-1.34) 0.75 (-1.25) 
(0,0) 0.99 (-0.97) 0.00 (-0.07) 0.37 (-0.40) 0.40 (0.52) 
(-1,0) 0.22 (0.08) 0.32 (1.31) 0.39 (0.94) 0.50 (1.81)* 
(-1,+1) -2.28* (-1.61) 0.05 (1.13) 0.02 (0.00) 0.03 (0.53) 
(-7,+7) 2.03** (-1.50) -0.11 (-1.36) 0.04 (-0.23) -0.36 (-0.58) 
(-20,+7) 3.39*** (-1.68) -1.38 (-2.24)** 1.10 (-1.60) -1.38 (-1.73)** 
Panel D: LATERAL SWITCHES 
(-20,-3) 1.96 (0.71) -1.39* (-1.45) -0.16 (-0.91) -0.63 (-0.85) 
(0,0) 0.20 (-2.16)** -0.06 (-0.86) 0.03 (-0.81) -0.06 (-1.17) 
(-1,0) 0.09 (-0.31) -1.02 (-1.84)* 0.96 (1.76) -0.13 (-1.34) 
(-1,+1) -0.18 (-1.84)* -1.01 (-1.75) 0.78 (1.50) -0.11 (-1.29) 
(-7,+7) 1.25 (-1.85)** -0.08 (-1.45) 0.01 (0.00) -0.27 (-1.53)* 
(-20,+7) 2.87** (-1.24) -1.57* (-2.06)** -0.01 (-0.13) -0.33 (-1.75)** 
 
EVENT 
WINDOW 
MV CREDIT SCORE REPORTING LAG 
Rank St-test Rank St-test Rank St-test 
Panel A:  TOP 15 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -0.17 (-3.01)*** -1.80** (-1.87)** -1.65 (-2.09)** 
(0,0) -0.18 (0.47) -0.96 (0.61) -0.99 (1.37)* 
(-1,0) 0.28 (1.81)** -0.20 (1.21) -0.18 (2.22)** 
(-1,+1) 0.99 (0.71) -0.29 (0.63) 0.26 (1.02) 
(-7,+7) -2.61** (-0.32) -1.40 (0.00) -2.49** (-0.84) 
(-20,+7) -1.38 (-2.20)** -2.70** (-1.38)* -1.31 (-2.10)** 
Panel C:  TOP 5 SWITCH-UPS 
(-20,-3) -2.32** (-0.77) 0.57 (-0.72) 0.75 (-1.71) 
(0,0) 0.92 (1.43) 1.23 (-0.54) 0.72 (-0.62) 
(-1,0) 0.26 (2.85)*** 0.21 (0.37) 0.15 (0.14) 
(-1,+1) -0.38 (1.86)* -0.25 (-0.18) -0.09 (-0.87) 
(-7,+7) 2.15** (0.21) 0.57 (-0.49) 0.94 (-1.86)* 
(-20,+7) 3.80*** (-0.64) 0.70 (-1.35) 1.52* (-2.72)** 
Panel D: LATERAL SWITCHES 
(-20,-3) -2.15 (-1.72) 0.66 (0.88) -0.47 (-1.24) 
(0,0) -1.46 (-2.00)** 0.72 (-0.98) -0.84 (-0.69) 
(-1,0) -0.23 (-1.88)* 0.18 (2.88)*** -0.14 (-0.21) 
(-1,+1) 0.35 (-1.39) -0.27 (2.01)** -0.17 (-0.36) 
(-7,+7) -1.77 (-1.00) 0.59 (1.08) -0.19 (-0.95) 
(-20,+7) -3.13 (-1.41) -0.47 (1.76) -0.53 (-1.49) 
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Table of Definitions 
 
Nomads  Nominated Advisers 
AIM    Alternative Investment Market 
Credit Score Measure of the probability of company failure in the year 
following the date of calculation (Qui score downloaded from 
Fame). 
Sustained Nomads Nomads that are retained by the company throughout the four-
year sample period. 
Net Losers Nomads who experience the fewest number of switches away 
from their firm over the sample period. 
Net Gainers Nomads who experience the most switches to their firm over the 
sample period. 
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Chapter 6   Corporate Governance Compliance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Over recent years, the extent and the way in which companies disclose information has 
become increasingly important.  Moreover, there has been a proliferation of studies 
examining the disclosure of corporate governance information as well as governance 
compliance with governing standards (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gompers et al, 2003; Beekes 
and Brown, 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006).  Lev (2000) and Beattie and Pratt (2002) 
report that when companies are faced with growing competition, there is a greater 
demand for information disclosure.  Bukh et al (2004) state that this requirement for 
increased external disclosure is not limited to traditional methods, such as the annual 
report, but also to: “intellectual capital statements, supplementary business reporting and 
prospectuses.”   
 
This chapter draws down on the corporate governance and disclosure literature from 
chapter 2 (section 2.7).  By creating a governance index, an investigation is carried out 
to determine the factors influencing corporate governance compliance on AIM listed 
companies, with specific focus on the effect of regulation.  From analysis, there is strong 
evidence of governance isomorphism, that is, a convergence in compliance over time 
rather than as a reaction to regulation.  This study contributes to extant literature in the 
following ways.  It extends the analysis undertaken be Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) by 
using empirical analysis, and updating the data to include companies that were listed 
after the most recent financial crisis.   
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This is one of the few studies that encompasses how managerial perspectives on 
governance have changed given the latest economic downturn and the subsequent 
increase in awareness and government intervention on governance issues.  Furthermore, 
this is the only study to date to use ordinal regression methodology for examining the 
differences between the factors influencing compliant and non-compliant companies.  
This is a useful technique in determining such differences as the model is non-linear and 
provides a suitable robustness check for the main multiple least squares regression 
analysis. 
 
6.1.1  AIM and Corporate Governance 
 
Although limited, there is a small body of literature pertaining to the quality and extent 
of corporate governance of AIM companies.  Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) study the 
admission documents of the 241 companies to join AIM in the first 18 months of the 
market’s inception, to assess the level of corporate governance disclosure.  To do this 
they use the City Group for Smaller Companies (CISCO) as a benchmark for analysis.  
CISCO is the former name for what is now known as the Quoted Companies Alliance 
(QCA), and has adapted the UK Corporate Governance Code to tailor corporate 
governance practices to best suit smaller listed companies, like many of those listed on 
AIM.  The study uses five measures of corporate governance against which to analyse 
the samples admission documents.  These measures are: board size, number of NEDs on 
board, split role of CEO and chairman, board sub-committees, and corporate governance 
in admission documentation.  Although no statistical testing is undertaken, the main 
findings observe that the close relationship between Nomads and their clients may have 
a lower level of importance than expected on formal governance measures.  They also 
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observe that companies have better quality governance when their Nomad also acts as 
the company’s broker.  Furthermore, companies not raising new capital at admission 
have a significantly weaker corporate governance structure.  The Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(1998) study was the first major study into AIM companies but it was limited to the first 
241 companies that listed.  Given that over 5,000 companies have joined AIM 
(internationally) since its launch, there is an opportunity to update the research into 
corporate governance to see whether compliance has improved over time.  In addition, 
regression analysis is performed to provide more robust evidence on the level of 
compliance which will allow more empirical conclusions to be made, as well as 
establishing whether the findings from Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) still hold under these 
conditions.  Furthermore, given the reliance placed on Nomads to advise on the 
suitability of a company’s corporate governance (as reported by Mallin and Ow-Yong, 
2010), this present study will investigate whether the quality of a supervisee company’s 
corporate governance structure is influenced by the reputation of its Nomad.  This 
analysis will allow us to establish whether Nomads play a corporate governance role for 
the companies they represent by acting as an external monitor as well as, the extent to 
which this role is dependent on the reputation of the Nomad.   
 
As alluded to in chapter 3, another key aspect of AIM is the light approach to regulatory 
enforcement it requires.  AIM is an exchange-regulated market, which allows AIM to 
function differently to other markets as they do not have to follow the EU directives on 
Listing Rules and are not regulated directly by the FCA (Espenlaub et al, 2012).  
Therefore, unlike companies listed on the Main Market, AIM companies are not required 
to follow the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010).  The voluntary nature of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) as applied to AIM companies allows managers who 
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choose to adopt these standards considerable discretion when choosing the extent and 
quality of their corporate governance structure.  It has been argued that this form of self-
regulation is not unsuccessful in encouraging quality corporate governance standards 
(Finch, 1994; Cuervo, 2002; Maassen et al, 2004).  However, it might also be argued 
that AIM is an international market, attracting global clients and participants who will 
have some expectations with regards to governance and monitoring in order to mitigate 
potential agency problems.  Furthermore, if companies want to be competitive within 
AIM, they have to communicate information in the same way as the larger quoted 
companies on the Main Markets.  One approach is to follow the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) as far as practicable. 
 
The QCA, a not-for-profit organisation aiming to represent the interests of SMEs, has 
produced the Corporate Governance Guidelines for Smaller Quoted Companies 
(September 2010) 5 .  These guidelines recommend a level of suitable corporate 
governance disclosure and are specifically designed and adapted for companies listed on 
the AIM while also incorporating the most recent revisions of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010).  The guidelines consist of 12 main principles that represent 
minimum best practices for AIM companies.  They include (but are not limited to): board 
balance and size along with skills and experience of the board; communication with 
investors through investor relations; and corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
However, these guidelines are, yet again, not obligatory.  With no formal requirement to 
follow any published corporate governance code or practices, managers clearly have 
considerable discretion regarding the level and quality of corporate governance 
                                                        
5 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-
andadvisors/aim/publications/documents/corpgov.pdf  
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structures (if any) they choose to employ as well as the extent to which they disclose 
information to investors.  This discretion inevitably raises questions surrounding the 
disclosure quality of AIM companies as well as governance quality, given that managers 
have little incentive to release/comply with costly disclosures/governance practices.  
This can exacerbate the agency problem as the lack of monitoring, normally provided by 
regulation, can lead to managers holding more information than the market, causing 
information asymmetries to occur (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Dey, 2008).  Verrecchia 
(2001) finds that information asymmetry declines as information disclosure increases as 
both managers and investors can make decisions using the same information, reducing 
the uncertainty for investors.  Therefore, the more information managers pass on to the 
market, the lower the information asymmetries are for that company.  Companies should 
therefore consider disclosing corporate governance information comprehensively to 
keep information asymmetry to a minimum.  Taking measures to reduce information 
asymmetry lowers managers’ cost of capital and the information risk borne by investors 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985; Merton, 1987). 
 
However, regulation is not completely absent on the AIM.  Companies must adhere to 
the set of guidelines called the AIM Rules For Companies (May 2014)6.  Failure to 
comply with these rules results in a company’s shares being suspended or even cancelled.  
These rules cover the appropriate behaviour of companies before and after listing.  In 
February 2007, AIM Rule 26 was introduced, although companies had till 20th August 
of that year to comply.  This Rule stated that each AIM company must, from admission, 
maintain an up-to-date website containing the following information: 
                                                        
6 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/rules/aim-rules-for-
companies.pdf  
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Exhibit 6.1  AIM Rule 26 Guidelines 
 A description of its business and, where it is an investing company, its investing strategy. 
 
 The names of its directors and brief biographical details of each, as would normally be 
included in an admission document. 
 A description of the responsibilities of the members of the board of directors and details 
of any committees of the board of directors and their responsibilities. 
 Its country of incorporation and main country of operation. 
 Where the AIM company is not incorporated in the UK, a statement that the rights of 
shareholders may be different from the rights of shareholders in a UK incorporated 
company. 
 Its current constitutional documents (e.g. its articles of association). 
 Details of any other exchanges or trading platforms on which the AIM company has 
applied or agreed to have any of its securities (including its AIM securities) admitted or 
traded. 
 The number of AIM securities in issue (noting any held as treasury shares) and, insofar 
as it is aware, the percentage of AIM securities that is not in public hands together with 
the identity and percentage holdings of its significant shareholders. This information 
should be updated at least every 6 months. 
 Details of any restrictions on the transfer of its AIM securities. 
 Its most recent annual report published pursuant to rule 19 and all half-yearly, quarterly 
or similar reports published since the last annual report pursuant to rule 18. 
 All notifications (made through RNS) the AIM company has made in the past 12 months. 
 Its most recent admission document (may have previously been admitted under another 
name or shares cancelled and then re-listed) together with any circulars or similar 
publications sent to shareholders within the past 12 months. 
 Details of its nominated adviser and other key advisers (as might normally be found in 
an admission document). 
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The most important development arising from AIM Rule 26 is the requirement for up-
to-date corporate governance information to be made accessible to all stakeholders via a 
company website.  Such details include: publication of the company’s admission 
document, features of the board of directors, a biography of specific board members as 
well as details of board committees, and other specifics about majority shareholders.  
Before 2007, there was no such requirement to disclose corporate governance 
information in such a structured and publicly accessible way, although selective data 
may have been available through the annual reports.  Immediately following the adoption 
of this regulation, in September 2007 the LSE investigated all AIM companies to assess 
the level of compliance with its new regulation and, as a result, took action against nine 
companies who were fined a total of £95,000 for various breaches of AIM Rule 267.  
This highlights the growing importance of regulation on AIM given the willingness of 
the LSE to intervene and deter further companies from breaching this new regulation, 
within a relatively short space of time from its adoption. 
 
There is now a greater focus and emphasis on the disclosure of the corporate governance 
issues as highlighted by AIM Rule 26.  This, along with the requirement to publish the 
company’s admission document, creates an opportunity to discover whether companies, 
at inception, intended to adopt comprehensive corporate governance structures before 
this rule was implemented.  It has also been documented by Certo et al (2001) that 
corporate governance items, such as board structure and experience, are integral to the 
success of an IPO.  The study asserts that investors use such governance attributes as an 
                                                        
7 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/aim-notices/aim-29-v-
4.pdf  
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aide in valuing the company; this can as a consequence reduce the level of underpricing 
experienced when listing.   
 
A comparative study of the extent of corporate governance compliance before and after 
the mandatory adoption of AIM Rule 26 will establish whether there is a difference in 
the compliance for companies listed before and after the introduction of the rule.  
Additionally, this study will indicate whether the possibility of information asymmetries 
has reduced in companies listing post-2007, given that disclosure is now mandatory for 
certain corporate governance aspects.  However, if it is found that there is no statistical 
change in the level of compliance, the theory of governance will be explored. 
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6.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses development 
 
The main focus of this second study is to examine how corporate governance compliance 
has changed over time, specifically focussing on how it has changed with the 
implementation of regulation.  However, given the unique nature of AIM companies 
with regard to self-regulation and as a platform for SMEs, analysis will also be conducted 
to test this compliance in relation to size, performance and the influence Nomads have 
on the clients they represent.  This section will discuss these topics in more detail as well 
as develop the associated hypotheses for this study. 
 
6.2.1 Regulation  
 
The seminal papers by La Porta et al (1997); and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) document 
the effects of corporate governance regulation.  These studies have shown that better 
quality regulation can provide: economic development, greater expansion/access to 
capital markets, and investors protected against entrepreneurial expropriation.  One of 
the main concerns surrounding AIM companies is information asymmetry resulting from 
the managerial discretion allowed to managers given the low levels of compulsory 
regulation.  As companies and managers are able to choose the level of their public 
disclosure (unless the information is price-sensitive), it stands to reason that AIM 
managers hold a greater level of firm-specific knowledge than investors, as unnecessary 
and unrequired disclosures are costly.  This, in turn, leads to greater information 
asymmetries.  However, since the application of AIM Rule 26, managers have had to 
abide by stricter corporate governance disclosure rules, providing shareholders with 
more information and lowering information asymmetries.  Therefore, by increasing the 
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level of information disclosure, information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders are reduced (Akhtaruddin, 2009).  Furthermore, with AIM Rule 26 
requiring the public disclosure of corporate governance structures, it may in turn provide 
managers with the impetus to improve governance standards from admission.   
 
The rationale behind this is that if investors view the internal corporate governance 
systems of their company as weak, this is likely to exacerbate the agency problem, and 
possibly deter potential shareholders from investing in the company.  Finally, publishing 
governance information on an up-to-date website, as required by Rule 26, makes the 
company more visible to shareholders and other stakeholders (both individually and 
collectively) providing an effective bonding mechanism as there are more external 
monitors scrutinising the company.  This is consistent with the findings from 
Easterbrook (1984) who states that increasing a company’s visibility reduces agency 
costs through greater monitoring from investors and other external regulators. 
 
The above literature highlights the requirement for small companies, like those quoted 
on AIM, to incorporate effective and appropriate corporate governance mechanisms 
within their company.  Prior to 2007, it was difficult for shareholders and other 
stakeholders to determine how effectively companies were implementing corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Therefore, the agency problems might have been more severe 
given that managers had more opportunity to make decisions that were not in the best 
interests of shareholders.  Additionally, information asymmetries prior to Rule 26 may 
have been more acute given that there was no requirement to disclose corporate 
governance information to shareholders and to do so would have been costly for smaller 
companies.   
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The first hypothesis in this study will test whether companies listing before 2007 
incorporated corporate governance mechanisms in the same way and whether the quality 
of corporate governance changed post-2007.  This will be achieved by comparing the 
level of corporate governance before and after this Rule was implemented.  It would be 
expected that AIM Rule 26 encourages companies to follow better quality practices 
given that this information is now readily accessible and in the public domain.  If the 
quality of corporate governance has significantly increased post-2007, it would also be 
expected that information asymmetries occurring in AIM companies has decreased over 
time. 
 
However, the timing of this regulation has other implications for this study.  August 2007 
saw the real start of the impact of the global economic crisis in the UK, with banks 
refusing to lend to each other and the subsequent collapse of Northern Rock by 
September.  Therefore, the study’s post-regulation sample primarily encompasses 
companies that listed during or just after the recession.  This period witnessed massive 
amounts of unprecedented government intervention; through nationalisation, to banking 
reforms.  In Europe, Basel III was passed to increase the regulation to the banking sector.  
In the UK, the British Government employed a rescue package for its failing financial 
institutions totalling £500 billion in loans and guarantees (Erkens et al, 2012).  Grant 
Kirkpatrick (2009) reports that this economic crisis can be attributed to failures and 
weaknesses in the corporate governance of financial services companies as existing 
structures failed to curb the excessive risks being taken by these institutions.  Given this, 
it might be said that during this time, corporate governance requirements also increased 
as the market required greater transparency and information before considering whether 
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to invest their money in potentially risky and unstable companies.  Furthermore, the 
increase in regulatory intervention made the field of corporate governance more 
important than ever before given the perceived link between company failure and poor 
governance.  This all leads to a possible convergence in governance compliance, as 
companies who require access to the capital market are required to be more transparent.   
 
This idea of isomorphism is detailed in chapter2 (2.7.6) and states that a convergence in 
international regulation, increased competition and changing attitudes to governance 
have lead this convergence in governance compliance (La Porta et al, 2000; Useem and 
Zelleke, 2006).  This may also have affected AIM companies as, even though corporate 
governance is voluntary, market participants may still expect these listed companies to 
report information in the same way as their Main Market counterparts, leading to further 
convergence between AIM companies and the Main Market, in terms of governance 
issues.   
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2010) have constructed a comparative analysis index of 
corporate governance regulatory systems over a 15-year period (1990-2005) for 30 
European countries and the US, to examine the different capital market laws throughout 
these countries and their evolution over time.  The study finds that there has been an 
improvement and convergence over time in regulation to improve corporate 
transparency and to increase investor protection.  It is also noted that common law 
countries and, in particular, countries of English origin, have the highest level of 
shareholder protection.  Therefore, a second extension will be added to this analysis 
where it is hypothesised that corporate governance has increased over time as the general 
6-152 
 
demand for better governance by investors increases alongside a convergence in 
corporate governance practices. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
H1a:  There has been an increase in the level of corporate governance compliance since 
the adoption of AIM Rule 26. 
H1b: There has been an increase in the level of corporate governance compliance, from 
1995-2012, leading to a convergence in standards. 
 
6.2.2 Company Size 
 
AIM was created to attract the listing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by 
offering no barriers to entry and limited regulation.  This implies that corporate 
governance on AIM is different and potentially weaker given the costs involved in 
implementing an appropriate system when compared with the incentives to do so.  The 
Cadbury Report (1995) states that there is a gradual decline in the level of compliance, 
as companies get smaller.  Ragothaman and Gollakota (2009) study the effects of firm 
characteristics on corporate governance in the US and find that firm size is statistically 
significant and concludes that small firms are less well governed.  Da Silva Rosa et al 
(2007) examine small firms in Australia and find similar results; small companies are 
less likely to comply with the corporate governance codes of best practice as they face 
large costs associated with their implementation.   
 
However, in one of the few studies carried out using the AIM market, Parsa and Kouhy 
(2008) find that contrary to the above evidence, small companies act similarly to large 
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companies in respect of social reporting information as a way of maintaining their 
corporate reputation.  To do this, the study uses an indexing approach to check the 
information disclosed against the list of corporate social reporting items from the CSR 
Europe 2003.  They find that SMEs take the same approach as large companies with 
regard to CSR, as they are aware of the benefits of establishing and preserving their 
corporate reputation.  Other existing literature on corporate governance and SMEs shows 
that following corporate governance practices results in improved firm value and 
performance (Borch and Huse, 1993; Johannisson and Huse, 2000).   
 
Mustakallio et al (2002) and Neville (2011) suggest that, given that SMEs are often 
tightly held with regards to ownership, the agency problem is often reduced because 
owners and management are often one and the same.  Although the owner-manager 
effect might reduce the traditional agency costs, AIM is an international market and 
therefore more complicated as the stocks are publicly floated.  This means that if 
companies wish to raise additional capital by listing on AIM, they will have to disclose 
information similar to their competitors in order to attract new investment.  In order for 
SMEs to grow and develop, experienced management is also required (Corbetta and 
Montemerlo, 1999).  SMEs are noted as having fewer internal resources than large listed 
companies, which increases the requirement for competent management (Storey, 1994).  
The role of the board is therefore important to SMEs as it provides advice and expertise 
to management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  It has also been 
noted that concentrated ownership can lead to management avoiding risk-taking 
strategies (Chandler, 1990).  In one of the limited studies into the AIM market, Mallin 
and Ow-Yong (2012) examine the voluntary disclosure of QCA compliance for a sample 
of 300 companies.  The study uses company annual reports to collate the QCA disclosure 
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information and creates a disclosure index, which is used as the basis for analysis.  They 
find that compliance increases with company size, proportion of independent NEDs, and 
within former Main Market listed companies. 
 
The evidence for links between company size and corporate governance structures is 
divided.  Ragothaman and Gollakota (2009) find that smaller companies are less well 
governed while existing literature on AIM indicates that these companies are encouraged 
to disclose information in the same was as their Main Market counterparts (Parsa and 
Kouhy, 2008).  However, AIM research pertaining directly to governance does indicate 
that size is positively related to governance.  Therefore, the second hypothesis will test 
whether the quality of corporate governance by AIM companies is affected by company 
size.  This will be undertaken by testing the disclosure of corporate governance indicators 
against proxies for company size.  It is expected that smaller companies will have lower 
quality corporate governance structures given the associated costs that come with 
implementing corporate governance.   
 
Hypothesis 2: 
H2: company size has a positive relation to corporate governance. 
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6.2.3 The Monitoring Role of Nomads 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, the main regulatory requirement for AIM-listed companies 
is to retain a Nomad.  The Nomad is the principal regulator of the AIM market, a 
responsibility delegated to them by the LSE.  As such, they provide a monitoring and 
advisory role to ensure that companies comply with the AIM rules appropriately and 
comprehensively.  Fan and Wong (2005) argue that management might employ an 
external intermediary with better reputation to provide guarantees to investors that the 
company is credible.  Such assurances as a result reduce existing agency costs.  
Espenlaub et al (2012) investigated the role of Nomads by examining IPO survival rates 
of AIM companies and Nomad reputation.  The study finds that companies who hire a 
reputable Nomad have significantly longer survival rates, on average by two years.  An 
explanation given for this is that Nomads have concerns over their own reputation so 
may be concerned about representing a company they expect to have a short survival 
time.   
 
The findings by Espenlaub et al (2012) document the importance of Nomad reputation 
although this is restricted to company survival rates.  In another AIM study, Mallin and 
Ow-Yong (2010) carry out interviews with managers, shareholders and Nomads to 
discuss the importance of corporate governance on AIM and find that companies depend 
on their Nomad for advice on ensuring a suitable corporate governance structure, while 
Nomads often decide whether to accept a client based on the quality of their corporate 
governance structure.  There is therefore scope to extend research into the role of 
Nomads and their reputation in relation to their influence on their client’s corporate 
governance, as there is relatively little existing literature in this area.  In addition, as long 
as the Nomad can show independence, they may also provide brokering services to their 
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clients.  These dual Nomads are known as NomadBros.  Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) 
analysed the difference between corporate governance indicators and whether a Nomad 
or a NomadBro represented the company.  They find evidence that NomadBro’s are 
associated with better corporate governance across all indicators.  Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2008) suggest the reason for this observed improvement in corporate governance is due 
to reputational risk as a NomadBro has more to lose if the company they represent later 
collapses.  However, when statistically analysed in relation to governance disclosure, 
there is no evidence that this Nomad and broker duality is associated with governance 
quality (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012).   
 
Although there is no literature specifically referring to a Nomad’s governance function, 
it is possible to look at the monitoring role from the external auditor perspective, as in 
the previous chapter.  Hired to carry out two different functions, auditors and Nomads 
have similar monitoring and advisory roles and must both be independent from the 
company’s they represent.  Furthermore, the appointment of a reputable auditor may also 
provide greater assurances on the quality of the governance role undertaken.  The 
auditors’ governance function was first reported in Jensen and Meckling (1979) and this 
states that the agency problem is mitigated if high quality auditors are appointed.  Fan 
and Wong (2005) studied the governance of auditors in East Asian emerging markets 
and find that when companies are subject to agency costs, management is more likely to 
hire a Big-5 auditor.  Similarly, Choi and Wong (2007) assert that in countries with a 
weak legal environment, auditors play a key role in a company’s corporate governance 
structure.   
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The findings from this auditing literature can be extrapolated in order to study the 
monitoring role of Nomads.  The role of Nomads includes an important governance 
function as they can provide investors with assurances that companies are complying 
with the AIM rules, and as a company’s sole regulator, guarantee to reprimand 
companies that do not comply.  Additionally, Nomads might also help mitigate the 
agency conflicts by ensuring that AIM companies follow all the necessary regulation.  
Therefore, the third hypothesis will test whether a company’s corporate governance 
structure, at admission, is superior when being monitored by a reputable Nomad.  The 
primary focus of this analysis is to extend the literature pertaining to the role of Nomads 
by establishing how effectively they function as the primary regulator and external 
monitor of AIM companies.  It would be expected that a more reputable Nomad might 
be more influential in ensuring that their supervisee companies conform fully to 
corporate governance best practices.  Chapter five found robust evidence supporting the 
top-15 Nomads listed aggregate Nomad reputation index as being reputable Nomads.  
Therefore, the top-15 Nomad aggregate index is used to determine Nomad Reputation.  
A second extension is added to this analysis to test the findings in Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2008), that Nomads who also provide brokering services are associated with better 
corporate governance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: 
H3a: Reputable Nomads have a positive relation with the level of corporate 
governance. 
H3b: Joint Nomad and Broker have a positive relation with the level of corporate 
governance. 
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6.2.4 The Admission Document 
 
In order to test the level of disclosure of corporate governance information and whether 
regulation has increased the level of this type of disclosure, the information on each 
company’s admission document will be gathered.  As previously mentioned, a 
company’s prospectus is becoming increasingly important for developing 
communication between companies and outsiders (Bukh et al, 2004).  Moreover, the 
adoption of AIM Rule 26 requires companies to keep an up-to-date website containing 
certain and specific information about the company.  This gives companies the 
opportunity to change and adapt their corporate governance strategies.  However, with 
the requirement to post the admission document, companies are not able to ignore the 
information already contained therein.  As such, there is an opportunity to assess how 
companies intended to comply with existing corporate governance standards, if at all, 
and how this has changed now that this document has to be made public on their website 
once listed.   
 
Beattie (1999) and Cumby and Conrad (2001) have both suggested that a company’s 
prospectus is an indicator of that company’s future reporting standard, as they tend to be 
more future-oriented in their IPO reporting.  Daily et al (2003) similarly report that the 
prospectuses are inclined to be highly accurate because companies are accountable for 
any misleading or inaccurate information.  Bukh et al (2004) has observed that, “the 
prospectus usually contains more information about future expectations regarding 
market developments and earnings, strategic direction and intent, management and 
board composition, etc., compared to the annual report from the same ﬁrm”.  
Furthermore, Mather et al (2000) and Aharony et al (1993) contend that management are 
keen to present the company in the best possible light given the incentives to maximise 
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proceeds from any share issue.  Although, Mather et al (2000) do also state that this can 
lead to earnings management.  Thus, the AIM admission document provides insight into 
the types of information that are selected by a company and its Nomads for presenting 
the company to its potential investors and analysts.  The admission document contains 
information regarding the company’s skills and growth potential as well as the 
company’s financial performance and any risk factors.  There are further benefits to 
transparency and greater disclosure on the admission document; Ang and Brau (2002) 
providing evidence that greater company disclosure before the IPO reduces ﬂotation 
costs.  Similarly, Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) state that, in the pre-IPO period, a 
greater frequency of disclosure is related to lower levels of underpricing. 
 
6.2.5 Summary 
 
The lenient approach to corporate governance regulation on AIM, and the question 
surrounding the related potentially large information asymmetry problem highlights an 
opportunity to investigate how effective the approach to minimal regulation has been.  
There is an opportunity to extend the evidence on the role of Nomads by examining 
whether the level of corporate governance is enhanced when companies hire a reputable 
Nomad.  In addition to the above areas of study it is also proposed to assess the role of 
AIM Rule 26 which was introduced in February 2007 (enforced from 20th August 2007), 
to increase information released to the public by requiring all AIM listed companies to 
keep an up-to-date website that contains information such as RNS news announcements, 
the admission document and director profiles.  Such disclosures, in turn, reduce the 
information asymmetries between a company’s management and shareholders.  This 
regulatory development gives rise to an opportunity to discover how corporate 
governance practices have changed since 2007.  For example, a company intending to 
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create a board of directors that does not split the role of the chair and the CEO may 
reconsider this configuration in order to have a more independent board, given that 
investors will have public access to this information post-2007.  Companies are still able 
to choose the extent of their disclosure as only a minimum level of information is 
necessary with no requirement placed on the amount of detail needed on the website.  
Investors may see companies with very little detail on their website as non-compliant 
and with weak corporate governance.  However, it is also worth noting that even before 
this regulation was implemented, there were still incentives for managers to be fully 
transparent with regard to the admission document, as greater disclosure is associated 
with lower flotation costs and reduced underpricing (Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004). 
 
 
  
6-161 
 
6.3 Explanation of Corporate Governance Measurements  
 
In order to ascertain the level of corporate governance compliance, the corporate 
governance information factors from the admission document of the 387 AIM companies 
are gathered.  These factors not only highlight the extent of corporate governance 
compliance by companies but also how compliance has changed following the 
introduction of AIM Rule 26.  Once gathered, each company is given a score based on 
how they complied with the benchmark/existing guidelines.  From here, an index is 
created to use as the basis for statistical analysis.  In addition to the corporate governance 
measures, the names of each of the samples initial Nomad and Broker will be collected 
to see whether the extent of compliance is related to the perceived reputation of Nomads.  
Nomad reputation will be based on the ranking system created in the previous study.  
More specifically, reputable Nomads are those who score in the top-15 in the aggregate 
ranking system.  The findings from this analysis will indicate whether Nomads play a 
monitoring role that, in turn, improves the quality of their supervisee’s corporate 
governance systems.  
 
The variables used to determine the level of corporate governance compliance are 
categories listed in the most recent publications from the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, the Quoted Companies Alliance: Corporate Governance Guidance for Smaller 
Quoted Companies and the measurements used by Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) as well 
as additional variables supported by the relevant literature.  The information factors 
describing these corporate governance measures are shown in Table 5.1.  The table 
displays the list of 25 measures and indicates if they appear in the Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(1998) study, the QCA guidelines and whether the attributes are supported by the 
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literature.  All 25 of these attributes are considered in this study.  This section extends 
the theory pertaining to governance in chapter 2, to further explain and provide 
supporting evidence for the variables used to create the governance index. 
 
Table 6.1  Measures of Corporate Governance Compliance 
Measures Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(1998) 
QCA 
Guidelines 
Literature 
Total Number of Directors ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of NEDs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Board Independence ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Split Role of CEO and Chair ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Gender Diversity on Board ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Board Experience ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Description of Audit Committee ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Total No. On Audit Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
NEDs on Audit Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Accounting Expert on Audit Committee ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Times per year Audit Committee Meet ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Description of Remuneration Committee ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Total No. on Remuneration Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
NEDs on Remuneration Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Solely NEDs on Remuneration Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Remuneration Policy ✕ ✓ ✕ 
Nomination Committee Description ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Total No. on Nomination Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
NEDs on Nomination Committee ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Big-4 Auditor ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Corporate Governance Statement ✓ ✓ ✕ 
Intention to Follow Combined Code ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Intention to Follow QCA Guidelines ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Percentage shares issued  ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Risk Factors ✕ ✓ ✕ 
The table indicates the variable used in the index to determine the level of corporate governance compliance.  It is constructed using 
the measures found in the Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) study along with further measures found in the QCA guidelines and finally 
additional variables from the literature.   
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6.3.1 Board Composition 
 
Broadly speaking, the role of the board of directors is to give advice and to monitor 
company management and set the strategic direction of the company (Mace, 1971; Demb 
and Neubauer, 1992).  Kaplan and Minton (2006) also find that directors have in 
increasing disciplinary role with an observed upward trend of CEO dismissals.  The role 
of the directors is therefore directly related to the corporate governance of the company 
as they monitor and discipline managers who fail to consider shareholder interests.  
Consequently, the first measure of corporate governance will be the different aspects of 
board composition.  Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (1998) study considers the composition of 
the board of directors in their study of corporate governance and the AIM.  That is, they 
examined the number of directors and non-executive directors (NEDs) and the split role 
of the chair and CEO.  These measurements are consistent with the recommendations of 
the QCA, whose guidelines specifically refer to corporate governance practices for AIM 
companies and state that there should be a minimum of two NEDs and separate chair 
and CEO.  However, the QCA further extends this and states that the board should be 
independent and not dominated by one person or a group of people.  In addition, the 
experience of the board should also be considered.   
 
Board composition is also supported in the literature relating to SMEs (mentioned in 
more detail in chapter 2).  Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) find that NEDs are able to 
challenge strategies and decisions made by the owner-managers who may not be acting 
in the best interests of other stakeholders.  Brunninge et al (2007) also find that 
weaknesses in management strategies can be overcome by employing more NEDs on 
the board.  As well as monitoring management, Keck (1997) and Leonard and Sensiper 
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(1998) find that outside directors have a wide variety of skills and expertise allowing 
them to make more informed strategic decisions.   
 
When considering the extent of corporate governance compliance of AIM companies, 
the measurements proposed by Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) will therefore be extended 
to include the QCA’s recommendation for board experience (using age as a proxy) and 
the more recent literature pertaining to board diversity. 
 
6.3.2 Board Independence 
 
Another aspect of board composition is independence.  This measure is mentioned in 
Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (1998) study as well as the QCA guidelines.  Furthermore, the 
literature supports this variable as Xie et al (2003) find that greater representation from 
independent directors lowers the level of earnings management as well as providing 
additional outside monitoring.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) study the appointment of 
outside directors and wealth effects.  The study concludes that significant positive returns 
are earned when such appointments are made.  Given this, the next independent variable 
will be board independence.  This is considered to be achieved when at least 50% of the 
board are NEDs, taking into account the QCA guidelines that the board should also have 
at least two NEDs.  It should be noted that, from the data collection, NED’s are referred 
to, rather than independent directors, in the AIM admission documents.  Only a handful 
of admission documents consider which NEDs are independent under the UK Corporate 
Governance code provisions regarding whether they have worked for the company or 
hold shares.  Therefore, this study will use the presence of NEDs as a proxy for Board 
Independence as they do not form part of the executive management team and are still 
required under the QCA guidelines.   
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6.3.3 CEO Duality 
 
The next variable concerns the split role between the CEO and chairman of the board.  
Agency theory suggests that agency costs can be mitigated by splitting the role of the 
CEO and chairman (Grove et al, 2011).  This measure is also found in Mallin and Ow-
Yong’s (1998) study as well as the QCA guidelines.  Agency theory predicts that when 
there is CEO duality, the interests of the owners will be sacrificed to a degree in favour 
of management, that is, there will be managerial opportunism and agency costs 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  It has also been reported that CEO duality reduces board 
control as the CEO as chairman has greater power and can limit the control and 
monitoring from the rest of the board (Boyd, 1995).  Boyd (1995) has also reported that 
this duality has also resulted in higher executive compensation while Yermack (1996) 
state that duality leads to lower board independence.  
 
6.3.4 Director Experience/Age 
 
The next document variable is director age.  Grove et al (2011) explains that there are 
mixed findings about this variable and the effects it has on performance.  One argument 
is that older directors may have more experience and knowledge, which, in turn, provides 
greater monitoring of company management and therefore lower agency costs.  
However, Grove et al (2011) also report that older directors may not provide such 
monitoring as they lack energy and appropriate incentives to do so which then increases 
agency costs.  This last point is corroborated by Core et al (1999) who conclude that 
governance is weaker when a higher proportion of outside directors are over 70 years 
old.  The empirical findings from the Grove (2011) study reveals that director age 
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follows a u-shape curve and that while older directors are associated with better 
performance, this benefit diminishes as director age goes past a certain point.   
 
For this study, director age will represent a proxy for board experience, as the above 
literature explained that older directors have more knowledge and expertise to effectively 
monitor managers.  The variable for board experience is also required under the QCA 
guidelines.   
 
6.3.5 Gender Diversity 
 
More recent literature has expanded the theory of board composition to consider the 
gender roles of the board of directors.  There is a view that considering there are so few 
women executives employed as NEDs compared with their male counterparts, female 
NEDs might better represent the concept of independent directors (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009).  In addition to this, Adams and Ferreira (2009) also document that females are 
more likely to join other monitoring committees (such as, the audit and remuneration 
committees) and have better attendance records than their male counterparts.  Dunn 
(2010) studies the appointment of female directors to the board and finds that women 
who are appointed to all-male boards have greater expertise within that company or have 
financial/legal knowledge that is required by the board.  Brammer et al (2009) studies 
corporate reputation and the role of gender, and find that the presence of women on the 
board is industry specific and is only positive when the industry operates close to final 
consumers.   
 
The literature regarding women on the boards in becoming wider but is still developing 
with regards to how females impact from a corporate governance perspective.  However, 
6-167 
 
the extant literature does suggest that females on the board do play a corporate 
governance role such as providing a monitoring role by more frequently sitting on board 
committees and providing greater expertise to the board itself.  There is no gender 
requirement within the QCA guidelines. 
 
This will be the first study to consider gender diversity in relation to governance 
compliance.   
 
6.3.6 Audit Committee 
 
A further measure of corporate governance, considered by Mallin and Ow-Yong’s 
(1998) study is the presence of audit and remuneration committees.  These requirements 
are consistent with the QCA’s guidelines although the QCA extends this condition by 
stating that companies should also include a remuneration policy (although this variable 
has been dropped from this study due to all companies in sample providing this 
information).  There is extensive support for these measures in the literature.  The audit 
committee is considered first.  The audit committee’s main responsibility is to oversee 
and monitor the financial reporting process, ensuring transparency by mediating between 
the external auditor, the internal auditors, managers, and directors (Saibaba and Ansari, 
2011; Puri et al, 2010).  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) assert that the presence of audit 
committees is associated with effective corporate governance.  Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1993) and DeZoort (1998) also suggest that members of the audit committee should be 
independent and that at least one member should have accounting management expertise.   
 
The frequency of audit committee meetings should also be considered.  Menon and 
Williams (1994) theorise that committees that meet more frequently are better able to 
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monitor the quality of information that is communicated to stakeholders.  With regards 
to SMEs, Kang et al (2011) studies the audit committee for SMEs in Australia.  The 
findings are consistent with previous literature: the most significant aspects of the audit 
are independence, committee expertise and the frequency of committee meetings.   
 
This study will therefore consider the presence and features of the audit committee when 
examining the corporate governance compliance of AIM companies.  It will be necessary 
to determine the presence of this committee, its size (at least two members for QCA 
compliance), whether it is independent, if an accounting expert is appointed, and how 
often it meets.   
 
6.3.7 The Remuneration Committee 
 
The management of remuneration is also a measure of corporate governance and its 
inclusion is also required under the QCA guidelines.  The remuneration committee is a 
subgroup of the main board of directors charged with the responsibility of determining 
the pay of the companies’ top managers (Conyon and Peck, 1998).  The presence of this 
committee is a strong corporate governance mechanism as without it, executives would 
be able to award themselves inflated salaries that are not in line with shareholders’ 
interests (Vafeas, 2003).  This committee should, ideally, be made up of NEDs as any 
executives on the board would be deciding their own pay.  However, UK evidence 
suggests that this is not the case.  Main and Johnston (1993) concluded that in two fifths 
of cases, directors were appointed to their own remuneration committee.  However, 
Evans and Evans (2002) found that having more NEDs on the remuneration committee 
did not have a significant effect on CEO compensation.   
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For this study, therefore, the inclusion of the remuneration committee as a corporate 
governance measure will be based on the QCA prerequisite that the committee has at 
least two members and consists solely of NEDs. 
 
6.3.8 The Nomination Committee 
 
The final, less familiar committee, is the nomination committee.  Although not expressly 
required under the QCA guidelines or measured in Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (1998) study, 
the existence of a nomination committee plays an importance governance role for 
companies.  This committee plays a central role in overseeing matters of corporate 
governance for the board by considering the size, structure and composition of the board, 
and the retirement and appointment of directors.  It is also charged with developing the 
quality of nominees to the board and ensuring the integrity of the nominating process 
(Watson, 2004).  In addition, a nomination committee is required under the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and should contain a majority of independent non-
executive directors.  Kanagaretnam et al (2007) state that the nomination committee 
enhances the monitoring effectiveness of the board.   
 
Given the recent focus on board composition and diversity, the role of a 
nominating/corporate governance committee has become a more popular feature within 
a company’s governance structure.  Furthermore, Brown (2002) finds that the adoption 
of a nomination committee is related to greater stakeholder involvement in governance 
issues.  Ruigrok et al (2006) studies the determinants and effects of the nomination 
committee.  They find that the existence of the nominations committee is associated with 
a higher number of independent directors and foreign directors but not gender diversity.  
The study also states that CEOs who also serve as Chairmen (CEO duality) are less likely 
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to favour a nomination committee as it could reduce their influence on the selection of 
board members and promote changes in company policy.  Similarly, Chapple et al (2013) 
find that CEO duality reduces the effectiveness of the nomination committee.   
 
For analysis purposes, this variable is treated in the same way as the other two board 
sub-committee variables.  Therefore, measures of compliance include: the presence of 
the committee, the boards having at least two members, and consisting solely of NEDs. 
 
6.3.9 Corporate Governance Policy Statement 
 
The final measure of corporate governance is the presence of a corporate governance 
policy statement.  This statement will identify a company’s intentions to comply with 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and/or the QCA guidelines.  The statement also 
explains the roles of the board and the various committees alongside how they intend to 
implement these corporate governance mechanisms appropriately.  This measure is used 
in Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (1998) paper and is also present in the QCA guidelines as a 
practice that should be implemented in all AIM companies.  In addition to the intention 
to follow the corporate governance code, the disclosure of the intention to follow the 
QCA guidelines will also be analysed.  Although the QCA guidelines are tailor-made for 
AIM companies, they are less onerous than the UK Corporate Governance Code.  As 
this section is just noting the intention of companies to follow the corporate governance 
code or the QCA guidelines, these variables are both binary.   
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6.3.10 Control and External Variables  
 
As well as the governance indicators mentioned above, this study also incorporates three 
other indirect or external governance measures that are considered important factors 
when examining a company’s governance structure.  These measures are the role of 
Nomads, the percentage of shares issued and whether a Big-4 auditor represents the 
company.  The role of Nomads has already been discussed in the literature chapter, but 
background and support for the remaining measures are discussed below.  
 
5.3.11 Percentage of Shares Issued 
 
Ownership structure is another important factor when analysing corporate governance.  
If a company is only issuing a small percentage of total shares to the market, this 
indicates that there are still a large proportion of the shares privately held, or large 
blockholder ownership.  In this instance, the blockholders have concentrated control of 
the company and are led by their own incentives/gain rather than what might be best for 
the company (Connelly et al, 2010).  Holderness (2003) also reports that large 
blockholders typically serve on the board of directors.  This raises concerns regarding 
the agency problem, as there will be little motivation for a company to maintain high 
quality corporate governance structures unless it is in the best interests of the 
blockholders.  It has already been noted by Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) that companies 
raising capital during AIM listings have better quality governance.  Therefore, it might 
be said that companies who offer a larger percentage of shares to the market are 
relinquishing control from blockholders, or just raising new capital for investment.  
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However, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) found no evidence that ownership structure 
influences the level of disclosure of governance attributes.   
 
This study will incorporate the percentage of shares being placed as a measure of 
governance within the index.  
 
6.3.12 Companies Represented by a Big-4 Auditor 
 
Another indirect and outside governance variable is Big-4 auditor.  That is, companies 
who retain one of the Big-4 auditors are associated with better corporate governance.  
Mitton (2002) studies the impact corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis.  
He reports that a company may have higher disclosure quality if its auditor is one of the 
Big-6.  This is supported by Michaely and Shaw (1995); and Dye (1993) who document 
that these Big-6 ﬁrms encourage increased transparency and eliminate mistakes in a 
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements in order to protect their reputation and reduce their legal 
liability if mistakes are found.  Therefore, given this, it would be expected that retaining 
a Big-4 auditor is associated with better corporate governance.  If companies, post-2007, 
became concerned about the shareholder perception of their corporate governance 
structure, given this information now has to be documented on the company website, it 
might be expected that there will be a greater frequency of Big-4 auditors observed in 
the post period compared to pre-2007.  
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6.4 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample consists of a stratified sample of 200 companies from the original 475 
companies used in the first project.  Given that this sample only contains AIM companies 
admitted up to August 2007, and a before and after comparison of AIM Rule 26 is 
required, a random sample of 200 post-August 2007 admissions is added, providing a 
final sample of 400 companies.  Only companies with an original admission document 
were used in order to omit any that may have re-listed.  Therefore, all companies in the 
sample appear once.  All financial entities were omitted8 as well as companies with a 
market cap below £5m9.  However, due to subsequent cancellations/delistings, the final 
sample consists of 190 pre and 197 post- AIM Rule 26 adoption companies, making a 
combined sample size of 387 companies.  Table 5.2 displays the distribution of the 
sample companies over the years they were admitted.  The final column demonstrates 
the number of companies admitted as a percentage of AIM companies still trading on 
AIM (as at November 2014) 10 .  The sample represents an average of 41.48% of 
admission per year (against companies that are still live).  It is also worth noting that the 
total number of admissions fell sharply in 2007 from 338 (in 2006) to 197 and has 
continued to fall since, with another substantial dip in listings in 2009.  This corresponds 
with the previous observation that this sample may be affected by the UK economic 
crisis which started in 2007.   
 
                                                        
8 Financial companies are subject to different disclosure regulations. 
9 This is to avoid the potential problem of thin trading as this data is used in the third project where daily stock 
market data is analysed. 
10 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/documents/documents.htm  
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Finally, as this sample originally only included companies that were still trading (dead 
companies do not have websites to access the admission document), the data may also 
be subject to survivorship bias.  Therefore, analysis can only be undertaken for 
companies that may already have superior governance to those that have failed, as well 
as those that have managed to survive the financial crisis.  However, since the data was 
collected, 35 companies have been cancelled and these companies remain in the sample 
for analysis, using a proxy called live/dead.  This will highlight whether cancelled 
companies have weaker governance although the sample of dead companies may be too 
small for robust analysis. 
 
Table 6.2  AIM Admission Sample 
Year Observations per 
year 
Total AIM 
Admissions 
Admission still 
live 
Obs/Live 
Companies 
1995 3 120 9 33.33% 
1996 4 131 13 30.77% 
1997 3 100 8 37.50% 
1998 2 68 9 22.22% 
1999 4 96 10 40.00% 
2000 13 265 33 39.39% 
2001 15 162 33 45.45% 
2002 10 147 38 26.32% 
2003 10 146 27 37.04% 
2004 32 294 85 37.65% 
2005 42 399 146 28.77% 
2006 48 338 138 34.78% 
2007 45 197 106 42.45% 
2008 33 87 51 64.71% 
2009 15 30 18 83.33% 
2010 52 76 79 65.82% 
2011 38 67 71 53.52% 
2012 18 47 59 30.51% 
Total 387 2770 933 41.48% 
The table displays the number of admissions over each year in the sample period. The second column shows the total 
number of admissions to AIM, while the third indicates how many of these companies are still trading.  The fourth 
column provides the per year representation of AIM admissions as a percentage of total companies admitted in that 
year that are still live. 
 
 
The combined results (before & after 2007) from the data collection are shown in Table 
5.3.  One important point to note is that the data collection procedure highlighted that 
6-175 
 
AIM admission documents tend to follow a generic format.  Given this, three of the 
variables are dropped as they appeared in every admission document making analysis of 
these variables ineffective.  The dropped variables are: Remuneration Policy, Corporate 
Governance Statement, and Risk Factors.  Although the corporate governance variable 
has been dropped, the information contained in this section of the admission document 
is used in other variables.  There are also two types of data amongst these variables, 
binary and numeric.  Where the descriptive statistics measurements are blank (-), the 
variable is binary.  Also worth noting are the missing variables.  In regard to how many 
times a year the audit committee meets, over half the observations (51%) are missing.  
In addition, in 71.5% of cases, there is no reported nomination committee (shown in NO 
column rather than missing).  This is likely due to the nomination committee being a 
more recently developed attribute of board structures.  The next section provides a more 
detailed explanation behind the variables used to create the corporate governance score 
and corresponding indexes.  
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Table 6.3  Descriptive Statistics from Data Collection 
 Average Median Min Max SD Kurtosis NO (0) YES (1) Observations Missing data 
 Panel A: Data Collection Statistics 
Before(0)/after(1) - - - - 0.501 -2.008 198 189 387 0     0% 
Big-4 Auditor - - - - 0.466 -1.376 264 122 386 1     0% 
Total Number of Directors 3.564 5 2 10 1.377 -0.077 - - 387 0     0% 
Number of NEDs 2.651 2 0 7 1.202 0.675 - - 387 0     0% 
Board Independence - - - - 0.491 -1.852 156 231 387 0     0% 
CEO Duality - - - - 0.315 4.194 43 344 387 0     0% 
Gender Diversity - - - - 0.471 6.013 317 61 387 0     0% 
Average Age of Board 50.488 51 34 65 5.424 -0.023 - - 375 12    3% 
Audit Committee Description - - - - 0.268 8.104 30 357 387 0      0% 
Audit Committee Total 2.470 2 0 5 0.715 1.732 - - 345 42   11% 
Audit Committee NEDs 2.201 2 0 5 0.810 0.804 - - 344 43   11% 
Present Accounting Expert - - - - 0.431 -0.595 85 261 346 41   11% 
How Many Times Board Meets 2.148 2 0 4 0.699 1.916 - - 189 198   51% 
Remuneration Committee Description - - - - 0.301 5.116 39 348 387 0     0% 
Remuneration Committee Total 2.476 2 0 5 0.693 1.671 - - 340 47   12% 
Remuneration Committee NEDs 2.241 2 0 5 0.813 0.867 - - 340 47   12% 
Solely NEDs on Remuneration Comm - - - - 0.421 -0.331 78 262 340 47   12% 
Nomination Committee Description - - - - 0.452 -1.091 276 111 386 0     0% 
Nomination Committee Total 2.793 3 0 7 1.137 2.769 - - 111 276   71% 
Nomination Committee NEDs 2.349 2 0 4 0.817 0.846 - - 106 281   73% 
Combined Code - - - - 0.358 1.884 57 323 380 7    2% 
QCA Guidelines - - - - 0.471 -1.480 254 125 379 8    2% 
% Issue 37.68% 32.77% 1.75% 100% 0.229 -0.353 - - 283 104   27% 
Top -15 Nomad - - - - 0.390 0.627 315 72 387 0     0% 
Dual Nomad and Broker - - - - 0.405 0.115 80 307 387 0     0% 
 Panel B: Index Scores Distribution 
Score 12.79 13 2 22 3.595 0.159 - - 387 0     0% 
Index Score 2.63 3 1 4 0.870 -0.643 - - 387 0     0% 
Score less Nomad  11.81 12 2 20 3.458 0.097 - - 387 0    0% 
Index Score less 2.58 3 1 4 0.858 -0.600 - - 387 0    0% 
The table displays the descriptive statistics for data collection process.  Panel B provides the stats for the governance score and the indexes. Nomad attributes are omitted in order 
to analyse the impact of Nomad reputation. 
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To ascertain whether there has been an improvement in corporate governance since the 
adoption of AIM Rule 26: a before and after comparison is carried out.  To do this, an 
indexing method is used by checking items disclosed in each of the sample firm’s 
admission document against a list of information items.  The use of the admission 
statement is similar to the method used in the Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (1998) report on 
corporate governance, although extended by the use of statistical analysis.  A score is 
given depending on whether the item is included in the admission document.   
 
This method has been used in many studies relating to company disclosures such as, 
Wallace and Naser (1995); Owusu Ansah (1998); Gompers et al (2003); Brown and 
Caylor (2006); and Parsa and Kouhy (2008).  Owusu Ansah (1998) also states that one 
of the main advantages of this method is that indexing provides the ability to rank 
companies in terms of disclosure scores.  This will allow consideration of whether AIM 
companies listed after 2007 scored higher in terms of corporate governance than 
companies listed prior to that year.  Wallace and Cooke (1990) identified that this 
method allows indexing scores to be statistically tested thus allowing this study to use 
more in-depth statistical analysis, making the results more robust.   
 
With the data collected, each company is given a score for each of the variables when 
that variable meets the minimum requirement set out in the QCA guidelines and other 
benchmarks set out in the Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) paper and the literature or the 
Combined Code.  A combination of both guidelines is used as companies can 
voluntarily state to follow either code.  As presented in Table 5.3, 323 companies 
disclosed the intention to follow the combined code in comparison with 125 that chose 
to adopt the QCA, which is specifically tailored for AIM companies.  Exhibit 6.2 
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provides the detail of the scoring system for governance compliance.  As there are no 
listing rules on AIM, other than the requirement to retain a Nomad, the Main Market 
requirement of 25% share issue is used.  If the company meets the minimum 
requirement they score one, if they did not, then they score zero.   
 
These variables along with the other binary variables described in Table 6.3 provide a 
maximum score of 23 (Exhibit 6.2).  It is also worth noting that the index, as with 
Brown and Caylor (2006); and Gompers et al (2003), is equally weighted.  This 
dichotomous weighting method may limit the index’s ability to capture the relative 
significance of the individual CG provisions (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al, 
2004; Barako et al, 2006).  However, there is currently no robust theoretical framework 
regarding weights applied to different CG provisions, therefore an un-weighted 
approach avoids a bias towards a particular corporate governance provision (Marston 
and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  Furthermore, previous 
studies indicate that the use of weighted and un-weighted indices produce similar 
results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Barako et al, 2006).  
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Exhibit 6.2  Corporate Governance Scoring System 
CGI Benchmark 
 
At least four directors, less than 9 
 
Minimum of two NEDs on Board 
 
Board Independence (proportionally more NEDs appointed) 
 
Split Role of CEO and Chair 
 
Board Experience (Using median age across sample) 
 
Gender Diversity (at least one female appointment) 
 
Presence of Audit Committee 
 
>2 Directors on audit committee  
 
Solely NEDs on Audit Committee 
 
Accounting Expertise on Audit Committee 
 
State frequency of meetings (1,0) 
 
Presence of Remuneration Committee 
 
>2 Directors on remuneration committee  
 
Solely NEDs on Remuneration Committee 
 
Presence of Nomination Committee 
 
>2 Directors on Nomination committee  
 
Solely NEDs on Nomination Committee 
 
Represented by Big-4 Auditor 
 
Top-15 Nomad 
 
Dual Nomad 
 
State intention to Follow Combined Code 
 
State Intention to Follow QCA guidelines 
 
Min 25% share issue 
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In order to test the relation between Nomad reputation and Nomad duality, these 
variables are removed from the Total Score to create the measure Score Less Nomad.  
This measure has a maximum score of 21.  As the scores are a continuous variable, 
these two variables (Score & Score Less Nomad) will be used to undertake Least 
Squares regression analysis.  In addition, two further indices are created, based on the 
two variables mentioned above.  The indexes range from 1-4, where 1 represents low 
corporate governance compliance and 4 represents good levels of compliance.  Theses 
indices are titled: Index Score and Index Score Less Nomad.  Panel B of Table 6.3 also 
provides the distribution of the scores for all four indices.  Considering the continuous 
score/ (score less Nomad) first, out of a possible score of 23(21), the highest score is 
22(20) and the lowest is 2 for both measures.  The kurtosis for both these scores are 
low but for robustness additional analysis is undertaken to test for skewness.  The 
results are presented in the Table 6.4 below.  There is no statistical evidence of 
skewness or kurtoses, so it can be taken that the dependent variables used for Least 
Squares analysis are normally distributed11. 
 
Table 6.4  Tests for Normal Distribution 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Adj chi2 Prob>chi2 
Score 387 0.1536 0.4693 2.57 0.2767 
Score less Nomad 387 0.0974 0.6199 3.00 0.2228 
Table provides output from the test for skewness and kurtosis.  The null for skewness and kurtosis is that the variable 
is normally distributed.  In both dependent variables, the null that variables are normally distributed cannot be 
rejected, at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 Additional charts are provided in Appendix 5.1 to corroborate the normality of the dependent variables. 
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In relation to the remaining two ranking indices, the highest score is 4 and the lowest 
is 1.  Exhibit 6.3 shows how the continuous score index corresponds to each level in 
the level in the index.  The scores in brackets represent the Score Less Nomad variable.  
It should also be noted that there are a smaller number of scores represented in sections 
2 and 3 of the ranking indices.  However, as ordinal regression analysis will be used, 
there is no detrimental impact on analysis, as this method avoids the assumption that 
the distance between categories is equal (Long and Freese, 2006).  With this, there are 
now four different measures of corporate governance compliance, the raw scores and 
their corresponding index.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the distribution of scores for the two 
continuous variables.  They are also split to show how the scores differ before and after 
the adoption of AIM Rule 26.  The figure illustrates that the score after the regulation 
is introduced is higher than before.  Furthermore, the ‘before’ variables peak scores are 
lower than those achieved by the ‘after’ variables.  
 
Exhibit 6.3  Index Scores Determination 
Score can range from 0-23 but highest observed score is 21 (Score less Nomad) 
 
Index: 
                Index Score       Index Score Less Nomad 
1     <8                             (<7) 
2     9-12                          (8-11) 
3    13-16                         (12-15) 
4     >17-                          (>16) 
 
Exhibit describes how the scores are distributed among the ranking indices.  Index Score Less Nomad remove the 
Nomad reputation index so they can be analysed separately.  1 represents the lowest compliance level and 4 the 
highest level of compliance.   
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Figure 6.1  Distribution of Corporate Governance Scores 
 
Figure illustrates the distribution of the corporate governance scores and indices.  They are separated into before 
and after to observe any changes in the score that might have been brought about by AIM Rule 26.  Figure shows 
that scores produced after the regulation are higher than those achieved beforehand. 
 
 
6.4.1  Control Variables 
 
As indicated in the previous section, firm-specific controls are required.  These include 
time controls, size controls, performance controls and whether the company is still 
trading or cancelled (live/dead).  These form the independent variables for the 
regression analysis.  The size controls are and Log market cap and are determined at 
listing point.  The performance measures are based on operating performance (and 
return-on-assets (ROA)), and on company valuation (Tobin’s Q, log Book-to-market).  
With regards to Tobin’s Q, Gompers et al (2003); Bebchuk and Cohen (2004); and 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) find that firms with stronger shareholder rights 
have higher Tobin Q’s, indicating that better-governed firms are more valuable.  In this 
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study Tobin’s Q is calculated by Tobin’s Q = (Equity Market value + liabilities market 
value) / (equity book value + liabilities book value) 
Datastream code = ((WC08001) + (WC03351)) / ((WC03501) + (WC03351).  The 
performance measures are all winsorized at the 1% level (top and bottom) to control 
for spurious outliers (Brown and Caylor, 2006).  Furthermore, these variables are also 
industry mean adjusted using industry sectors for all AIM UK companies12.   
 
Table 6.5 displays the results from the Pearson correlation analysis with the two 
continuous governance score variables and the independent variables13.  The first panel 
displays the correlation for the independent variables.  Given there is strong statistical 
significance (at 1%) in some of the variables and there is more than one variable 
representing size and profitability, it is also necessary to check for multicollinearity.  
The coefficients themselves aren’t at a level that would indicate multicollinearity.  
Furthermore, for robustness, regressions were undertaken using these control variables 
to analyse the r2 for possible multicollinearity.  There was no evidence to suggest this 
was an issue and therefore, the variables are appropriate and used without further 
manipulation.  However, the variables market cap, total assets, and book-to-market 
have been transformed using their logs/natural logs (to improve linearity), and are now 
named log market cap, log assets and Ln b/m, respectively. 
 
Panel B displays the results for the corporate governance scores against the 
independent variables.  The table shows significant positive correlation between both 
score variables and the before/after dummy.  This indicates that corporate governance 
                                                        
12 Details of ratios with corresponding DataStream codes can be found in appendix 6.2 
13 Details of variable names can be found in Appendix 6.3. 
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increased after 2007 when AIM Rule 26 was introduced.  Similarly, the year dummy 
also indicates that corporate governance improves over the sample period (1995-2013).  
The score index also shows a positive relation between the Nomad variables and 
corporate governance, suggesting that a more reputable Nomad represents better 
quality companies or possibly provides more effective monitoring services that 
encourage their companies to adopt more comprehensive governance policies.  
However, none of the performance measures are significant.  With regard to the size 
controls, there is a positive correlation between score and the log assets variable, which 
supports the second hypothesis that larger companies have better quality corporate 
governance.  Panel B also reports the descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables.   
 
For robustness, Panel C shows the association between each of the corporate 
governance variables and the independent control variables.  There is positive 
significance across 12 of the 23 variables for the before/after dummy.  This indicates 
that companies had better governance after 2007.  There is also positive significant 
evidence across the size variables (log assets and log market cap), which provides 
evidence for the second hypothesis that larger companies are associated with better 
governance.  There is little evidence supporting the fourth hypothesis that governance 
is associated with better performance as shown in the sales growth, ROE and ROA 
variables.  The results for the valuation variable, Tobin’s Q, are also mixed and often 
negative, suggesting better governance is related to poor performance.  
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Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 Market cap  Tobin’s Q  ROA   Ln b/m 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix for independent Variables    
Tobin’s Q 0.0864*    -0.285***  -0.368*** 
ROA  0.141***  -0.285***    0.124** 
Ln b/m 0.0207  -0.368***  0.124**   
Log Market cap   0.0864*  0.141***  0.0207 
        
Panel B: Pearson Correlation between Independent Variables and Governance Index Scores  
Controls Score less 
Nomad 
Score Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max N 
Before/after 
dummy 
0.226*** 0.236*** .501 .50 0 1 387 
Year  0.305*** 0.315*** 12.49 3.694 1 19 387 
Live/dead 0.00397 0.00341 0.909 .2872 0 1 387 
Log Market cap 0.00543 0.00633 9.905 1.346 101.13 1979395 384 
Tobin’s Q -0.00658 0.0100 1.285 4.529 -2.344 32.498 385 
ROA -0.0329 -0.0363 -.1497 0.487 -3.06 .473 386 
Ln b/m -0.0450 -0.0353 5.560 2.591 -6.495 8.699 387 
Top 15 Nomad 0.215***  0.186 .389 0 1 387 
Dual Nomad 0.252***  0.793 .405 0 1 387 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations between Independent Variables and All 23 Governance Measures 
 Before after 
dummy 
 
Year 
Live dead 
Log Market 
cap 
Tobin’s Q   Roa   Ln b/m 
Big 4 auditor 0.055 0.0102 0.001 0.099* 0.033   0.032  0.002 
Total number of directors -0.051 -0.0209 0.069 -0.009 -0.072   0.031  0.019 
Min 2 NEDs -0.016 0.0488 -0.039 0.041 -0.105**   0.008  -0.005 
Board independence 0.199*** 0.241*** -0.037 -0.022 0.013   -0.018  -0.093* 
CEO duality 0.130** 0.150*** -0.026 -0.050 -0.057   -0.047  0.022 
Women on board 0.0452 0.0281 -0.109** 0.034 -0.011   0.033  0.060 
Age 50 0.131** 0.193*** 0.056 0.024 -0.029   -0.027  0.120** 
Audit committee  0.044 0.136*** 0.010 -0.026 -0.061   -0.004  0.062 
Audit committee >2 0.081 
0.0487 
0.014 -0.013 0.065   -0.031  
-
0.223*** 
Solely NEDs on audit -0.034 0.0151 -0.037 0.059 -0.021   -0.005  0.040 
Present accounting expert 0.073 0.0377 -0.057 0.091* -0.049   0.103*  0.025 
Frequency of meeting  0.081 0.144*** 0.053 -0.004 0.018   -0.031  -0.049 
Remuneration comm >2  0.032 0.138*** 0.044 -0.098* -0.130**   -0.009  0.127** 
Remuneration total 0.118** 
0.0838* 
0.015 -0.046 0.029   -0.055  
-
0.158*** 
Solely NEDs on 
remunerat’n 
-0.033 0.0561 -0.043 0.128** -0.073   -0.003  0.004 
Nomination committee 0.183*** 0.0561 -0.041 0.093* 0.043   0.007  -0.051 
Nomination >2 0.170*** 0.184*** 0.037 0.026 0.052   -0.022  -0.096* 
Solely NEDs 0.145*** 0.135*** -0.029 0.071 0.050   0.012  0.031 
Combined code -0.136*** -0.0581 0.023 -0.007 -0.023   0.040  0.019 
QCA 0.479*** 0.470*** 0.024 0.097* 0.095*   -0.046  -0.057 
% Issued shares 0.0911* 0.157*** 0.071 0.026 -0.091*   -0.048  0.054 
Top 5 Nomad 0.102** 
-0.0946 
0.012 -0.040 -0.022   -0.013  
-
0.160*** 
Dual Nomad 0.086* 0.103** -0.005 0.025 -0.090*   0.043  0.051 
Table displays correlations for corporate governance scores and independent variables along with descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables.  Panel A provides Pearson correlations for the independent variables; Panel B displays the correlation between independent 
variables and the corporate governance scores as well as the descriptive statistics; and Panel C provides the correlation for the individual 
attributes that feature in the index against the independent variables. Significance at (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). 
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6.5  Data Analysis 
 
6.5.1 Regression Analysis 
 
The evidence supporting the hypotheses thus far has been univariate.  It is now 
necessary to undertake multivariate analysis in the form of Least Square (LS) 
regression and ordinal logit/probit regression (Ologit/Oprobit).  As mentioned before, 
the continuous score variables will be used for the LS regression and the indexes will 
be used in the Ologit/Oprobit as this is the appropriate method for ordinal dependent 
variables (Long and Freese, 2006).  The study uses four main models, which are 
presented below.   
 
The approach taken with this multivariate analysis is consistent with other governance 
index analysis from Wahab et al (2007); Brown and Caylor (2006); and Gompers et al 
(2003).  However, this is the first study to measure corporate governance using an 
ordinal regression model.  
 
6.5.2 Least Squares Regression Methodology 
 
The first analysis employs Least Squares regression methodology.  Although a linear 
model, it is suitable in this analysis as there is no perfect multicollinearity between the 
independent variables.  Furthermore, the robust standard errors are used to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  There are four modes presented below.  The first model (a&b) 
include all the controls, part 1a includes the Nomad variables in the index and Model 
2 omits the Nomad variables from the index, and instead includes them as explanatory 
variables to test for governance in relation to Nomad reputation. Finally, the 
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independent variables are all collected and calculated using DataStream.  The models 
are as follows: 
 
Model 1 
 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑 +
 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 +  𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑞 + +𝛽𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑏/𝑚 +  𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑝15𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑 +  𝛽𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑 +  𝜀 
   (6.1) 
 
Model 2 
 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑 +  𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 +
 𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑞 + 𝛽𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑏/𝑚 +  𝛽𝑡𝑜𝑝15𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑 +  𝛽𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑 +  𝜀   (6.2) 
 
       
 
Where, 
 
Score = The corporate governance score with the Nomad variables included 
beforeafterdummy = AIM Rule 26 interaction (before=0, after=1) 
year = dummy for all years in sample 
livedead = dummy for whether company is still listed (no=0, yes=1) 
marketcap = Market Capitalisation 
tobinsq = Tobin’s Q (method in Appendix 6.2) 
ROA = Return on Assets 
logb/m = book-market-ratio 
top15nomad = Nomads ranked in top-15 for reputation (using chapter four findings) 
dualnomad = Nomads who also provide dual Nomad and brokering services. 
 
6.5.3 Least Squares Results 
 
Table 6.6 displays the results from the LS regressions analysis. Both permutations of 
the regression model provide strong evidence (at 1% level) that corporate governance 
has increased over time, consistent with hypothesis 1(b).  However, there is no 
significance associated with the before/after dummy, meaning there is no evidence 
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supporting the first hypothesis that governance increased after the adoption of AIM 
Rule 26.  This analysis therefore supports the theory of a general convergence in 
governance standards rather than the effects of regulatory intervention. 
 
Furthermore, there is weak evidence in support of the second hypothesis that company 
size is associated with superior corporate governance when considering the log market 
cap, which is significant at the 10% level.  These findings therefore support those by 
Ragothaman and Gollakota (2009) and Da Silva Rosa (2007) that smaller companies 
may lack the resources to implement the same standard of corporate governance as 
larger companies.   
 
With regard to Nomad reputation, the findings suggest that Nomad reputation is 
positively associated with corporate governance.  There is evidence that companies 
represented by a top-15 Nomad are positively associated with corporate governance at 
the 10% level in the full sample.  However, there is no significant finding to support 
the theory that Nomads who provide a dual brokerage service plays a role in corporate 
governance.  This is consistent with the findings from Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012).   
 
Finally, there are mixed reactions between governance scores and the control measures.  
The only significant result is with the valuation variable: Ln b/m (book-to-market), 
which is significantly negative at the 5% level across all windows.  This indicates that 
as governance compliance improves, the value of that company decreases.  Similarly, 
all association with Tobin’s Q are negative although not significant in any window.  
There is also a significant negative relation between governance and ROA (at 10%) in 
the last model iteration.  
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Table 6.6  OLS Regression Results for Governance Scores 
 (1) (2) 
 Score Less Nomad Score 
Before/after -0.242 -0.273 
 (-0.46) (-0.47) 
   
year 0.331*** 0.334*** 
 (4.56) (3.97) 
   
Live/dead -0.268 -0.254 
 (-0.41) (-0.38) 
   
Log market 
cap 
0.179 0.261* 
 (1.19) (1.74) 
   
Tobins Q -0.0215 -0.0454 
 (-0.42) (-0.98) 
   
ROA -0.0102 -0.122 
 (-0.03) (-0.32) 
   
Top-15nomad 0.751**  
 (1.97)  
   
Dual nomad 0.560  
 (1.25)  
   
Log bm -0.116 -0.159* 
 (-1.57) (-1.83) 
   
_cons -654.6*** -659.1*** 
 (-4.50) (-3.92) 
N 371 371 
R2 0.130 0.109 
adj. R2 0.109 0.092 
F 7.309 7.160 
df_m 9 7 
df_r 361 363 
Table provides the results from the least squares regression analysis.  Score includes the Nomad variables while Score less 
Nomad omits them.  The independent variables are company size, operative performance, Nomad reputation.  There are 
also controls for year and whether the company is still live.  Performance, size and value measure are industry adjusted 
and winzorised at 1% level, top and bottom to remove spurious outliers.  Statistical significance at (*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 
0.1). 
 
 
6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
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In addition to examining how the corporate governance index interacts with the 
independent variables, it is also of interest to analyse how each of the compliance 
variables is associated with the independent control variables.  To do this, each of the 
23 governance variables that comprise the governance index becomes the dependent 
variable.  The results are displayed in Table 6.7.  Interestingly, the before/after dummy 
shows negative statistical significance across the variables: Min 2 NEDs, Solely NEDs 
on the audit committee, the presence of a remuneration committee, and solely NEDs 
on the remuneration committee.  This is inconsistent with the 1st hypothesis that 
compliance has improved with the adoption of AIM Rule 26 and rather supports a 
theory of self-regulation.  Similarly, the Kay Report (2012) states that regulation should 
only be implemented when in the best interests of both companies and investors.  
Furthermore, the disclosure of the intention to follow the combined code is 
significantly negative while QCA guidelines are significantly positive.  This is due to 
the change in preference over time to move from the combined code, to the QCA 
guidelines.  However, it should be noted that although the QCA guidelines are tailored 
for AIM companies, the burden to comply is much lower and may not indicate an 
increase in governance quality.  
 
Consistent with the previous index analysis, there is significant evidence of an increase 
in compliance over time.  This supports hypothesis 1b that governance has converged 
over time.  Literature pertaining to isomorphism supports these findings as Di Maggio 
and Powell (1983); La Porta et al (2000); and Useem and Zelleke (2006) all document 
that regulation, external monitors and competition all lead to governance standards 
eventually converging.  Furthermore, the operating performance measures are 
consistent with the index analysis and find that compliance has a negative effect on 
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operating performance.  The observed negative relation is particularly strong for the 
size of the audit and remuneration committees.  Although this is inconsistent with prior 
literature, Bebchuk et al (2009) does note that performance and governance exhibit 
endogeneity conflict.  Therefore, it could be postulated that the increased compliance 
is due, in part, to a period of poor operating performance.  
 
The log assets variable also provides strong support for the second hypothesis that 
larger companies are better governed.  The size variable proved statistical significance 
for 11 out of the 23 governance measures.  However, there is no relation between 
company size and disclosing the intention to follow either the combined code or the 
QCA guidelines.  There is also no relation between size and Nomad reputation.  It 
would have intuitively been expected that only large companies would have the 
finances and resources to hire a reputable Nomad, however, there is no support for this 
empirically.   
 
The final measure to be examined concerns the Nomad reputation indicators.  There is 
significant support for the third hypotheses that governance is positively related to 
Nomad reputation and dual Nomads.  Considering the top-15 Nomad variable first, 
there is a strong association between companies who hire a top-15 Nomad and a Big-4 
auditor.  Given that Nomads and auditors provide an important monitoring role, the 
appointment of both implies a willingness to adopt quality corporate governance 
mechanisms.  There is also strong evidence that top-15 Nomads are associated with the 
size of the equity offering.  This implies a negative relation with Nomad reputation and 
ownership concentration and suggests that companies hire a more reputable Nomad 
when they wish to raise capital from their flotation.  Furthermore, there is strong 
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positive evidence of a relation between Nomad duality with split roles of CEO and 
chair, and the presence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees.  This 
supports hypothesis 3b that dual Nomads are associated with better governance as well 
as empirically confirming the theory purported by Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998); and 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008). 
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Table 6.7  Regression Results for Each Index Variable 
 Before after dummy Year Live/dead Log Market cap Tobin’s q 
Big-4 Auditor 0.0842 (-1) -0.00882 (-0.78) 0.0146 (0.17) -0.0076 (-0.31) 0.00437 (0.8) 
Total Directors -0.0684 (-1.31) 0.00366 (0.49) 0.0617 (1) -0.00259 (-0.18) -0.00118 (-0.39) 
Min 2 NEDs -0.112* (-1.80) 0.0148 (1.59) -0.0688 (-1.31) 0.0089 (0.56) -0.00424 (-1.21) 
Board Independence -0.0372 (-0.45) 0.0335*** (3.11) -0.124 (-1.43) -0.0383* (-1.71) -0.000617 (-0.19) 
CEO Duality 0.027 (0.46) 0.0093 (1.01) -0.046 (-0.77) -0.0114 (-0.82) -0.00181 (-0.44) 
Gender Diversity 0.0258 (0.36) -0.000444 (-0.05) -0.169* (-1.92) -0.00266 (-0.12) -0.00148 (-0.61) 
Board Experience -0.049 (-0.56) 0.0289** (2.46) 0.068 (0.73) -0.00558 (-0.23) -0.00114 (-0.21) 
Audit Committee -0.0696 (-1.36) 0.0128* (1.68) -0.0149 (-0.30) -0.0114 (-0.85) -0.000727 (-0.23) 
Audit Total 0.067 (0.8) -0.00131 (-0.12) -0.0226 (-0.25) -0.0341 (-1.54) -0.000159 (-0.04) 
Solely NEDs on Audit -0.131* (-1.83) 0.0144 (1.29) -0.0873 (-1.36) -0.00573 (-0.30) 0.00115 (0.34) 
Accounting Expert 0.025 (0.3) -0.00119 (-0.09) -0.052 (-0.67) 0.0196 (0.77) -0.00623 (-1.25) 
Times per year they meet -0.0818 (-0.94) 0.0317*** (2.79) 0.0178 (0.19) -0.0131 (-0.53) 0.000095
1 
(0.02) 
Remuneration Committee -0.0882 (-1.57) 0.0180** (2.19) 0.0283 (0.45) -0.0115 (-0.77) -0.00397 (-0.81) 
Remuneration Total 0.0969 (1.16) -0.00135 (-0.12) -0.0173 (-0.19) -0.0223 (-0.96) -0.00277 (-0.52) 
Solely NEDs on Remuneration -0.223** (-2.49) 0.0315** (2.46) -0.107 (-1.11) 0.0166 (0.68) -0.00644 (-1.25) 
Nomination Committee 0.0663 (0.87) 0.0151 (1.43) -0.0905 (-1.11) 0.0137 (0.64) 0.00426 (0.93) 
Nomination Total 0.00937 (0.14) 0.0195** (2.12) 0.0416 (0.58) -0.0134 (-0.72) 0.00427 (1.06) 
Solely NEDs on Nomination 0.06 (0.92) 0.00756 (0.84) -0.068 (-0.97) -0.00958 (-0.53) 0.00868** (2.21) 
Combined Code -0.169*** (-2.75) 0.00933 (1.1) 0.0788 (1.18) 0.0088 (0.51) 0.00253 (0.69) 
QCA 0.288*** (3.97) 0.0321*** (3.18) -0.0498 (-0.64) -0.00817 (-0.40) -0.000339 (-0.08) 
Min 25% Issue -0.0438 (-0.51) 0.0213* (1.79) 0.11 (1.19) 0.00703 (0.29) -0.0118** (-2.27) 
Top-15 Nomad -0.0364 (-0.43) -0.0085 (-0.72) -0.0278 (-0.30) 0.0408* (1.72) 0.000363 (0.07) 
Nomad Duality 0.0345 (0.48) 0.00843 (0.86) -0.00004 (-0.00) 0.0203 (1.02) -
0.00890** 
(-2.09) 
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Table 6.7 (contd.)  Regression of each Index Variable 
 ROA Top-15 Nomad Dual Nomad Ln b/m _cons 
 
Big-4 Auditor 0.0651 (0.73) 0.147*** (2.79) -0.00113 (-0.02) -0.00463 (-0.38) 17.32 (0.77) 
Total Directors 0.0387 (0.85) 0.0325 (1.12) 0.0501 (1.12) -0.000878 (-0.14) -6.762 (-0.46) 
Min 2 NEDs 0.00236 (0.05) 0.0129 (0.35) 0.0642 (1.21) -0.0092 (-1.39) -29.37 (-1.57) 
Board Independence -0.0189 (-0.25) -0.0756 (-1.37) 0.00688 (0.11) -0.0312*** (-3.93) -66.60*** (-3.09) 
CEO & Chair split -0.0467 (-0.87) 0.00882 (0.25) 0.134*** (2.67) 0.00188 (0.26) -17.76 (-0.96) 
Gender Diversity -0.00493 (-0.07) -0.017 (-0.37) 0.0286 (0.55) 0.00166 (0.2) 0.921 (0.05) 
Board Experience 0.00853 (0.09) 0.0226 (0.4) -0.0952 (-1.42) 0.0186* (1.83) -57.50** (-2.45) 
Audit Committee -0.0186 (-0.45) -0.0123 (-0.42) 0.0893** (2.09) 0.00286 (0.41) -24.71 (-1.62) 
Audit Total -0.033 (-0.42) 0.0821 (1.47) 0.00905 (0.14) -0.0452*** (-4.96) 3.012 (0.13) 
Solely NEDs on Audit -0.00932 (-0.13) 0.0791* (1.67) -0.00953 (-0.17) 0.00383 (0.39) -28.45 (-1.26) 
Accounting Expert 0.023 (0.32) -0.0239 (-0.42) -0.0495 (-0.73) -0.00807 (-0.86) 2.592 (0.1) 
Times per year they meet -0.0227 (-0.28) 0.0829 (1.44) -0.0323 (-0.47) -0.0144 (-1.52) -62.93*** (-2.76) 
Remuneration Committee -0.0045 (-0.10) -0.014 (-0.43) 0.0900* (1.95) 0.00786 (1.01) -35.21** (-2.13) 
Remuneration Total -0.0718 (-0.90) 0.0456 (0.8) 0.0859 (1.36) -0.0355*** (-3.85) 2.986 (0.13) 
Solely NEDs on Remuneration -0.067 (-0.81) 0.0396 (0.68) -0.0473 (-0.67) -0.0111 (-1.00) -62.81** (-2.45) 
Nomination Committee -0.00164 (-0.02) 0.0401 (0.79) 0.132** (2.18) -0.0180* (-1.82) -30.59 (-1.45) 
Nomination Total -0.0252 (-0.39) 0.0672 (1.52) 0.0357 (0.68) -0.0201** (-2.31) -39.33** (-2.13) 
Solely NEDs on Nomination 0.0629 (1.01) 0.0408 (0.95) 0.0307 (0.6) 0.0038 (0.45) -15.25 (-0.85) 
Combined Code -0.0319 (-0.54) 0.0218 (0.53) 0.039 (0.8) 0.00386 (0.48) -18.06 (-1.06) 
QCA 0.00896 (0.13) 0.0366 (0.76) -0.0517 (-0.91) -0.0166* (-1.77) -63.85*** (-3.16) 
Min 25% Issue -0.143* (-1.73) 0.145** (2.54) -0.0374 (-0.55) 0.00428 (0.38) -42.58* (-1.79) 
Top-15 Nomad -0.051 (-0.62) -0.00316 (-0.14) -0.0157 (-1.42) 0.046 (0.019) 10 (350) 
Nomad Duality -0.0935 (-1.36) -0.0012 (-0.06) -0.000674 (-0.07) 0.03 (0.002) 10 (350) 
Table provides the results from the least squares regression analysis for all 23 individual governance measures. The independent variables are as before and measure company size, operative performance, 
Nomad reputation.  There are also controls for year and whether the company is still live.  Performance, size and value measure are industry adjusted and winzorised at 1% level, top and bottom to remove 
spurious outliers. Statistical significance at (*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1). 
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6.5.5 Ordinal Logit/Probit Regression Methodology 
 
The use of ordinal logit/probit has not to date been utilised in corporate governance 
index analysis.  However, this technique is particularly useful when the data is ordinal 
and the values of each category have a sequential order where the value of one category 
is higher than the previous one.  Long and Freese (2006) note that although ordered 
outcomes are consecutive, linear regression analysis is not appropriate as ordinal 
outcomes violate the assumptions of the linear regression model.  This is supported by 
McKelvey and Zivona, (1975); and Winship and Mare (1984).   
 
The purpose of this analysis is to establish how well the response categories are 
predicted by the responses to other questions (independent variables), or more simply, 
how changes in the predictors explain the probability of observing a particular ordinal 
outcome.  It is an extension of the logistic regression model that applies to binary 
dependent variables but allows for more than two (ordered) response categories.  The 
model for the ordinal logit/probit is presented below and is based on the model provided 
by Long and Freese (2006).  Ordered logit and ordered probit use the same model but 
the distribution is different.  Ordinal logit uses a standard logistic distribution while 
ordinal probit follows a standard normal distribution.  For robustness, both methods 
are used here although they should produce similar results.  The start point for the 
model is the underlying equation (Model 3), where y* is the unobserved dependent 
variable, x is the vector of the independent variables, 𝛽 is the unknown parameter 
vector and 𝜀 is the error term.   
 
In ordinal logit/probit, instead of y* the following is observed: 
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𝑦 =  1     𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗   ≤  𝑢1 
𝑦 =  2     𝑖𝑓 𝑢1  <  𝑦
∗   ≤  𝑢2 
𝑦 =  3   𝑖𝑓 𝑢2  <  𝑦
∗  ≤  𝑢3 
𝑦 =  4     𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗   ≥  𝑢3  
In this case, y is the level of corporate governance compliance (1=bad, 4=good) and 𝑢 
is the vector of the unknown threshold parameters that is estimated using the 𝛽 vector 
(Sawkins et al, 1997).  As the name suggest, ordered logit/probit has to be ordered from 
low to high, this analysis will use the index scores detailed in Table 6.3 as the 
distribution of scores.  With regard to the model, which measures the probability of 
observing a particular outcome, the error term is assumed to have a standard logistic 
distribution.  The models are described below: 
 
Ordinal Regression Model (Model 4) 
 
The Underlying model: 
 
𝑦∗  =  𝛽′𝑥 +  𝜀         (6.3) 
 
Instead of y* the following is observed: 
 
𝑦 =  1     𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗   ≤  𝑢1  (low governance compliance) 
𝑦 =  2     𝑖𝑓 𝑢1  <  𝑦
∗   ≤  𝑢2  (low/medium governance compliance) 
𝑦 =  3   𝑖𝑓 𝑢2  <  𝑦
∗  ≤  𝑢3  (medium governance compliance) 
𝑦 =  4     𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗   ≥  𝑢3   (good governance compliance) 
 
The Ordered Logit Model: 
 
Pr[𝑦𝑖 =  𝑗] = 𝐹[𝑢𝑗 − 𝛽
𝑖𝑥𝑖] − 𝐹[𝑢𝑗−1 − 𝛽
𝑖𝑥𝑖]    (6.4) 
 
Therefore, 
Pr[𝑦𝑖 =  𝑗] =  
1
1+𝑒
−𝑢𝑗𝛽
𝑖𝑥𝑖
− 
1
1+𝑒
−𝑢𝑗−1𝛽
𝑖𝑥𝑖
     (6.5) 
 
Where, 
 𝑢𝑗  are the unknown parameters to be estimated. (1-4) which denote weak to 
strong corporate governance compliance. 
 F is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the error term 𝜀. 
 For ologit, F has a logistic distribution with Var(𝜀) = 𝜋^2 ⁄ 3 . 
 For oprobit, F has a standard normal distribution cdf 
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 Finally, i is the observation. 
 
Before the Ordered logit/probit model is applied, it is important to discuss the 
underlying assumption when using ordinal regression models (ORM).  Using the 
notation presented in Long and Freese (2006), ORM can be written as: 
 
Pr[𝑦 =  1|𝑥] = 𝐹[𝑇𝑚 − 𝑥𝛽] 
Pr[𝑦 =  𝑚|𝑥] = 𝐹[𝑇𝑚 − 𝑥𝛽] − 𝐹[𝑇𝑚−1 − 𝑥𝛽]  Form= 2 to j-1 
Pr[𝑦 =  𝐽|𝑥] = 1 − 𝐹[𝑇𝑚−1 − 𝑥𝛽] 
 
From here, we can compute the cumulative probabilities: 
Pr[𝑦 ≤ 𝑚1|𝑥] = 𝐹[𝑇𝑚 − 𝑥𝛽]  Form=1 to j-1   (6.6) 
 
This equation highlights the ORM is equivalent to j-1 binary regressions with the 
critical assumption that the slope coefficients are identical across each regression.  This 
means, given four ranking outcomes, each of the corresponding probability curves 
varies only by being moved to the left or right, and are therefore parallel.  This leads to 
the assumption that the 𝛽s are equal across each probability equation.  Put another way, 
the coefficients that describe the relationship between the lowest category (1) and all 
higher categories of the responses (2, 3, & 4) are the same as those that describe the 
relationship between the next lowest category and all higher responses.  Given this 
assumption, one model can be used for all outcomes rather than different models to 
explain the relation between each outcome group.  If the test produces a significant 
result, then the assumption it violated and an alternative method needs to be used.   
 
The approach used to test this assumption is the Brant test (Brant, 1990).  This is a user 
defined Stata command and estimates the coefficients from j-1 binary regressions, 
using comparisons of the separate but correlated fits to the binary logistic models 
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underlying the overall model (Brant, 1990).  This command tests that the coefficients 
across all independent variables are all simultaneously equal.  Table 6.8 displays the 
results for the Brant test.  The output for the Brant shows that the overall model does 
not produce a significant result, so does not violate the parallel slopes assumption.  
Therefore, changes in probabilities, and further analysis using the ordinal logit model, 
are carried out with these variables omitted.   
 
 
Table 6.8  Brant Test of Parallel Slopes Assumption 
Variable Chi^2 P>chi^2 df 
All 1.60 1.000 20 
Before/after dummy 12.75 0.002 2 
Year  7.71 0.021 2 
Live/dead 3.12 0.211 2 
Log Market cap 3.33 0.189 2 
Tobin’s Q 45.80 0.000 2 
ROA 1.50 0.473 2 
Top-15 Nomad 2.08 0.354 2 
Dual Nomad 0.21 0.899 2 
Log assets 2.83 0.243 2 
Ln b/m 0.85 0.655 2 
The table presents the results for the Brant test which test for the parallel slopes assumption. The Chi^2 identifies 
variables that may not have equal coefficients.  Although, the overall test is not significant, Tobin’s Q and the 
before/after dummy are significantly different from the other coefficients Log assets in included in this test to 
increase the performance of the Brant test.  
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6.5.6 Ologit Results 
 
Table 6.9 displays the results from the ordinal logit and probit regression analysis.  The 
analysis is undertaken for the complete index score as well as the index score less 
Nomad, to allow analysis to be carried out on the third hypothesis relating to Nomad 
reputation.  The table displays the ordinal log coefficients along with their associated 
test statistic.  Interpretation of the coefficient is that for a one unit increase in the 
predictor (index score), the explanatory variable is expected to change by its respective 
regression coefficient in the log-odds scale, while the other variables in the model are 
held constant.   
 
The results are broadly consistent with the Least Squares regression analysis, as there 
is strong evidence that score increases over time, rather than in 2007 with the 
implementation of AIM Rule 26, as year is positive and significant at the 1% level for 
all four index scores.  This supports hypothesis 1b, and provides additional support for 
the isomorphism/convergence theory suggested by La Porta et al (2000). Furthermore, 
in regard to the Nomad analysis, there is a positive relation at the 1% level for both 
models between Nomad reputation and compliance (coeffs. For Ologit and Oprobit: 
3.26 and 3.47, respectively).  This highlights the importance governance role played 
by Nomads in influencing governance structures among the companies they represent.  
Finally, there is no evidence that index scores are associated with company 
performance.   
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Table 6.9  Ordinal Regression Results for Index Scores 
 Index Score Index Score Index score 
less Nomad 
Index score less 
Nomad 
 Ologit Oprobit Ologit Oprobit 
Before/after -0.0511 -0.0854 -0.124 -0.119 
 (-0.16) (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.64) 
     
year 0.182*** 0.109*** 0.176*** 0.107*** 
 (4.13) (4.20) (3.96) (4.09) 
     
Live/dead -0.417 -0.190 -0.167 -0.0392 
 (-1.25) (-0.96) (-0.48) (-0.20) 
     
Log market cap 0.145* 0.0840* 0.0898 0.0617 
 (1.87) (1.91) (1.15) (1.39) 
     
Tobins Q -0.0147 -0.00780 -0.0187 -0.0143 
 (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.82) (-1.27) 
     
ROA -0.153 -0.0475 -0.0862 -0.0414 
 (-0.67) (-0.36) (-0.39) (-0.31) 
     
Top-15nomad   0.709*** 0.430*** 
   (3.26) (3.47) 
     
Dual nomad   0.838*** 0.459*** 
   (3.30) (3.09) 
     
Log bm -0.0793* -0.0473* -0.103** -0.0642** 
 (-1.90) (-1.95) (-2.40) (-2.57) 
     
cut1 0.617 0.417 0.905 0.687 
 (0.66) (0.77) (0.95) (1.26) 
     
cut2 2.592*** 1.551*** 2.960*** 1.861*** 
 (2.74) (2.86) (3.08) (3.37) 
     
cut3 4.843*** 2.880*** 5.224*** 3.203*** 
 (5.00) (5.22) (5.31) (5.71) 
N 371 371 371 371 
Table provides the results from the ordinal logit and probit regression analysis using the index less Nomad score. t 
statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). 
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With the ordinal logit and probit models now performed, it is possible to examine the 
changes in the predicted probability of observing a specific outcome (y=1-4) when 
focusing on changes in the level of x.  This is a useful technique for examining the 
predicted probability when there are one or more variables held at a certain value or 
even a change in value (Xu and Long, 2005; Williams, 2006).  For example, the 
probability of observing good levels of governance (score 3&4) are greater after 2007 
can be tested.  To do this, the predicted probability is calculated when the before/after 
dummy is equal to one, and repeated when the before/after dummy is equal to zero.  The 
change in predicted probability is then calculated by subtracting these two outcomes 
(probability after minus probability before).  
 
The model used to test the predicted outcome for a specified change in x is: 
Model 5 
 
 
∆ Pr 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗
∆𝑥
= Pr(𝑦𝑖 =  𝑗|𝑥𝐴) −  Pr(𝑦𝑖 =  𝑗|𝑥𝐵)     (6.7) 
 
The associated confidence interval is: 
𝑃𝑟 [
∆ Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗)
∆𝑥 𝐿𝐵
≤
∆ Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗)
∆𝑥
≤  
∆ Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗)
∆𝑥 𝑈𝐵
] = 0.95   (6.8) 
 
Where, 
∆ Pr(𝑦𝑖 =  𝑗) is the predicted change on probabilities over the ordinal outcomes, 1-4. 
∆𝑥 is the change in the independent variable from 𝑥𝐴 to 𝑥𝐵.   
LB and UB denote the upper bound and lower bound of the confidence interval. 
 
It would be expected that if corporate governance increased after 2007, then the change 
in predicted probability would be positive for scores 2&3 (as the probability for 
producing ‘good’ scores before should be lower) but negative for 1&2 (as there should 
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be a greater proportion of ‘bad scores’ before 2007 relative to the post 2007 period).  
As before, the analysis is conducted for both ordinal logit and probit models and the 
results are displayed in Table 6.10.  Panel A provides the predicted probability when 
the before/after dummy = 1 (representing the post 2007 period); Panel B provides the 
before/after dummy = 0 (pre 2007 period).  Each of the probability outcomes is shown 
alongside its corresponding confidence interval, calculated at the 95% level.   
 
The findings report that there is no evidence of an improvement in index scores after 
the implementation of AIM Rule 26 using the ordinal logit approach.  However, there 
is some evidence at y=3 that companies have a greater probability of scoring good 
governance after 2007, as zero does not lie in the confidence interval.  Significance is 
at the 5% level but does not hold when y=4 which is the highest level of governance 
compliance.  These finding are, once again, consistent with the OLS regression and 
contradict the first hypothesis (1a) that governance compliance improved with the 2007 
AIM regulation. 
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Table 6.10  Predicting Change in Probability (before-after) 
 Probability 
when x=1 
Probability when 
x=0 
Predicted Change 
(1-0) 
95% CI for Change 
Panel A: Predicted change using Ordinal Logit model.   
Pr(y=1|x):         0.0892   [ 0.0509, 0.1275] 
Pr(y=2|x): 0.3573   [ 0.2813, 0.4333] 
Pr(y=3|x): 0.4509   [ 0.3752, 0.5266] 
Pr(y=4|x): 0.1026   [ 0.0615, 0.1437] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):  0.0747  [ 0.0409, 0.1086] 
Pr(y=2|x):  0.3246  [ 0.2521, 0.3972] 
Pr(y=3|x):  0.4788  [ 0.4100, 0.5477] 
Pr(y=4|x):  0.1218  [ 0.0726, 0.1710] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):   -0.0145 [-0.0623, 0.0332] 
Pr(y=2|x):   -0.0326 [-0.1397, 0.0745] 
Pr(y=3|x):   0.0279 [-0.0635, 0.1194] 
Pr(y=4|x):   0.0192 [-0.0443, 0.0827] 
Panel B: Predicted change using Ordinal Probit model.   
Pr(y=1|x): 0.0989   [ 0.0546, 0.1432] 
Pr(y=2|x): 0.3625   [ 0.2890, 0.4360] 
Pr(y=3|x): 0.4417   [ 0.4094, 0.4739] 
Pr(y=4|x): 0.0970   [ 0.0539, 0.1401] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):  0.0748  [ 0.0374, 0.1122] 
Pr(y=2|x):  0.3265  [ 0.2549, 0.3981] 
Pr(y=3|x):  0.4728  [ 0.4339, 0.5117] 
Pr(y=4|x):  0.1259  [ 0.0730, 0.1789] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):   -0.0241 [-0.0824, 0.0342] 
Pr(y=2|x):   -0.0360 [-0.0379, -0.0341] 
Pr(y=3|x):   0.0312 [ 0.0245, 0.0378] 
Pr(y=4|x):   0.0289 [-0.0414, 0.0993] 
Table provides the results for the predicted change in probability when comparing the before and after variable.  All other variables 
are held at their means.  The output shows that you have the probability of observing score 1-4 when x=1 (after) and the probability 
of the same observation when x=0 (before) then the difference in probabilities is calculated (after-before).  In Panel A (ordinal 
logit) even though the probability of observing better corporate governance (score 3&4) is higher after 2007, it is not significant 
(zero lies within the confidence interval).  However, there is evidence in Panel B (ordinal probit) of a significant increase in the 
probability of observing good governance (y=3) after 2007.  Confidence Intervals calculated using delta method.   
 
 
In addition to the examination above, this methodology has been used to undertake 
additional analysis on how the predicted probability is affected by changes in time and 
by Nomad reputation which will provide support for the other hypotheses.  The results 
are displayed in Table 6.11 and for brevity; only the ordinal logit results are reported 
here.   
 
As the analysis for AIM Rule 26 was weak, an additional assessment has been 
undertaken to establish if there is a change in the governance score between 2006 and 
2007.  Here the predicted probabilities for 2007 are subtracted from those calculated 
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for 2006.  Apart from (y=3), the results are significant and suggest that governance 
increased in 2007, compared to 2006 (results in Panel A).  However, given the previous 
analysis did not garner strong evidence to support hypothesis 1a, relating to how 
governance changes with the implementation of regulation, it does provide support for 
hypothesis 1b stating that there has been an observed increase in governance over time.  
This is also consistent with the findings in the OLS regression suggesting a 
convergence in governance standards as the market has grown more aware of the 
importance of governance issues, especially given the recent economic downturn.   
 
The next set of analysis compares the probability changes in relation to Nomad 
reputation.  Firstly, Panel B shows how the predicted probability changes when the 
companies are represented by a top-5 Nomad, compared with those who are not.  The 
findings show that the change in probability is significantly negative for the likelihood 
of companies to have poor governance compliance (y=1&2).  This means that the 
companies not represented by a reputable Nomad are more likely to have lower 
governance.  Similarly, the results indicate that companies are more likely have good 
governance scores (y=3&4) when they are represented by a reputable Nomad, as shown 
by the significant difference in the change in probability.  This analysis finds strong 
evidence supporting the third hypothesis that more reputable Nomads are associated 
with better performance.   
 
 
 
Finally, Panel C documents the difference in the predicted probability when a company 
is represented by a NomadBro against those who are represented by Nomad-only firms.  
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However, unlike the results from the LS regression, there is no significant evidence to 
suggest that companies who provide dual Nomad and brokering services are associated 
with better governance.  Therefore, in this instance, the result is inconsistent with that 
of Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008) so hypothesis 3b is rejected in favour of the null, and 
conclude that Nomad duality does not influence governance compliance, using ordinal 
logit methodology.  
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Table 6.11  Predicting Change in Probability - Additional Analysis 
 Probability when 
x=2006 
Probability when 
x=2007 
Predicted Change 
(2006-2007) 
95% CI for Change 
Panel A: Predicted change from Year 2006-2007.   
Pr(y=1|x):           0.0921   [0.0519, 0.1041] 
Pr(y=2|x): 0.3552   [0.2748, 0.3752] 
Pr(y=3|x): 0.4491   [0.4192, 0.5314] 
Pr(y=4|x): 0.1036   [0.0876, 0.1558] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):  0.0780  [0.0629,  0.1213] 
Pr(y=2|x):  0.3250  [0.3019, 0.4084] 
Pr(y=3|x):  0.4753  [0.3939,  0.5044] 
Pr(y=4|x):  0.1217  [0.0733, 0.1339] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):   0.0141 [0.0067, 0.0214] 
Pr(y=2|x):   0.0302 [0.0145, 0.0458] 
Pr(y=3|x):   -0.0262 [-0.0401, -0.0122] 
Pr(y=4|x):   -0.0181 [-0.0275, -0.0086] 
 Probability when 
x=1 
Probability when 
x=0 
Predicted Change (1-
0) 
95% CI for Change 
Panel B: Predicted change for Top 5 Nomad    
Pr(y=1|x): 0.0612   [0.0280,      0.0944] 
Pr(y=2|x): 0.2809   [0.1936,      0.3682] 
Pr(y=3|x): 0.5055   [0.4334,      0.5775] 
Pr(y=4|x): 0.1525   [0.0838,   0.2211] 
 
      
Pr(y=1|x):  0.0917  [0.0617,   0.1217] 
Pr(y=2|x):  0.3544  [0.2998,     0.4090] 
Pr(y=3|x):  0.4499  [0.3934,      0.5063] 
Pr(y=4|x):  0.1041  [0.0725,      0.1356] 
       
Pr(y=1|x):   -0.0305 [-0.0646,    0.0036] 
Pr(y=2|x):   -0.0735 [-0.1639,    0.0169] 
Pr(y=3|x):   0.0556 [0.0035,    0.1147] 
Pr(y=4|x):   0.0484 [0.0179,    0.1147] 
 Probability when 
x=1 
Probability when 
x=0 
Predicted Change (1-
0) 
95% CI for Change 
Panel C: Predicted change for Dual Nomad    
Pr(y=1|x): 0.0803   [0.0527,     0.1078] 
Pr(y=2|x): 0.3302   [0.2772,     0.3832] 
Pr(y=3|x): 0.4711   [0.4137,     0.5286] 
Pr(y=4|x): 0.1184   [0.0837,     0.1532] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):  0.1063  [0.0587,     0.1538] 
Pr(y=2|x):  0.3805  [0.2998,     0.4613] 
Pr(y=3|x):  0.4234  [0.3403,     0.5065] 
Pr(y=4|x):  0.0897  [0.0487,     0.1308] 
      
Pr(y=1|x):   -0.0260 [-0.0696,    0.0176] 
Pr(y=2|x):   -0.0504 [-0.1268,    0.0261] 
Pr(y=3|x):    0.0477 [-0.0305,    0.1259] 
Pr(y=4|x):    0.0287 [-0.0133,    0.0707] 
Table displays additional analysis using the changes in predicted probability.  Panel A provides the results for the predicted change 
in probability in score between 2006 and 2007.  This highlights whether there was a significant change in governance in the year 
of the regulation.  Table shows significant evidence that there was a significant improvement in the probability of observing better 
governance in 2007 than in 2006.  Panel B show the predicted change when companies have a more reputable Nomad.  Reputable 
Nomad = 1, otherwise, zero.  There is strong evidence supporting Nomad reputation.  However, this does not hold for Panel C 
where the probability is calculated when the Nomad offers dual brokerage services.  There is no evidence that Nomad duality is 
associated with better governance. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines the level of corporate governance compliance with specific 
regard to regulation, company performance and the role of Nomads.  In doing so, this 
study has taken the theory purported by Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) and studied 
compliance empirically to assess how unregulated companies comply with pre-
existing, but voluntary, standards.  It was hypothesised that the adoption of AIM Rule 
26 marked a major exchange intervention that made companies more visible, from 
inception, to their prospective shareholders.  As such, with the market downturns and 
the increased awareness of governance issues around this time, it may have been 
expected that governance standards increased in companies listing post-2007.  
However, there is no empirical evidence to support this with either the OLS or ordered 
logit/probit regression analysis.  Instead, there is significant evidence that compliance 
has increased over time rather than an event-specific turnaround.   
 
Such advances in compliance may be attributed to the growing awareness of 
governance by market participants.  Moreover, increasing pressure from stakeholders 
post the economic turndown, as well as their competitors listed on the more stringent 
Main Market, has led to a convergence in governance compliance.  This is consistent 
with Di Maggio and Powell (1983); and Useem and Zelleke (2006) who document that 
external pressures encourage companies to behave in a certain way, leading to their 
behaviour converging.  Another explanation may be that the AIM market in general, 
before 2007, was relatively new and the role of Nomads was still being established so 
there may have been less emphasis placed on monitoring and governance.  However, 
as the market has grown, AIM companies are faced with pressure by shareholders, 
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Main Market competitors, and even developments in AIM regulation.  This leads to 
companies reporting information in the same way as companies listed on the Main 
Market.   
 
The next hypothesis tested how governance is related to company size.  AIM is a 
market targeted at SMEs and, as such, these companies may not be well placed to incur 
the costs associated with comprehensive governance compliance.  Given this, the 
second hypothesis tested for a positive relation between company size and governance 
compliance.  Regression analysis provided strong support for this hypothesis as log 
asset test significant at the 1% for all indices, although there is no statistical evidence 
regarding the log market cap variable.  Furthermore, the ordinal regression analysis 
also provides strong support that log assets are positively related to compliance.  This 
also supports the findings from Da Silva Rosa (2007); and Ragothaman and Gollakota 
(2009) that smaller companies are less well governed.  Furthermore, the results are 
also consistent with the Mallin and Ow-Yong’s (2012) study which reports that AIM 
companies level of QCA governance disclosure is positively associated with company 
size. 
 
The next area of analysis concerns the role of Nomads and provides support to the 
hypothesis that Nomad reputation is positively associated with governance 
compliance.  The OLS regression analysis found significant evidence that a top-15 
ranked Nomad is associated with compliance, confirming hypothesis 3a.  This is 
further supported by the results from the ordinal logit regression, which finds there is 
a significant probability of having better governance (Y=3&4) when represented by a 
top-15 Nomad.  However, this did not hold for analysis pertaining to dual Nomads.  
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Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998 and 2008) document that dual Nomads experience greater 
reputational risk when they provide additional brokering services, which leads them 
to encourage better governance or only accept clients with appropriate governance 
standards in place.  There is no support for hypothesis 3b under least squares regression 
analysis.  Similarly, there is no evidence under ordinal logit analysis that dual Nomads 
have a greater probability of being associated with better governance. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 Transformation Plots 
 
 
 
 
The graphs plot the various normality transformations when dealing with non-normality in relation to the 
dependent variables.  The plot ‘identity’ is the untransformed plot and most represent normal distribution. 
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APPENDIX 6.2  Definitions of Firm Performance Measures 
 
 
OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
 
Return on Equity = Net income / book value on equity 
Datastream Code: WC08301 
 
 
Return on Assets = Net Income / total assets 
Datastream Code:  WC01751/ DWTA 
 
 
VALUATION 
 
 
Tobin’s Q = (Equity Market value + liabilities market value) / (equity book value + 
liabilities book value) 
Datastream code = ((WC08001) + (WC03351)) / ((WC03501) + (WC03351)) 
 
Where, 
WC08001 = market capitalization (annual)  
MV = market value  
WC03351 = total liabilities 
WC03501 = common stock 
 
Book to Market = Book Value of Firm/Market Value of Firm 
Datastream code = 1/MTBV 
 
Where,  
MTBV = market-book ratio 
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APPENDIX 6.3 Description of Variable Labels 
 
 
Score less Nomad = The corporate governance score minus the Nomad variables 
Score = The corporate governance score with the Nomad variables included 
Before/after dummy = AIM Rule 26 interaction (before=0, after=1) 
Year = dummy for all years in sample 
live/dead = dummy for whether company is still listed (no=0, yes=1) 
log market cap = Log of Market Capitalisation 
Tobin’s q = Tobin’s Q (method in Appendix 5.2) 
ROA = Return on Assets 
Log b/m = book-market-ratio 
Top-15 Nomad = Nomads ranked in top 5 for reputation (using chapter four 
findings) 
Dual nomad = Nomads who also provide dual Nomad and brokering services. 
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Chapter 7  Corporate Governance and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosures 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
7.1.1 Agency Theory, Information Asymmetry, and Disclosure 
 
This study provides evidence on the association between voluntary disclosures and a 
company’s corporate governance structure.  Corporate governance is the set of 
internal controls and policies that protect investors from management self-interest by 
encouraging managers to make value-maximising decisions and thus, mitigating the 
agency problem (Mitton, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003).  Agency theory is the 
conflict that arises due to the separation of ownership and control when the owners’ 
delegate works to the management, who then carry out the functions of that company 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  However, problems arise 
from this separation such as, the two parties having different attitudes to risks or, 
more generally, the owners and the managers having different goals and objectives 
that lead to conflict between owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989).  To give an 
example, a company’s management may make decisions that are detrimental to the 
wealth of the company and its shareholders, causing a conflict of interest to arise 
between the two parties (Healy and Palepu, 2001).   
 
Related to the agency problem is the idea that management holds more information 
about the company than its shareholders, leading to information asymmetries.  
Holmstrom (1979) states that the lack of information available to investors can also 
initiate the agency problem and companies that provide additional information to 
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shareholders reduce this problem.  Taking steps to reduce such asymmetries benefits 
both manager and investor as it decreases the premium for handling this information 
risk, as well as lowering the cost of capital for management (Barry and Brown (1984, 
1985) and Merton (1987).  Voluntary disclosure is greatly influenced by the form of 
the ownership and management structure (Chau and Gray, 2002; Gelb, 2000; Ho and 
Wong, 2001).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that when ownership and control 
are separated, the potential for agency costs arises because of conflicts of interest 
between manager and shareholders.  Under such circumstances, the demand for 
information is higher, and therefore, voluntary disclosures could be considered as a 
means of lowering information asymmetries and mitigating the agency problem.  
Kanagaretnam et al (2007) used bid-ask spreads around the announcement of 
quarterly earnings as a proxy for information asymmetry, alongside eight corporate 
governance variables, to ascertain the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and information asymmetry.  The study finds significant evidence that 
higher levels of corporate governance are associated with lower information 
asymmetries between companies and investors.  This is consistent with Ajinkya et al 
(2005) and Klein (2002) who find that companies with a more effective board have 
an enhanced quality and rate of information release.  This, in turn, indicates that 
information asymmetries will be lower.  The above evidence suggests that poor 
corporate governance leads to lower levels of disclosure and, in turn, large 
information asymmetries.  
 
Previous findings have shown that information asymmetries are inherent to agency 
conflicts and both of these problems can be reduced, in part, by company disclosure.  
Corporate disclosures help bridge the gap between managers and investors as they 
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provide investors with additional information and protection regarding how their 
investment is being handled (Akhtaruddin et al, 2009).  Disclosures, therefore, are 
central to a company’s corporate governance structure (Baek et al, 2004).  Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) find better corporate governance is associated with better quality 
disclosures.  Studies also report that better disclosure reduces cost of capital (Botosan, 
1997), lowers the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998), and improves a company’s stock 
performance (Healy et al, 1999; Mitton, 2002).   
 
There are two main components to corporate disclosure, the first is mandatory 
disclosures.  This is the obligatory disclosures that all companies are required to make 
and are set out by their markets regulatory body.  The second is voluntary disclosures, 
which are the disclosures made by management over and above the mandatory 
requirement. 
 
7.1.2  Voluntary Disclosure 
 
This study is concerned with voluntary disclosure strategies, specifically around the 
time of earnings announcements, and how these are associated with a company’s 
corporate governance structure.  Studies have documented several incentives for 
managers to increase the level of voluntary disclosure.  Firstly, increased liquidity.  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) both report that 
information asymmetries are reduced with greater levels of disclosure.  This leads to 
more investor confidence regarding the price of stocks reflecting its fair value, which 
in turn, increases liquidity.  This is corroborated by Welker (1995) and Healy et al 
(1999) who both report a positive relation between liquidity and analyst ratings 
disclosures.  Another incentive for increasing voluntary disclosure is during periods 
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of stock overvaluation.  Managers might at such times take steps to reduce the 
potential for litigation by signalling to the market that stocks are overvalued by 
increasing voluntary disclosure (Skinner, 1994).   
 
Voluntary disclosure also serves to lower the cost of capital.  As previously 
mentioned, voluntary disclosures lower information asymmetries between managers 
and markets participants.  These voluntary disclosures should enable investors to 
make more reliable stock price valuations and therefore, reduce the information risk 
associated with that stock (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  This is supported by Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002) who find a negative relation between analyst rankings of annual 
report disclosures, and the cost of capital.  However, the study also reports that the 
cost of capital is positively related to rankings of quarterly disclosures.   
 
Although there are several theoretical benefits through providing comprehensive 
voluntary disclosures, it can be a costly strategy.  Not only can the act of publishing 
additional information be a cost burden, but also there are potentially considerable 
propriety costs involved.  That is, detailed disclosure will provide and reveal 
potentially important information to competitors, which may not benefit the company 
and therefore can be a substantial cost associated with voluntary disclosure (Ellis et 
al, 2012; Verrecchia, 1983).   
 
Finally, it has also been documented that managers voluntarily disclose bad news in 
order to realign shareholders expectations, which, in turn, improves investment 
efficiency.  Kumar et al (2012) examines how capital allocation influences voluntary 
disclosure strategies when managers hold superior information regarding a 
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company’s investment opportunities.  They document that when disclosing bad news, 
the aforementioned increase on efficiency, gained through voluntary disclosure, 
outweighs any unfavourable effects in the stock price if they had not made the 
disclosure.  This strategy of voluntarily disclosing bad news is supported by Skinner 
(1994) who finds that managers will disclose bad news early in order to avoid 
litigation costs.  Myers and Majiluf (1984) and Beyer and Guttman (2010) also report 
that voluntary disclosures are used as a strategy to increase a company’s share price 
during periods when additional equity financing is required.   
 
7.1.3  Voluntary Disclosure and AIM 
 
The literature relating to corporate disclosure has provided evidence of a link between 
the level of disclosure announcements and the quality of a company’s corporate 
governance structure using agency and information asymmetry theories.  However, 
very little research has been undertaken to examine the link when using voluntary 
rather than mandatory disclosures.  Voluntary disclosures are important to corporate 
governance as these announcements indicate to shareholders the willingness of 
management to communicate additional information to its shareholders over and 
above the minimum requirements that are mandated by regulation.  This, in turn, 
inspires confidence amongst investors that management are not expropriating 
shareholder funds. 
 
This study examines the relation between the quality of a company’s corporate 
governance structure and the level of voluntary disclosure made to test whether there 
is a significant difference in the level of voluntary disclosures when a company has a 
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quality corporate governance structure.  It is the first study to examine voluntary 
disclosures on AIM, providing insight into how effectively managers communicate 
to shareholders on AIM given that there is so little regulatory encouragement to do 
so and great discretion with which they can do so.  Furthermore, it is one of the few 
studies that examines pre-announcement disclosure as research has mainly 
concentrated in the voluntary disclosures found in a company’s annual report.   
 
The study also extends the theory into the role of Nomads by assessing how these 
external monitors impact on disclosure level/quality.  Corporate Governance 
measures will include: board composition, Number of NEDs on board, ownership 
structure, split role of CEO/chair, the presence of an audit committee, features of the 
remuneration and nomination committees, and finally, the choice of Nomad. 
 
As highlighted before, AIM companies are not required to formally follow the UK 
Corporate Governance Code or the QCA Guidance for Smaller Quoted Companies, 
which could lead to a wide disparity amongst companies when it comes to the quality 
of their corporate governance.  If companies choose not to follow these codes then it 
would be expected that they would also choose not to communicate with their 
shareholders through voluntary disclosures.  The AIM Rules for Companies (May 
2014) Rules 10-17 establish the boundaries when it comes to disclosure14.  Rule 10 
states that where price sensitive information is going to be announced at a shareholder 
meeting, disclosure of that information must be made to ensure that the public is not 
notified later than those attending the meeting.  Rule 11 sets out the general disclosure 
requirements for price sensitive information, which states that companies must 
                                                        
14 An outline if these rules can be found in Appendix 1. 
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disclose price sensitive information where there has been a change in its financial 
position/its sphere of activity/the performance of its business/the expectation of its 
performance.  Additionally, companies must disclose substantial and related party 
transactions (Rule 12&13); notify the exchange when they engage in a reverse 
takeover and issue a new up-to-date admission document (Rule 14); and inform the 
exchange when there is a fundamental change in the business such as, the 
disposal/insolvency of the company (Rule 15).  Companies must in addition keep up-
to-date company information on a website (Rule 26).   
 
Although AIM companies are encouraged to disclose the above information, the 
necessary level and detail of such disclosures are vague, open to interpretation, and 
leave much of the requirement to disclose, voluntary.  Consequently, information 
asymmetries might arise in the AIM market given the lenient approach to disclosure 
requirements.  The main rule of interest in this study is Rule 11, which relates to the 
timely disclosure of price sensitive information in regards to the company’s financial 
position, activity and performance.  This still leaves large scope for the use of 
voluntary disclosures as a means of indirectly communicating additional information 
to shareholders.  This can be achieved through the use of notifications of accounts, 
preliminary earnings, trading statements, and notices of holdings in the company.   
 
These items will be the main focus for analysis as the study concentrates on the pre-
announcement period (when a company releases its final/interim accounts) and the 
disclosure of these items may relay some information to the shareholder.  There may 
also be other voluntary/non-financial disclosures made within this period, such items 
may be firm or industry specific such as mining updates.  However, all disclosures 
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will be analysed in the first instance, then repeated to omitting general voluntary 
disclosures.  The pre-announcement period is defined as the time between a 
company’s year-end or half-year end and the date of the actual announcement of the 
final/interim results.  It is expected that companies with better governance will 
disclose more information to investors in this period.  Finally, although not under the 
purview of the FCA, AIM companies are required to follow Section 5 (DTR-5) of the 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules which states that, firms must make monthly 
announcements declaring the total number of shares in issue in order to determine 
any major shareholdings15.   
 
As well as the relation between corporate governance and information asymmetry, it 
is also of interest to examine whether there is a signalling effect with regard to pre-
announcement disclosures.  Therefore, an event study is undertaken to document the 
returns around the announcement period to see whether there is a relation between 
the level of voluntary disclosure and company performance.  A comparison will also 
establish whether there is a difference between companies that make disclosures and 
those who do not.  It might be expected that better governed companies make 
voluntary disclosures to signal information to shareholder about whether the results 
will contain good or bad news.  Skinner (1994) examines earnings-related voluntary 
disclosures and finds that managers voluntarily disclose bad news as they face 
litigation by shareholders should they fail to notify shareholders of bad news on a 
timely basis, causing large stock price falls.  
 
                                                        
15 Found at: http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/DTR/5  
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Companies listing on AIM are also generally smaller than those listed on the main 
market and are more tightly held.  This potentially means that their corporate 
governance system is different and potentially weaker given the costs involved for 
SMEs in implementing an appropriate system.  Ragothaman and Gollakota (2009) 
study the effects of firm characteristics on corporate governance in the US and find 
that firm size is statistically significant and conclude that small companies are less 
well governed.  Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) conclude that smaller 
companies have more lenient disclosure strategies compared to large companies.   
 
Therefore, given the relaxed approach to regulation and the concentrated ownership 
experienced on AIM companies, there may be inherent agency problems and 
information asymmetries between management and shareholders.  This leads to an 
opportunity to study a market where corporate governance is fundamental to 
protecting shareholders’ interests, but its adoption is completely voluntary.  Given 
this, there might be a connection between the quality of corporate governance 
structures, at company level, and the extent of voluntary disclosures that are not 
covered by the AIM Rules and the FCA disclosure directive.  The previous chapter 
finds significant evidence that corporate governance compliance has increased over 
time, providing the opportunity to discover whether voluntary disclosure strategies 
have equally improved with time. 
 
  
7-222 
 
7.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypothesis 
 
Different measures of corporate governance will be used to determine the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and different aspects of corporate governance.  This 
will allow comparison between different types of governance and the level of 
voluntary disclosures made to establish whether certain categories play a greater role 
in company disclosure than others.  The following discussion examines the roles of 
these corporate governance measures, referring to extant literature. 
 
7.2.1 Board Composition 
 
The role of the directors is directly related to the corporate governance of the 
company as they monitor and discipline managers who fail to consider shareholder 
interests.  Akhtaruddin et al (2009) state that board size is related to the level of 
disclosure given that it is the responsibility of the board of directors to set the level 
of disclosure.  Their study examines different corporate governance measures 
comparing the level of voluntary disclosure made by a sample of Malaysian 
companies and finds a positive relationship between board size and voluntary 
disclosures.  This is consistent with the finding from Chen and Jaggi (2000) and 
Birnbaum (1984) who both find that information asymmetries can be reduced by 
increasing board size.  However, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) examine board 
composition and the extent of voluntary disclosures for a sample of companies listed 
on the Singapore stock exchange in the year 2000.  They focus specifically on whether 
the extent of voluntary disclosure is influenced by the two different regulatory 
regimes: disclosure based regime or a merit based regime.  Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) state that, “under a disclosure-based regulatory framework, market 
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participants are expected to determine the merits of a firm's actions whereas in a 
“merit-based” regulatory framework, regulators decide on the propriety of firm 
transactions”.   The study finds no evidence that larger boards are associated with 
increased disclosure.  In fact, the study supports the findings from Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993) that when boards a too large, they have diffuse opinions 
and are unable to provide sufficient monitoring.  Therefore, the literature pertaining 
to board size is inconclusive.  However, given AIM is a market targeting SMEs, it 
might be assumed that there, boards are generally smaller so the first hypothesis 
supports the findings of Akhtaruddin et al (2009), that a greater proportion of 
directors on the board will result in a greater level of disclosure.  Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Number of directors to the board is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosures. 
 
7.2.2 Board Independence 
 
In addition to the size of the board, another important governance attribute is board 
independence.  An independent board has a greater proportion of independent 
directors than executive directors.  Fama (1980) states that independent directors are 
the principal monitors of management, charged with protecting the interests of 
shareholders.  Fama and Jensen (1983) extend this supposition and state that 
independent boards have greater control of the management decision-making process 
than boards with a low proportion of outside directors.  Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) 
find that NEDs are able to challenge strategies and decisions made by owner-
managers who may not be acting in the best interests of other stakeholders.  
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Brunninge et al (2007) also find that weaknesses in management strategies can be 
overcome by employing more NEDs on the board.  Similarly, Fiegener (2005) finds 
that presence of outside directors on the board is used to promote strategy 
development given that the owner-managers may not be competent to make such 
decisions.  This is supported by Keck (1997) and Leonard and Sensiper (1998) who 
find that outside directors will have a wide variety of skills and expertise allowing 
them to make more informed strategic decisions.  Johannisson and Huse (2000) also 
report that the presence of outside directors on the board enhances company 
reputation.  Independent directors also have incentives to provide a more effective 
monitoring role, as they have to maintain their reputational capital in order to keep 
their place on the board, as well as maintain opportunities to gain future positions on 
other boards (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).   
 
With regards to board independence and voluntary disclosure, empirical evidence is 
limited.  Ho and Wong (2001) use analyst perception as a measure of voluntary 
disclosure and do not find a significant relation between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and board independence.  Eng and Mak (2003) find a significant and 
negative effect associated with the percentage of independent directors and the level 
of voluntary disclosure.  Their findings show that greater numbers of outside directors 
on the board actually decreases the level of voluntary disclosures made.  This is put 
down to a substitution effect whereby NEDs are appointed by blockholders who 
receive information about managers directly rather than through voluntary public 
disclosure.  Similarly, Gul and Leung (2002) report a significant negative relation 
between voluntary disclosures and the percentage of NEDs (using multiple board 
memberships as a proxy).  However, Forker (1992) states that NEDs monitor the 
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quality of disclosure more effectively but do not examine the level of such disclosure.  
Chen and Jaggi (2000) examine both voluntary and mandatory disclosures and 
conclude that they are both positively associated with the proportion of NEDs on the 
board.  Similarly, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find a significantly positive relation 
between board independence and the level of voluntary disclosure, this association 
being two to three times stronger under the disclosure-based regulatory regime.  
These findings are supported by Akhtaruddin et al (2009) who examine voluntary 
disclosures found in the annual reports of 110 Malaysian companies.  The study 
documents significant evidence that voluntary discourse is positively related to board 
independence.  Evidence surrounding the effect of board independence in increasing 
a company’s transparency by way of voluntary disclosure is mixed, but more recent 
literature does provide intuitive and empirical evidence of a positive association. AIM 
companies only specifically highlight/refer to non-executive directors (NEDs) in the 
admission document which does not guarantee their complete independence.  
However, NEDs are outside directors and as the Corporate Governance code and 
QCA guidelines require independent directors, NEDs will be used as a proxy for 
board independence.  Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Percentage of NEDs is positively related to voluntary disclosures. 
 
Related to the theory of board independence, is CEO duality.  This is an important 
aspect in relation to corporate governance as duality may distort board independence 
as well as reducing the effectiveness and capability of the board to effectively monitor 
and controlling management (Jensen, 1993; Khanchel, 2007).  In addition, this may 
reduce the quality and quantities of the information disclosed and further exacerbate 
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the agency problem, by increasing information asymmetries (Li et al 2008).  This 
suggests that CEO duality reduces the board’s ability to effectively control 
management, which consequently lowers the level of disclosure.  Empirical results 
support the above evidence and report a significant negative relationship between 
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure (Gul and Leung, 2004; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008).  However, in other studies the results for duality are not significant as in Ho 
and Wong (2001) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006).  Given the AIM already has 
limited disclosure requirements, obstructions such as CEO duality may impede the 
quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures made.  Therefore, an extension to board 
independence, hypothesis 2b proposes: 
 
H2b: CEO Duality is negatively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
7.2.3 Gender Diversity 
 
With regards to gender diversity and level of company disclosure, Gul et al (2011) 
study the role of female directors and the level of corporate disclosure in US 
companies.  They find that more gender diverse boards are associated with a greater 
level of disclosure as diversity enhances transparency and the accuracy of financial 
reports.  This is corroborated by Barako et al (2008) who document that a higher 
presence of females and independent directors on the board is positively related to 
the level of CSR disclosure, for Kenyan banks.  Similarly, Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-
Sanchez (2010) find that gender diversity changes board behaviour in a way that 
increases transparency in relation to sustainability reporting.  In relation to UK 
markets, Cai et al (2006) study market efficiency for 144 companies listed on the LSE 
and find that gender diversity on the board results in less information asymmetry in 
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the market.  However, Nalikka (2009) studies gender roles and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure made in the annual reports for Finnish companies.  The study finds no 
significant relation between the presence of women and the volume of voluntary 
disclosures.  Furthermore, Hambrick et al (1996) states that gender diversity can have 
a divisive impact on the board, that can supress the decision making purpose of the 
board, negatively affecting board functionality.  To date, there has been very little 
research into gender roles and their association with voluntary disclosures, and the 
previous study found no relation between gender diversity and governance 
compliance.  However, there is an argument that as voluntary disclosures are 
influenced by the monitoring of the company, and as Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
document that women provide a more effective monitoring role within the board, it 
might be expected that their presence on AIM companies will increase voluntary 
disclosures.  Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Percentage of female directors on the board is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosures. 
 
7.2.4  The Audit Committee  
 
The audit committee’s main responsibility is to oversee and monitor the financial 
reporting process, ensuring transparency by mediating between the external auditor, 
the internal auditors, managers and directors (Saibaba and Ansari, 2011).  These 
responsibilities are discussed in detail in the previous chapter.  This present study is 
concerned with the transparency roles the audit committee has, as this will directly 
influence the level of voluntary disclosures.  With regard to corporate governance and 
disclosure, Ho and Wong (2001) find that the presence of an audit committee is 
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significantly and positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure, while the 
proportion of family members on the board is negatively related to voluntary 
disclosures.  Similarly, Forker (1992) studies the quality of share option disclosure in 
financial statements and finds that the monitoring role supplied by the audit 
committee reduces agency costs by enhancing the quality of disclosures made by 
management.  However, the findings by Akhtaruddin et al (2009) reveal that the 
quality of the members on the audit committee is more influential than the number of 
members.  Given this, there will be two hypotheses to test the importance of the audit 
committee in regard to both size and experience.  The next set of hypotheses is 
therefore: 
 
H4a: The presence of a director with accounting experience on the audit 
committee will be positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
 
H4b: The size and presence of an audit committee will be positively related to 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
7.2.5  Remuneration Committee 
 
The previous chapter has already noted the importance of the remuneration 
committee in limiting the ability of management to expropriate funds by awarding 
themselves inflated salaries Vafeas (2003).  However, there is very little theoretical 
or empirical analysis on how the remuneration committee influences the level of 
voluntary disclosures (if at all), and no prior study has examined the importance of 
this variable individually.   
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Beekes and Brown (2006) study the association between the quality of a company’s 
corporate governance and the informativeness of its disclosures.  The measure of 
informativeness includes: number of disclosures, analysts’ forecasts, and the 
timeliness of disclosures.  The study finds that better governed companies supply 
more informative disclosures.  However, the quality of corporate governance is 
measured using an index (similar to the one used in the previous chapter) and as such 
it cannot be determined how the remuneration committee variable affected the 
outcome in regards to disclosure.   
 
These findings are similar to those of Ho et al (2008) who document a positive 
relation between corporate governance and the level of voluntary disclosure, using a 
sample of Malaysian listed companies from 1996-2001.  However, once again, the 
remuneration committee variable is subsumed into a corporate governance index.  
There is therefore an opportunity to discover whether the remuneration committee 
provides an additional monitoring role with regards to the level of voluntary 
disclosures.   
 
The presence of remuneration might not intuitively affect the level of disclosure but 
a committee that only engages non-executive directors indicates a better-governed 
and monitored company and therefore one that might be more likely to reduce 
information asymmetries through voluntary disclosure.  Therefore the next 
hypotheses will be: 
 
H5a: The presence of a remuneration committee is positively associated with 
disclosures. 
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H5b: Remuneration committees with solely NEDs on the board is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
 
7.2.6  Nomination Committee 
 
The nomination committee is another potential corporate governance attribute 
associated with voluntary disclosures.  As mentioned in section 3.8 of the previous 
chapter, the nomination committee is tasked with considering the size, structure and 
composition of the board.  The nomination committee plays an important role in 
companies with a presence of large controlling shareholders, since it can provide 
minority shareholders with the opportunity to support a nominee (Jensen 1993; 
Shivdasani and Yermack 1999).  This might be particularly applicable on AIM where 
the percentage of shares being issued is relatively small and there is no regulatory 
minimum requirement with regard to the percentage of shares being issued16.  The 
effectiveness of this committee to appoint directors who are appropriate monitors 
and/or with the suitable experience will determine the success of the board.  This will 
then have a direct effect on how the board motivates and monitors its managers to 
reduce information asymmetries.  Therefore, the presence and structure of the 
nomination committee can contribute to the effectiveness of the monitoring process 
carried out by the board (Vafeas, 2000).  As with the remuneration committee, there 
is no extant literature relating to this possible association directly, but the variable is 
included, as part of a governance index, in a limited number of studies.  
 
                                                        
16 Table 3 in the previous chapter corroborates the claim that AIM companies have relatively small issues, as the 
mean issue size was 37.68%. 
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Allegrini and Greco (2013) study the voluntary disclosures made in 177 annual 
statements from Italian listed companies.  They combine the audit, remuneration and 
nominating committees to create one integrated committee variable.  However, there 
is no significant evidence to suggest that the committees are associated with the level 
of voluntary disclosure.  Similarly, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) examine the 
association between corporate governance and the level of voluntary intellectual 
capital disclosure using European biotechnology firms.  Once again the three main 
board sub-committees are integrated to form one variable.  Consistent with Allegrini 
and Greco (2013), there is no evidence supporting the relation between the 
nomination committee and the level of voluntary disclosures.  In fact the results are 
significantly negative, which the authors suggest could be owed to a substitution 
effect between corporate governance and disclosure.  Finally, O’Sullivan et al (2008) 
examine governance in relation to forward-looking disclosure information such as, 
the earnings forecasts found in the annual reports of Australian listed companies.  In 
contrast to the previous findings, there is a significantly positive relation between the 
‘committee’ variable and the level of the voluntary disclosure.   
 
The evidence surrounding the importance of the nomination committee in influencing 
a company’s disclosure policy is mixed.  However, given AIM is associated with 
concentrated ownership, the nominating committee could be an important feature, 
especially for the minority, allowing shareholders to influence and support the 
appointment of independent directors.  It is therefore important to consider this 
variable separate to the other committee variables, unlike in previous studies, to 
determine the relative and particular effect of board sub-committees in determining 
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the level of voluntary disclosure.  The hypothesis relating to the nominating 
committee is: 
 
 H6: An independent nominating committee is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
7.2.7  Ownership Structure 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that when there is a separation of ownership and 
control, conflict of interest between the two groups leads to agency costs.  In such 
circumstances, monitoring becomes more important along with the disclosure of 
information to protect the interests of shareholders.  Hossain et al (1994) assert that 
when a company’s shares are more widely held, the level of disclosure is higher.  
These findings are consistent with Chau and Gray (2002) who find a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and diffuse ownership.  However, Berle 
and Means (1932) suggests that companies with dispersed ownership experience less 
corporate monitoring.  This implies a negative relation between ownership and 
voluntary disclosure.  Coffee (1999) states that companies wishing to expand and 
remain competitive will adopt higher corporate governance standards than other 
companies listed on the main US markets.  The study suggests that companies with 
concentrated ownership will voluntarily disclose information to their shareholders.  
Lakhal (2005) studies the relationship between corporate governance attributes and 
voluntary disclosures of French firms.  The paper finds that disclosures increase when 
the company has a less concentrated ownership structure suggesting that better 
corporate governance leads to greater frequency of voluntary disclosures.  Similarly, 
La Porta et al (2000) find that dispersed ownership is more commonly found 
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alongside better quality corporate governance.  The theory reported by La Porta et al 
(2000) and Chau and Gray (2002) suggests a negative relation between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure.  Additionally, Coffee (1999) indicates that 
this might not be the case and that global competition will lead to companies with 
concentrated ownership acting in much the same way as those companies with 
dispersed ownership.   
 
The observations presented above provide mixed evidence regarding ownership 
concentration.  However, it is intuitive to hypothesise that tightly held issuing 
companies, who are not listing on AIM to raise additional capital, might not have the 
same incentives to have comprehensive disclosure policies as they have no need to 
provide the wider market with additional information.  From the admission document 
data collection block-holder are not always disclosed, the only comparable variable 
is the percentage of shares that are being admitted to the market.  Given AIM 
companies are generally SMEs; they are likely to be tightly help ownerships 
structures.  This study will use the % is shares being issued as a proxy of ownership 
concentration.  Therefore the next hypothesis is:  
 
H7: % of shares available is negatively related to voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
7.2.8  The Choice of Nomad 
 
As well as the aforementioned corporate governance measure, this study is also 
concerned with extending the research into the role of Nomads by examining their 
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relation to voluntary disclosure levels.  Given Nomads provide a monitoring and 
advisory role to ensure that companies comply with the AIM rules, it might also be 
expected that this role can influence a company’s disclosure policy.  Fan and Wong 
(2005) state that management might employ an external intermediary with the 
reputation to provide guarantees to investors that the company is credible.  Such 
assurances then reduce any existing agency costs.  Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) 
conducted interviews with AIM managers and Nomads and discovered that 
companies relied on their Nomad for corporate governance advice, while Nomads 
often decided whether to accept a client based on the quality of their corporate 
governance structure.  However, when this was empirically investigated, Mallin and 
Ow-Yong (2012) found no evidence that Nomad duality is significantly related to the 
corporate governance compliance of AIM listed companies.   
 
This study hypothesises that more reputable Nomads (top-15 Nomads) will encourage 
the companies they represent to disclose more information voluntarily given their 
primary monitoring function.  In addition to this, the assertion that Dual Nomads are 
better monitors, due to their increased reputational risk, is also analysed in relation 
with the extent of voluntary disclosures.   Therefore, the eighth hypotheses assert that: 
 
H8a: Companies that employ a top-15 Nomad are positively associated with 
company disclosure. 
 
H8b: Companies that employ a Dual Nomad are positively associated with 
company disclosure. 
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7.2.9 Auditor Quality 
 
External auditors are tasked with monitoring managerial behaviour on behalf of a 
firm’s stakeholders.  The positive relation between the audit process and the quality 
of corporate governance is reinforced by the quality of the auditor (Yeoh and Jubb 
2001).  Audit firm size has been well documented to have a positive influence on the 
level of corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ntim et al, 
2012) as well as the quality of the audit itself (DeAngelo, 1981).  This is attributed to 
these larger audit firms having greater expertise, experience, and knowledge of their 
roles and responsibilities (DeAngelo, 1981; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  This, in turn, 
enhances their independence and ability to mitigate any unscrupulous pursuits of 
managers.   
 
Previous studies (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995) provide 
further evidence that the type of audit firm and the level of disclosure are positively 
related.  More recently, O’Sullivan et al (2008) examine how the appointment of a 
Big-6 audit firm is associated with the level of disclosure.  They find a significantly 
positive relation that Big-6 auditors voluntarily disclose more information in their 
annual report.  Given that AIM is largely compiled of SMEs, it might be suggested 
that the cost burden associated with hiring of a Big-4 auditor might be an indicator of 
quality.  This would then suggest that these companies would adopt better disclosure 
policies.  Therefore the ninth hypothesis will be: 
 
H9: Companies who appoint a Big-4 auditor will are positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure levels. 
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7.2.10 Control Variables 
 
Prior literature identifies a number of additional factors that could influence the level 
of voluntary disclosures.  The control variables that are included in the model are: 
firm size (Hossain et al, 1994), firm performance (Meek et al, 1995), and industry 
sector (Meek et al, 1995).  In addition, previous disclosure studies indicate that a 
positive association exists between voluntary disclosure and firm size (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al, 1994; Kent and Ung, 2003).  Similarly, Cox (1987) 
and Choon et al, (2000) state that larger firms are also more likely to publish earnings 
forecasts than smaller firms.  Studies also report the relation between leverage and 
disclosure.  Voluntary disclosure can mitigate information asymmetry, decreasing the 
borrower’s risk of default, which in turn, reduces the cost of capital (Baiman and 
Verrecchia, 1996; Sengupta, 1998).  However, empirical analysis produces mixed 
results as Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Hossain et al (1994) find the association 
between leverage and disclosure to be non-significant while Meek et al (1995) 
document a significant negative relation.  The final variable will be bid-ask spread to 
control for liquidity. 
 
7.2.12 Summary of Literature 
 
The table below presents a summary of the above literature with the corresponding 
sign in relation to voluntary disclosure.  Furthermore, the expected sign hoped to be 
achieved in this study is provided in the final column. 
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Table 7.1  Summary of Literature Review 
 Experienced Sign Expected Sign 
Board Composition  
+ve 
Akhtaruddin et al (2009) +ve 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) +ve 
Birnbaum (1984) +ve 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) +ve 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) -ve 
Jensen (1993) -ve 
Board Independence   
Ho and Wong (2001) No Evidence 
+ve 
Eng and Mak's (2003) -ve 
Gul and Leung (2002) -ve 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) +ve 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) +ve 
Akhtaruddin et al (2009) +ve 
CEO Duality   
Gul and Leung (2004) -ve 
-ve 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) -ve 
Ho and Wong (2001)  No Evidence 
Cheng & Courtenay (2006). No Evidence 
Gender Diversity   
Barako and Brown (2008) +ve 
+ve/-ve 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 
(2010) 
+ve 
Gul et al (2011) +ve 
Nalikka (2011) No Evidence 
The Audit Committee   
Ho and Wong (2001) +ve 
+ve Forker (1992) +ve 
Akhtaruddin et al (2009) No Evidence 
Remuneration Committee   
Beekes and Brown (2006) +ve* 
+ve 
Barako (2008) +ve* 
Nomination Committee   
Allegrini and Greco (2013) No Evidence* 
+ve/-ve Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) No Evidence* 
O’Sullivan et al (2008) +ve* 
% Shares Issues   
Hossain (1994) +ve 
+ve 
Chau and Gray (2002) +ve 
Berle and Means (1932) -ve 
Coffee (1999) -ve 
La Porta et al (2000) +ve 
Nomad Reputation   
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) +ve 
+ve/-ve 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) No Evidence 
Auditor Quality   
Owusu-Ansah, 1998 +ve 
+ve 
Eng and Mak, 2003 +ve 
Ntim et al (2012) +ve 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) +ve 
Wallace and Naser (1995) +ve 
O’Sullivan et al (2008) +ve 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) +ve 
The table lists the corporate governance indicators used in this study along with the relevant literature supporting 
its inclusion.  The second column provides the sign experienced in relation to the level of voluntary disclosures; 
the third column provides the sign expected to be found in this study. (+ve) is a positive relation, and (-ve) is a 
negative relation. * denotes items not directly examined but rather combined as part of a governance index. 
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7.3 Data 
 
The sample consists of 200 of the most recently listed companies used in the previous 
sample17.  This incorporates a period from 2006-2012.  As this study is not concerned 
with how disclosure level has changed over time, this stratified sample instead 
consists of the most up-to-date data sample that incorporates pre-post economic crisis 
data.  Although this gives rise to questions surrounding selection bias, this sample 
allowed for more complete data collection as older companies, over the course of the 
entire study, have been observed more cancellations. 
 
In order to measure the level of voluntary disclosure, all voluntary pre-
announcements disclosures are collected between each company’s year-end/half-
year-end and the time the actual results are announced.  Schedule 5, in Appendix 6.1, 
states the boundaries for disclosures, which apply to pre-announcement.  Therefore, 
voluntary disclosures include: Notification of Results, trading updates, managerial 
changes, quarterly earnings announcements, awards, operational updates, and general 
non-financial news announcements.  The window for issuing voluntary 
announcements is large, although as the pre-announcement window starts from a 
company’s year-end, then it is appropriate to examine all announcement made during 
this period.  Analysis later in this study will examine specific pre-announcements of 
the Notification of Results, which is more directly associated with the actual 
final/interim results. 
 
                                                        
17 Sample size based on timeliness to hand-collect the data. 
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AIM companies have a six-month window in which to report their final results and a 
three-month window for their interim results18.  This is considerably longer than the 
four (two) months allowed to Main Market listed companies to publish their final 
(interim) reports19.  This gives firms a long window to issue voluntary disclosures 
such as “Notification of Results” and trading statements, to reduce the impact of the 
actual announcement, especially where this announcement is expected to contain bad 
news (Soffer et al, 2000).  This data is gathered from the London Stock Exchange 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) through NexisUK.  Any missing data was checked 
against the RNS announcement stored on the company’s own website.  All other data 
and control variables such as, gearing, market cap, total assets and operating 
performance measures are gathered using DataStream. 
 
In addition to the voluntary disclosures, the corporate governance attributes discussed 
in the previous section are also collated.  While the previous study examined the level 
of compliance, this study focuses on the actual structure of these governance 
variables.  Therefore, the raw data from the previous section’s data collection will be 
used as a basis for analysis.  That is, instead of requiring a minimum board size of 
four, the actual size of the board for each company will be used.  Furthermore, to 
guarantee the accuracy of these governance variables in relation to voluntary 
disclosure, the data will only include final and interim results for the company’s first 
year of incorporation, as the governance variables are collected from the admission 
document. Any reported change in director where this change affects the board 
composition is amended accordingly (that is, if the independence or gender diversity 
                                                        
18 AIM rule 18 and 19. 
19  http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/documents/brochures/main-
market-continuing-obligations.pdf  
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variables are affected).  Finally, as the role of Nomads is also being further 
investigated, any announcement of a Nomad switch is also documented and the 
reputation ranking updated.   
 
Unlike previous studies that focus on voluntary disclosures in the annual reports, this 
study is concerned with new announcement published in the pre-announcement 
period leading up to the final/interim results publication.  Furthermore, there is no 
judgement made on whether the disclosure contains positive or negative news as this 
form of content analysis would inevitably involve subjective judgements.  This is 
reported as the main limitation of this type of methodology (Healy and Palepu 2001, 
p. 427).  Instead, two indices are created; one to include the total number of voluntary 
pre-earnings disclosures made, and another that removes general disclosure that may 
be firm/industry specific and skew the results even after controlling for industry 
sector.  For example, Oil and Gas entities make ‘drilling’ and ‘mining’ updates, which 
other industries understandably do not issue.   However, although no judgement is 
made about the type of the content in the announcement, the second part of this study 
will determine what the market infers from certain types of announcements by 
examining the market reaction to the publication of a Notice of Results. 
 
Table 7.2 describes the voluntary disclosure collected for the indices.   Panel A lists 
the different types of voluntary disclosures collated from the data collection.  General 
disclosures, which include mining updates and operational aspect of the company, 
are the prime voluntary disclosures made.  However, it is worth noting that general 
disclosure such as mining and drilling updates are industry specific.  The final two 
rows in panel A report the number of voluntary disclosures made and the total number 
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of disclosures made and shows that there are over 1,000 more mandatory disclosure 
made over the sample period indicating that voluntary disclosures are underutilised 
as a form of communication. 
 
The panel B reports the number of firm observations over the different industry 
sectors and years.  Basic Material is the most represented industry and Utilities the 
worst, with only 8 observations.  Furthermore, there are only 13 and 16 observations 
of the years 2009 and 2012, respectively.  Panel C documents the distribution of the 
Notification of Results and Trading Statement disclosures made over the year-end 
and half-year end pre-announcement period.  These are important voluntary 
disclosures as they are the only two that directly correspond to the actual earnings 
announcement.  The panel reports that there are more trading statements made than 
notice of results but also highlights that these trading statements occur more 
frequently preceding the final earnings announcement. 
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Table 7.2  Distribution of Voluntary Disclosure 
 Obs. Min Max Mean Median SD 
Panel A: Distribution of Disclosures     
Notification of Results (NOR) 89 0 2 1.00 1 0.15 
Trading Statements 92 0 4 1.03 1 0.32 
Operations Updates 22 0 3 1.29 1 0.69 
Quarterly Earnings 5 0 2 1.67 2 0.58 
Managerial Changes 18 0 2 1.06 1 0.24 
Awards 4 0 2 1.33 1 0.58 
General Disclosures 577 0 12 1.39 2 1.80 
Total Voluntary Score 807 0 17 3.88 3 3.01 
Total Disclosure (vol+man) 1851 0 27 5.11 4 4.38 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry and year 
BMATR 34 OILGS 28 2006 36 2010 35 
CNSMG 18 TECNO 27 2007 34 2011 33 
CNSMS 24 TELCM 12 2008 33 2012 16 
HLTHC 21 UTILS 8 2009 13   
INDUS 28       
Panel C: NOR and Trading Statement Observations 
 YES NO Y/E Obs H/YE Obs 
Notification of Results  89 311 44 45 
Trading Statements 92 308 56 36 
Table display the descriptive stats from the data collection.  Panel A details the observations across the different 
types of voluntary disclosure.  Panel B lists the firm observations over industry sector and year.  Finally, Panel C 
provides the distribution of the main earnings announcement over combined sample, year-end sample (YE), and 
Interim results (HYE). The Score in Italics is represents the total number of per-announcement disclosures: 
voluntary + mandatory. 
 
Finally, given the number of independent variables and controls it is necessary to 
generate a correlation matrix to provide univariate relationships between the variable 
and test for the presence of potential multicolinearity.  The results are presented in 
Table 7.3.  For the year-end index (VIndexYE), the strongest relationships occur 
between the nomination committee (+ve), Nomad Duality (-ve) and year (+ve).  For 
the interim index (VIndexHYE), the strongest results are CEO duality (-ve), and log 
market capital (+ve).  Finally, none of the coefficients indicate the presence of 
mulitcolinearity.  
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Table 7.3  Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
    a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v 
a VIndex YE 1.000                      
b VIndex HYE 0.254 1.000                     
c Total No on Board -0.079 -0.046 1.000                    
d Gender Diversity -0.094 -0.024 0.271 1.000                   
e Board Independence 0.000 -0.016 0.120 0.053 1.000                  
f CEO Duality -0.070 -0.114 0.138 0.026 0.085 1.000                 
g Audit Committee Size -0.020 -0.051 0.435 0.091 0.197 0.162 1.000                
h Accounting Expert 0.026 0.032 0.093 -0.072 0.148 -0.019 0.176 1.000               
i NEDs on Remuneration -0.044 -0.091 0.252 0.006 0.330 0.154 0.187 0.151 1.000              
j Nomination Committee 0.203 0.096 0.236 0.156 0.013 -0.071 0.140 0.026 0.130 1.000             
k % Share Issue -0.013 -0.016 0.022 0.031 0.044 0.067 0.156 0.061 0.136 0.004 1.000            
l Top-15 Nomad -0.030 -0.027 0.140 0.000 -0.067 -0.071 0.085 -0.032 0.078 0.133 0.080 1.000           
m Nomad Duality -0.187 -0.053 0.018 0.008 0.024 -0.001 0.011 -0.092 -0.081 0.097 -0.015 0.287 1.000          
n Tobin’s Q 0.028 -0.010 -0.102 0.017 -0.058 -0.245 -0.049 -0.080 -0.127 -0.031 0.000 0.012 -0.074 1.000         
o Big-4 Auditor 0.030 -0.055 0.139 -0.007 0.011 -0.129 0.064 0.045 0.057 0.157 -0.024 0.242 0.104 -0.061 1.000        
p Log Market Cap -0.004 0.157 0.187 -0.004 -0.014 -0.006 0.035 0.207 0.073 0.225 0.008 0.051 0.035 0.108 0.199 1.000       
q ROA -0.009 0.047 0.086 0.043 -0.074 -0.004 0.019 0.004 -0.010 0.054 -0.102 -0.113 -0.015 -0.247 0.089 0.160 1.000      
r Gearing  0.035 -0.056 -0.006 -0.021 0.085 0.001 0.005 0.051 0.077 0.147 0.069 -0.052 0.044 0.020 0.137 0.056 -0.029 1.000     
s Year 0.164 -0.020 -0.065 -0.046 0.001 -0.040 -0.007 -0.032 -0.097 0.068 -0.021 -0.010 0.081 0.074 0.024 0.044 -0.046 -0.101 1.000    
t Industry Codes 0.121 0.084 0.094 0.051 0.002 -0.035 0.100 -0.106 0.110 0.110 0.062 -0.022 0.016 0.076 0.062 0.173 -0.044 0.128 -0.060 1.000   
u CAR (-1, +1) -0.009 0.010 -0.021 -0.041 -0.109 0.020 0.063 0.042 -0.126 0.103 0.074 -0.059 0.040 0.186 -0.048 0.118 0.013 -0.011 0.016 0.083 1.000  
v Information Asymmetry 0.020 0.010 -0.015 -0.025 -0.153 0.036 0.072 0.010 -0.153 0.110 0.048 -0.053 0.015 0.174 -0.054 0.126 0.017 -0.013 0.032 0.075 0.176 1.000 
Table provides spearman correlation matrix for the independent variables and the two voluntary disclosure indices.  VIndex YE is the voluntary pre-announcement disclosure made around the 
final earnings announcement, VIndex HYE is the disclosure made in the period preceding the interim results announcement.  The letters depicting the variable in the title row correspond to the 
matching letter and variable on the vertical title axis. 
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Table 7.4 provides the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the 
regression analysis.  The statics provided are the average, standard deviation, minim 
observation and maximum observation for all variables.  The main issues to note at this 
point is that gearing and Tobin’s Q have high standard deviations due to being not 
normally distributed.  However, attempts at transformations did not improve the 
distribution enough to warrant doing so.  Therefore, as these variables are not well 
specified, regression analysis is undertaken by systematically removing these two 
variables for robustness. 
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Table 7.4  Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
VIndex YE 199 2.176 2.016 0 14 
Vindex HYE 199 1.814 1.673 0 9 
Total No on Board 199 5.317 1.469 2 10 
Gender Diversity 199 0.236 0.481 0 2 
Board Independence 199 0.653 0.477 0 1 
CEO Duality 199 0.925 0.265 0 1 
Audit Committee Size 183 2.443 0.708 0 5 
Accounting Expert 182 0.780 0.428 0 2 
NEDs on Remuneration 198 0.712 0.526 0 3 
Nomination Committee 199 0.342 0.475 0 1 
% Share Issue 199 0.513 0.501 0 1 
Top-15 Nomad 199 0.372 0.485 0 1 
Nomad Duality 199 0.799 0.402 0 1 
Tobin's Q 196 1.016 3.928 -5.849 32.498 
Big-4 Auditor 199 0.286 0.453 0 1 
Log Market Cap 197 9.868 1.442 4.616 13.889 
ROA 198 -0.251 1.167 -14.675 0.971 
Gearing 187 0.900 4.980 -11.473 54.12 
Year 199 2008 1.924 2006 2012 
Industry Codes 199 4.397 1.376 1 9 
CAR (-1, +1) 196 0.370 1.212 -0.137 72.963 
Information Asymmetry  196 0.276 0.145 3.89e-07 2.000 
Table provides the descriptive statistics for the independent variables alongside the two VIndex dependent variable 
denoting pre-announcements disclosures made for the final results announcements (VIndex YE), and the disclosure 
made preceding the interim announcement (VIndex HYE). Obs is the number of observations.  
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7.3 Methodology (Part I) 
 
The first analysis undertaken will be to establish the relation between the level of 
voluntary disclosures, through the VIndex, and individual corporate governance 
attributes.  To do this, LS regression is performed.   The model is presented below.  It 
should be noted that all the following equations that refer to a regressions to be tested 
will be referred to by their model number.  The corresponding Table 7.5 describes all 
the variables used in each of the regression models, as well as the expected sign to be 
generated after the regression is employed.   
   
Model 1 
𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽1 Total Board +   𝛽2  Gender Diversity + 𝛽3  Board Independence +𝛽4 
CEO duality+ 𝛽5 Audit committee Size + 𝛽6 Accounting expert + 𝛽7 Solely Neds + 
𝛽8  Nomination committee + 𝛽9  Ownership + 𝛽10  Top-15 Nomad + 𝛽11  Nomad 
Duality + 𝛽12 Tobin’s Q + 𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor + 𝛽14 Log Market Cap + 𝛽15 ROA +𝛽16 
Gearing+ 𝛽17 Year + 𝛽18 Industry + 𝛽19 Live/Dead + 𝜀     (7.1) 
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Table 7.5  Description of Variables and Relationship in LS Regression 
Variable Labels Variable Description 
Exptd. 
Sign 
VIndex Voluntary disclosure index. Index 
𝛽1 Total Board The total number of directors on the board. + 
𝛽2 Gender Diversity The total number of females (if any) on Board. + 
𝛽3 Board Independence A greater proportion of NEDs on the board. + 
𝛽4 CEO duality The combined role of CEO and chair (1=split, 0=dual) - 
𝛽5 Audit committee Size 
The number or directors assigned to the audit 
committee. 
+ 
𝛽6Accounting expert 
Whether there is an accounting expert on the audit 
committee. 
+ 
𝛽7 Solely Neds  
Whether there are solely NEDs on the remuneration 
committee. 
+ 
𝛽8 Nomination committee 
Whether the nomination committee is constructed by a 
majority of independent directors (1= yes, 0= no). 
+ 
𝛽9 Ownership  Minimum share issue of 25% + 
𝛽10 Top-15 Nomad 
1 if Nomad is a Top-15 Nomad, 0 otherwise.  Measures 
Nomad Reputation. 
+ 
𝛽11 Nomad Duality 
1 if Nomad also acts as Broker, 0 otherwise.  Measures 
Nomad Reputation. 
+ 
𝛽12Tobin’s Q  + 
𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor 1 if auditor is Big-4, 0 if otherwise. + 
𝛽14  Market Cap Market Capitalisation controls for company size.   + 
𝛽15 ROA Return on Assets to control for performance + 
𝛽16 Gearing Total Liabilities to Total Assets + 
𝛽17 Year 
Year dummy to show whether disclosure has changed 
over time. 
+ 
𝛽18 Industry Industry dummy. +/- 
𝛽19 Live/Dead 
Live company dummy. 1=company is still listed, 0= 
company is dead. 
+ 
𝛽20 CAR(-1,+1) 
Cumulative abnormal Return for three-day period 
around announcement. 
+/- 
𝛽21 Info Asymmetry  Standard deviation of the three-day abnormal returns - 
𝛽22 VIndex Voluntary disclosure index. Index 
The table provides a list of the variables in the OLS regression, along with a description of each variable and its 
expected relationship with the voluntary disclosure index in the OLS regression model.  VIndex is the dependent 
variable and 𝛽1 − 𝛽22 are the independent variables.  NB in model 3, information asymmetry is 𝛽21. 
 
 
7-248 
 
In addition to how corporate governance attributes influence the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, an examination of stock market returns is also performed.  This indicates 
whether managers choose to release good news or bad news voluntarily, as a way to 
avoid price shocks and potential litigation (Skinner, 1994).  To do this, cumulative 
abnormal returns are analysed over the period the earnings announcement is made.   
 
Similar to chapter four, market model parameters are used and measured over a 100-
day estimation period prior to each announcement.  The abnormal returns (AR) are 
then estimated for the period (-1, 0, +1).  Where -1 is one day before the announcement, 
0 is the event date and, +1 is one day after the announcement date.  This three day 
holding period return reduces event day uncertainty in observations where the 
announcement may have been made on a non-trading days.  This might be particularly 
problematic for voluntary news announcements, especially general news 
announcements, that may not be made during trading hours. The abnormal returns are 
calculated using the following equation: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝛼 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡] (7.2)  
 
Where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡is the abnormal returns of the company 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the returns of the 
company 𝑖  at time 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the realised return on the market index (FTSE 
ALLSHARE ), and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the regression equation parameters.  To help control 
for thin trading, the 𝛽  is adjusted using the Scholes and Williams (1977) method 
(detailed in 5.4.2). As in section 6.4.2, the 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is adjusted for the risk-free rate 
of return, using UK T-bills and converting the annual figure into daily trading risk by 
assuming 250 trading days per year.  From here the average abnormal return is 
calculated which aggregates the abnormal returns for all observations to find the 
7-249 
 
average abnormal return at each time t.  This helps eliminate idiosyncrasies in 
measurement.   
 
The CAR is then calculated by taking a sum of the abnormal returns for each company 
from day-1 through to day+1 as shown in the following equation: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−1,+1) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖(−1,+1)
𝑡1
𝑡−1                           (7.3) 
    
With the CARs calculated, the model is now repeated with the addition of stock price 
performance.  The model is presented below.  As disclosure should be the driver of 
ex-post CAR, CAR (01, +1) is the dependent variable in the next analysis.  Once again, 
a description of the variable is provided in Table 7.5. 
 
Model 2 
CAR(-1,+1) + 𝜀 = 𝛽1 Total Board +   𝛽2 Gender Diversity + 𝛽3 Board Independence 
+𝛽4 CEO duality+ 𝛽5 Audit committee Size + 𝛽6 Accounting expert + 𝛽7 Solely Neds 
+ 𝛽8  Nomination committee + 𝛽9  Ownership + 𝛽10  Top-15 Nomad + 𝛽11  Nomad 
Duality + 𝛽12 Tobin’s Q + 𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor + 𝛽14 Log Market Cap + 𝛽15 ROA +𝛽16 
Gearing+ 𝛽17 Year + 𝛽18 Industry + 𝛽19 Live/Dead 
 + 𝛽19𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥+ 𝜀                    (7.4) 
 
The next examination incorporates the effects voluntary disclosures have on 
information asymmetries.  It has been well documented that voluntary disclosures 
increases communication between managers and shareholders and therefore, reduce 
information asymmetries.  To measure information asymmetry, the method stipulated 
by Dierkins (1991) is used.  This method uses the volatility around abnormal returns 
as a proxy for information asymmetry.  This is calculated using the standard deviation 
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of the three-day abnormal returns around the final/interim results announcement date.  
The market-adjusted abnormal returns are used as a basis for this method (as in project 
one) and are also adjusted for thin trading under the Scholes and Williamson method.  
A strong positive/negative reaction around the announcement date will indicate the 
presence of information asymmetry (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Moeller 
et al, 2007).  This measure is then incorporated into the LS regression and is shown in 
Model 3.  However, given that information asymmetry should encourage managers to 
mitigate the agency problem through increased disclosure, it is the asymmetry that 
should drive the level of disclosure, and is the dependent variable in this next model.  
Furthermore, Model 4 incorporates both the abnormal returns and information 
asymmetry proxy to the model. 
 
Model 3 
Information Asymmetry = 𝛽1 Total Board +  𝛽2  Gender Diversity + 𝛽3  Board 
Independence +𝛽4 CEO duality+ 𝛽5 Audit committee Size + 𝛽6 Accounting expert + 
𝛽7 Solely Neds + 𝛽8 Nomination committee + 𝛽9 Ownership + 𝛽10 Top-15 Nomad + 
𝛽11 Nomad Duality + 𝛽12 Tobin’s Q + 𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor + 𝛽10 Top-15 Nomad + 𝛽11 
Nomad Duality + 𝛽12 Tobin’s Q + 𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor + 𝛽14 Log Market Cap + 𝛽15 
ROA +𝛽16 Gearing+ 𝛽17 Year + 𝛽18 Industry + 𝛽19 Live/Dead 
 + 𝛽19𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥+ 𝜀                    (7.5) 
 
Model 4 
𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽1 Total Board +   𝛽2  Gender Diversity + 𝛽3  Board Independence +𝛽4 
CEO duality+ 𝛽5 Audit committee Size + 𝛽6 Accounting expert + 𝛽7 Solely Neds + 
𝛽8  Nomination committee + 𝛽9  Ownership + 𝛽10  Top-15 Nomad + 𝛽11  Nomad 
Duality + 𝛽12 Tobin’s Q + 𝛽13 Big-4 Auditor + 𝛽14 Log Market Cap + 𝛽15 ROA +𝛽16 
Gearing+ 𝛽17  Year + 𝛽18  Industry + 𝛽19  Live/Dead+ 𝛽20  CAR(-1,+1) + 𝛽21 
Information Asymmetry + 𝜀            (7.6) 
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The final part of the regression analysis examines voluntary disclosures that directly 
correspond to earnings.  To do this, only notification of results (NOR) and trading 
statements are analysed, and information asymmetry and the CAR are the dependent 
variables.  Binary variables are included in the independent variable to represent 
companies that only issue NORs and those that only issue trading statement, or those 
who issue both.  The other independent variables described in models 1-4 remain the 
same.  This analysis will determine how disclosure affects information asymmetries 
and the abnormal returns earned at the time of the actual earnings announcement. 
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7.4. Data Analysis (Part I) 
 
The first part of this analysis examines how corporate governance attributes affect the 
level or voluntary disclosure using Models 1-4 detailed in the section above.  Models 
1 and 4 test corporate governance attributes in relation to the voluntary disclosure 
index.  However, the only significant results are Gender Diversity, which is negative 
at the 5% level.  This suggests that the presence of women on boards negatively 
impacts on the level of voluntary disclosure.  This is also contrary to extant literature 
from Berako and Brown (2008) and Gul et al (2011).  There is also a positive relation 
between voluntary disclosure and the presence of the Nomination Committee.  
Although the results in relation to corporate governance attributes are limited, there is 
evidence supporting the sixth hypothesis relating to the nomination committee.  
Overall these finding indicate that governance attributes are not the main driver to 
voluntary disclosure as, with the exception of hypotheses two and six, all others have 
to be rejected. 
 
Model 2 is related to the abnormal returns earned around the time of the actual earnings 
announcement and whether corporate governance attributes and the level of voluntary 
disclosure drive them.  The only significant result here is, CEO duality.  This suggest 
that governance is a driver of the abnormal returns earned through the split role of the 
CEO and chair.  However, there is no significant finding for any other governance 
attribute and there is also no significance relating to the level of voluntary disclosure.   
 
Model 3 examines the relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetries, using the standard deviation of the abnormal returns over 
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the announcement period (-1, +1) as a proxy. As before, there is only one significant 
finding in this analysis, that of Nomad reputation.  There is a weak (1%) negative 
relation between a reputable Nomad and the level of information asymmetry.  This 
highlights that Nomads play a governance role that help mitigate the agency problem, 
by having a negative impact of the issue of information asymmetry.  To provide further 
confidence in the Models 2&3, the Durbin and Wu-Hausman are performed in order 
to test for endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables.  The scores 
are shown below.  The null hypothesis for these tests is that the variables are 
exogenous.  Therefore, in both models, we cannot reject the null and, therefore, the 
variables are not endogenous. 
Model 2 
  Robust score chi2(1)                = .089733 (p = 0.7645) 
  Robust regression F (1,112)      = .075347 (p = 0.7842) 
Model 3 
  Robust score chi2(1)                =   .40041 (p = 0.5269) 
  Robust regression F (1,113)      = .342791 (p = 0.5594) 
 
Finally, there is no significance among the control variables used in this analysis.  The 
results for the LS regression for voluntary disclosure around interim earnings results 
are presented in Appendix 7.2.  The results for this analysis are weaker than the year-
end results as no governance variable is associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  However, the findings suggest the company size is influential as this result 
is significantly positive.  In addition, gearing and Tobin’s Q, despite have large 
standard deviations, did not improve the regression model when removed. Therefore, 
is still presented in the results below. 
 
Table 7.6  Regression Analysis for YE Voluntary Disclosure 
 VIndex CAR Information 
Asymmetry 
Vindex 
(combined) 
Big-4 auditor -0.0702 -0.0375 -0.0257 -0.149 
 (-0.19) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.37) 
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Total number of directors -0.225 -0.0180 -0.0101 -0.234 
 (-1.15) (-1.03) (-0.80) (-1.17) 
Number of NEDs 0.335 0.0301 0.0443 0.337 
 (1.26) (1.20) (0.42) (1.25) 
Board independence 0.113 -0.00121 -0.0586 0.0812 
 (0.21) (-0.18) (-1.13) (0.15) 
CEO duality -0.902 0.0131** 0.0520 -0.918 
 (-0.82) (2.41) (0.97) (-0.82) 
Gender diversity -0.655** -0.0101 -0.0182 -0.732** 
 (-2.08) (-1.21) (-0.58) (-2.19) 
Audit committee total -0.340 -0.0362 0.0255 -0.306 
 (-1.28) (-0.10) (0.96) (-1.13) 
Present accounting expert -0.258 0.0309 0.0105 -0.248 
 (-0.67) (0.42) (0.44) (-0.61) 
Solely NEDs on remuneration -0.470 0.00291 -0.0559 -0.503 
 (-0.79) (0.65) (-1.21) (-0.82) 
Nomination committee 0.0977** 0.0130 0.0598 0.104** 
 (-2.51) (-0.19) (-1.09) (-2.58) 
Share issue -0.0561 -0.0112 0.153 0.0230 
 (-0.09) (-0.94) (1.19) (0.03) 
Top-15 nomad 0.122 0.0827 -0.0388 0.129 
 (0.32) (0.18) (-1.91)* (0.33) 
Dual nomad -0.728* 0.00195 0.0400 -0.738* 
 (-1.70) (0.28) (1.00) (-1.66) 
Tobins Q 0.0245 0.0232 0. 305 0.0212 
 (1.42) (0.92) (0.79) (1.23) 
Log market cap -0.0788 -0.0727 0.0198 -0.0679 
 (-0.69) (-0.35) (1.14) (-0.57) 
ROA 0.0342 -0.00721 0.00272 0.0429 
 (0.27) (-1.15) (0.63) (0.35) 
Gearing 0.0222 0.0178 -0.0126 0.0221 
 (1.23) (1.20) (-1.02) (1.23) 
Year 0.0953 -0.0474 0.00199 0.0918 
 (1.24) (-0.54) (0.63) (1.18) 
Live/dead -0.166 0.0164 0.0222 -0.146 
 (-0.31) (0.27) (0.59) (-0.26) 
Industry 0.0957 -0.00472 0.00268 0.0987 
 (1.27) (-0.57) (0.70) (1.32) 
VIndex  -0.0413 -0.0485  
  (-0.33) (-0.80)  
CAR    -2.206 
    (-0.28) 
Info asymmetry    0.0267 
    (0.00) 
_cons -184.8 0.975 -4.212 -177.9 
 (-1.19) (0.55) (-0.66) (-1.14) 
N 136 134 135 134 
R2 0.192 0.088 0.174 0.197 
adj. R2 0.051 -0.083 0.021 0.038 
F 2.351 0.705 0.271 2.264 
df_m 20 21 21 22 
df_r 115 112 113 111 
Table displays the regression coefficients and the corresponding test statistic for models 1-4 for the voluntary 
disclosures made around a company’s final results.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
7.4.1  Multinomial Regression Analysis 
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The final part of this analysis examines the choice companies make when considering 
whether to disclose trading statements, notification of results, or both.  These two 
disclosures are the key earnings pre-announcements as they are the only two that 
specifically refer to the actual earnings of the company.  This next analysis uses 
multinomial logit regression to examine how the independent variable affects the 
choice of choosing on both these voluntary disclosures.  Multinomial logistic 
regression is useful in situations where the dependent variable is nominal but cannot 
be ordered.  This model also assumes that the dependent variable is not perfectly 
predicted from the independent variable in any of the outcomes.  Furthermore, there is 
no need for the independent variables to be independent from each other.  Its 
application and interpretation is similar to logistic regression but with nominal rather 
than binary outcomes (Long and Freese, 2006).  This analysis also requires a base 
against which to test.  In this study the alternative outcome is the choice to publish 
none of these disclosures.   
 
The results are documented in Table 7.7 and use the same independent variables as the 
LS regression analysis.  The significant findings from this analysis are all positive.  
Therefore, with regard to notice of results only, there is a positive relation between % 
share issue and voluntary disclosure.  That is, there is a significant probability that as 
the diffuse ownership increases, the multinomial log-odds for preferring to voluntary 
disclose Notice of Results over the choice not to disclose any information increases by 
1.28 (holding all other variable in the model constant).  Similarly, there is also support 
that as information asymmetry increases the choice of preferring to voluntarily 
disclose notices of results increases compared to the alternative not to disclose any 
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information.  This indicates that companies may issue voluntary disclosures to reduce 
the adverse effects of information asymmetries.   
 
With regard to trading statements, there is only documented support for Nomad 
reputation.  There is significant evidence that as Nomad reputation increases, there is 
greater probability of companies choosing to issue trading statements over the 
alternative to not disclose any information.  The remaining results in trading statements 
are the same as the choice to issue both types of voluntary disclosure, so will be 
discussed together.  The results from ROA are significant, which supports the LS 
regressions and indicates that as companies perform better they are more likely to 
make voluntary earnings announcements.  Although the findings for corporate 
governance are, once again, limited there is support for the 7th hypothesis and the 
finding from Chau and Gray (2002), and Hossain et al (1994) that diffuse ownership 
is positively related to the level of earnings disclosures.  Finally, there is also support 
for hypothesis 8a that Nomad reputation is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure, although this finding is limited to trading statements and does not hold 
under LS regression analysis. 
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Table 7.7  Multinomial Model for Pre-announcements 
 Notice of Results 
only 
Trading 
Statement Only 
Both 
Total number of directors -0.241 0.306 -0.297 
 (-1.00) (1.40) (-0.86) 
Board independence 0.825 0.145 1.318 
 (1.17) (0.24) (1.26) 
CEO duality -0.460 -0.285 0.122 
 (-0.34) (-0.25) (0.08) 
Gender diversity -0.345 0.449 0.543 
 (-0.52) (0.89) (0.69) 
Audit committee  0.305 -0.653 -0.782 
 (0.66) (-1.44) (-1.02) 
Present accounting expert 0.0315 0.483 0.243 
 (0.05) (0.70) (0.24) 
Solely NEDs on remuneration 0.953 0.178 0.259 
 (1.52) (0.29) (0.28) 
Nomination Committee 0.864 -0.0117 0.545 
 (1.46) (-0.02) (0.63) 
% Share issue 1.285** 0.0492 0.639 
 (2.10) (0.09) (0.81) 
Top-15 nomad -0.204 1.353** 0.658 
 (-0.32) (2.27) (0.76) 
Dual nomad 0.482 0.460 1.453 
 (0.67) (0.60) (1.14) 
Tobin’s q -0.24 -0.136 -0.29 
 (-1.41) (-0.74) (-0.91) 
Big-4 auditor 0.568 -0.0835 -0.783 
 (0.88) (-0.14) (-0.82) 
Log market cap 0.328 0.047 0.0246 
 (1.26) (0.20) (0.07) 
ROA 0.57 2.468** 4.938** 
 (0.81) (2.03) (2.00) 
Gearing -0.0662 -0.0445 0.108 
 (-0.79) (-0.37) (0.80) 
Year -0.123 0.177 0.181 
 (-0.89) (1.21) (0.87) 
Industry 0.108 0.240** 0.682*** 
 (0.88) (2.07) (3.44) 
CAR -9.299 -12.58 10.74 
 (-0.76) (-0.92) (0.68) 
Info asymmetry 14.40* -2.314 17.60 
 (1.67) (-0.21) (1.29 
_cons 242.0 -361.7 -371.6 
 (0.88) (-1.22) (-0.89) 
Chi2  = 92.44    
Prob > chi2 = 0.0092    
Pseudo R2  = 0.2607    
P =  0.00923    
Table displays the results from the multinomial regression analysis.  The base for this analysis is the choice 
not to disclose either notification of results or trading statements.  t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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7.5 Methodology (Part II) 
 
With the relation between voluntary disclosures, corporate governance and 
performance now established, this section will examine whether these disclosures are 
used as a management strategy such as a signal of good or bad news.  Soffer et al 
(2000) reports that managers pre-announce nearly all bad news, and only release 
around half of good news.  This supports the theory that managers utilise disclosure 
strategies to avoid negative earnings surprises and, in turn, a negative market reaction.  
This is supported by Libby and Tan (1999) who examine the relation between earnings 
pre-announcements and analyst forecasts.  They find that when managers with bad 
news conceal part of this information, this leads to greater negative market reaction at 
the earnings announcement date.  This in turn leads to analyst’s forecasts of subsequent 
earnings to be lower than if they had pre-released all the bad news.  This evidence 
implies that managers can use voluntary disclosures to signal information to 
shareholders, which lowers earnings shocks and limits negative market reactions 
around the actual earnings announcement.  Furthermore in doing so, even though the 
pre-announcements contain negative news, information asymmetries will be reduced. 
 
As AIM companies are given considerable discretion and time to release their 
final/interim results, it is difficult to specify how these disclosures are directly 
disclosed with the earnings results in mind.  However, the disclosure of a ‘notification 
of results’ announcement is different, and directly corresponds to the earnings 
announcement, even more so than trading statements, which can be made throughout 
the year.  Therefore, an event study is performed to see whether managers issue this 
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notice as a means of signalling information to shareholders and, in turn, reduces 
information asymmetry.   
 
In this section, three years of final and interim results are documented: the first year 
corresponds to the data used in the previous sections plus an additional two firm years.  
The addition of these further firm years is necessary in order to increase the sample 
size and to get stock price information of the companies once they are more developed, 
and not suffering from potential thin-trading.  An event study is appropriate and is 
often used to investigate firm performance around the time of companies’ financial 
results, as in Cheng Fan Fah (2006) and Chen et al (2005) where both studies examined 
the effect timing had on firm performance.  Using the market model to calculate the 
abnormal returns of these firms, the results are then grouped into different event 
windows to capture returns before and after the date of the actual announcement to 
examine whether firm performance is affected by the disclosures, and to compare these 
results with the performance of companies that do not pre-announce the date of their 
earnings announcement.  In addition, the market model previously presented will be 
repeated to document the market reaction to the notification as well as the abnormal 
returns earned when the actual announcement is made.  Scholes and Williams (1977) 
𝛽 adjusted method (detailed in 5.4.2) is used to control for thin trading. 
 
Alongside the documented average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAR).  Armitage’s (1995) study into different event study methods 
finds performance of the LS market model is enhanced when the abnormal returns are 
standardised by the regression’s standard errors.  The standard error is calculated by 
dividing each share’s abnormal return (AR) by the standard error of the regression (S), 
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which generates the standard error from which t-tests can be carried out20.  Corrado 
(1989) and Corrado and Zivneys’ (1992) rank test will also be performed as a 
robustness check. 
 
To allow analysis of performance and suitable comparisons to be undertaken, the 
sample must be grouped into two portfolios using the Notification of Results (NORS).  
One portfolio will contain the companies that pre-release their announcement date, and 
the other the companies that do not release this information.  This will allow analysis 
to be carried out to determine if there is a significant difference between the returns 
earned on the two portfolios once the actual results are released.  There is also further 
analysis for the disclosure-only portfolio.  This allows the abnormal returns to be 
studied around the date of the actual notification to see whether investors interpret the 
voluntary pre-announcement as a signal for potential good/bad news in the up-coming 
earnings announcement.  It is expected that, suggested by Soffer et al (2000) and 
Skinner (1994), the market perceives this voluntary pre-announcement as a signal of 
bad new and react negatively the day the notification of the results date is made. 
 
Table 7.8 displays the descriptive statistics for the event study.  Around a quarter of 
all companies, per year, make a notification of results.  This relatively small number 
of observation is slightly higher for interim results, excluding the third year of 
observations.  It should be noted that there is a reduced number of observations in the 
third year, as there interim year-end date had only just passed at the time of the data 
collection.  The lower part of the table provides the distribution over the sample period.  
2006 is the first year of admission documents used in this study and therefore, has 
                                                        
20 In-depth detail of this methodology is provided in 5.4.2. 
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relatively fewer observations as the earnings announcement for that year was generally 
made in 2007.   
 
Table 7.8  Descriptive Statistics for Event Study 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 HYE1 HYE2 HYE2 
NOR 43 39 44 45 45 37 
No NOR 157 161 156 155 155 152 
% NOR 26.22% 23.21% 26.99% 27.78% 27.78% 21.76% 
By Year YE Total Obs YE NOR % HYE Total Obs HYE NOR % 
2006 10 2 20.00% 16 4 25.00% 
2007 43 11 25.58% 50 8 16.00% 
2008 79 16 20.25% 122 34 27.87% 
2009 95 22 22.45% 61 12 19.67% 
2010 85 21 24.71% 105 23 21.90% 
2011 97 17 17.53% 92 20 21.74% 
2012 85 15 17.65% 77 12 15.58% 
2013 72 18 25.00% 39 8 20.51% 
2014 34 4 11.76% 27 5 18.52% 
Total 600 126 20.90% 589 126 21.39% 
Table displays the descriptive statistics for the event study analysis.  The top section provides detail of the number 
of notification of results made over the extended three-year sample period, alongside the number of companies who 
did not pre-release their announcement date. The third row details the percentage of Notices in relation to sample 
total.  The lower part of the table provides the distribution of observations over the companies’ year-end/half year-
end date. 
 
 
 
7.6 Data analysis (Part II) 
 
The literature has highlighted key differences regarding the performance of firms 
surrounding firm disclosures.  Collett (2004) suggested that firms are more likely to 
disclose bad news, suggesting that pre-announcements are more likely to lead to 
negative abnormal returns; while Skinner (1994) states that firms disclose bad news in 
order to avoid litigation.  Conversely, Miller (2005) finds no evidence that disclosures 
lead to a negative reaction.  Therefore, this section provides evidence for abnormal 
returns earned around earnings announcement as well as the time the voluntary 
disclosure is made.   
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The first analysis in this section examines the abnormal returns earned around the 
actual earnings announcement.  This is separated into two portfolios; one containing 
companies who pre-released the date of their results (with NOR) and another 
containing those who did not (without NOR).  This split is carried out separately for 
year-end and interim results, as the pre-announcement is two months shorter for 
interim result so disclosure strategies may be different.  The results are documented in 
Table 7.9.  The first column displays the results for the CAR and its associated test 
statistic.  The remaining columns document the corresponding test statistic, the 
standardised test statistic, the rank test statistic, and the results from the AAR analysis.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that this examination required the removal of several 
observations due to thin trading, potentially owed to year one on this analysis also 
being their first year on the market. 
 
Panels A and C contain the findings for the voluntary disclosure companies.  The 
abnormal returns are negative in the announcement windows and significantly so in 
the t-test and standardised scores (not the rank test). The abnormal returns remain 
significantly negative in the post-announcement window.  This provides support 
support the theory put forward by Soffer et al (2000), and Skinner (1994) that 
managers pre-disclose bad news in order to avoid large earnings loses once the 
earnings announcement is released. Although a strategy utilised by managers to 
control earnings shocks, the evidence also supports the theory that voluntary disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry as abnormal returns on either side of the 
announcement is more significant than the actual earnings announcement, suggesting 
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the news contained within it was not a surprise.  However, without the additional 
confirmation from the rank test, these finding are not entirely robust.   
 
Panels B and D display the results for the companies that did not issue a notification 
of results to the market.  For the interim observations, companies are underperforming 
prior to the release of the final results.  Both pre-event windows, (20, -3) and (-20, +7), 
for the interim results, are negative and significantly so at 1% for the (-20, +7) window 
under the standardised t-test.  However, this does not hold after robustness checks and 
the ordinary t-test.  The results then become positive from the event window, though 
not significantly so.  This suggests there was good news contained in the final results, 
but the reaction was delayed.  Furthermore, the results indicate a more positive 
response to the earnings announcement for the final results (panel B). The results are 
positive over all event windows and significant at 5% for the pre-announcement 
windows, suggesting these companies were already performing well prior to the 
release of the interim earnings announcement.  The earnings surprise at the event 
widow is opposite to the findings for the disclosure companies, further indicating that 
voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry.  Overall, the findings in this 
section supports prior literature and indicate that the use of voluntary disclosure can 
be used as a signal of future earnings as well as a means to reduce an information 
asymmetries in the market. 
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Table 7.9  Abnormal Returns around Earnings Announcement 
 CAR T-Stat St-test Rank AR T-Stat 
Panel A: With NOR YE (N=108)   
(-20, -3) 1.43% 3.15*** 2.18 -1.71* -0.13% -1.25 
(-20, 7) -0.53% -0.97 -0.43 -2.66** -0.02% -0.18 
(0,0) -0.64% -6.22* -9.44** -1.02 -0.64% -6.22* 
(-1, +1) -1.06% -5.95*** -6.45** -0.19 -0.35% -3.44* 
(0, +7) -1.39% -4.79 -5.42** -1.43 -0.17% -1.69 
Panel B: Without NOR YE (N=437)   
(-20, -3) 3.64% 4.64** 5.12*** 0.87 0.26% 1.54 
(-20, 7) 4.07% 4.50** 2.23* -1.36 0.15% 0.85 
(0,0) 0.49% 2.89 5.12* 0.98 0.49% 2.89 
(-1, +1) 0.89% 2.74* 3.29* -0.10 0.27% 1.58 
(0, +7) 0.53% 1.09 3.30** 0.72 0.07% 0.39 
Panel C: with NOR HYE (N=112)    
(-20, -3) 3.42% 0.14 4.46*** -1.64 -0.05% -0.04 
(-20, 7) 2.20% 0.08 4.85*** 2.66** 0.08% 0.01 
(0,0) -0.21% -0.04 -10.06** -1.07 -0.21% -0.04 
(-1, +1) -0.82% -0.09 -8.34** 0.33 -0.27% -0.05 
(0, +7) -0.43% -0.93 -3.22* -0.78 -0.05% -0.01 
Panel D: Without NOR HYE (N=371)    
(-20, -3) 5.57% 0.10 -2.81** -1.02 0.43% 0.03 
(-20, 7) 5.29% 0.08 -4.42*** -1.59 0.19% 0.02 
(0,0) 0.26% 0.02 0.11 -0.99 0.06% 0.02 
(-1, +1) 0.58% 0.03 0.63 0.17 0.19% 0.02 
(0, +7) -0.26% -0.01 0.82 -0.85 0.26% -0.01 
Table displays the CAR and AR alongside their associated t-stats for companies who pre-announce the date of 
their results and another portfolio of firms who do not. This is done for final and interim results.  * ** *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  N represents the number of observations for 
each panel, NOR is the abbreviation for Notice of Results announcements.  The analysis is carried out over five 
different event windows, 0 being the announcement date. St-test is the standardised test statistic and rank is the 
Corrado (1989) non-parametric rank test. 
 
  
7-265 
 
The analysis of abnormal returns has revealed thus far that, around the release of 
interim and final results, the market reacts negatively to companies who pre-release 
prio to the date of their announcement but positively for those firms who did not pre-
disclose this information.  This indicates that firms who publish “Notification of 
Results” do so as a signal of future bad news/underperformance.  Additionally, such a 
signal also serves to reduce the impact of a future negative earnings announcement so 
the company does not experience a reaction as suggested by Soffer et al (2000).   
 
In order to make the link between negative returns and pre-announcements more 
cohesive, it is now necessary to assess firm performance around the actual date the 
notification is made.  The results are displayed in Table 7.10. 
 
The findings from this final analysis shows that for both final and interim pre-
announcement disclosures, companies were experiencing significant positive 
abnormal returns in the pre-event window which turns negative after the release of the 
Notice of Results.  For the standarised test statistic, the event window has weak 
signifiance at the 5% level and post-event window at 1% for the interim results.   
Furthermore, the significantly positive pre-announcement window is observed in the 
non-parametric rank test. There is statistical significance supporting a negative market 
reaction to the notices for the final results for the t-test and St-test but this is not 
corroborated by the rank test for the (0,0) event window.  The post-event also provides 
strong evidence of a negative reaction to the voluntary disclosure.  Given the 
significant positive returns these companies were experiencing prior to the pre-
announcement, which changed to being negative, and significantly so in the days 
following the announcement, the findings suggest that shareholders do infer bad news 
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on the announcement of a notice of results, even if there is no performance related 
detail contained within the notification itself.  This might be down to shareholders not 
anticipating such a notice, as relatively few companies make such pre-announcements, 
and thus viewing the announcement as a form of earnings warning, and a signal of bad 
news, which in turn results in shareholders selling their shares and depressing the share 
price.  However, there is not robust evidence supporting these findings for the interim 
results posted in Panel B, as the rank test is not statistically significant in any event 
window. 
 
These findings therefore support the use of voluntary disclosures as a means of 
interpreting future earnings as well as supporting the previous findings from Collett 
(2004); Soffer et al (2000); and Skinner (1994) that companies are more likely to 
voluntarily disclosure bad news.  
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Table 7.10  Abnormal Returns at Notice of Results Announcement 
 N CAR St-test T-Stat Rank AR T-Stat 
Panel A:  NOR 
YE 
108 
 
 
  
  
(-20, -3)  1.77% 4.72** 1.75 1.64 0.02% 0.13 
(-20, 7)  1.11% 3.63** 1.15 0.09 0.02% 0.13 
(0,0)  -1.41% -1.11 -3.26* -1.65 -1.40% -3.26** 
(-1, +1)  -1.89% -0.53 -3.49** -2.58** -0.32% -2.47** 
(0, +7)  -3.52% 1.58 -5.20** -2.76** -0.02% -1.27 
        
Panel B:  NOR 
HYE 
112 
 
 
  
  
(-20, -3)  1.65% 4.22*** 3.94*** 1.11 0.02% 1.15 
(-20, 7)  1.14% 2.73** 2.10* 1.14 0.01% 0.40 
(0,0)  -1.01% -6.32* -10.03* -1.39 -1.01% 6.32* 
(-1, +1)  -0.10% -0.42 -0.28 0.20 -0.01% -0.24 
(0, +7)  -0.28% -2.42** -2.84** 0.13 -0.01% -1.13 
Table displays the CAAR and AAR earned around the time the notification of results are issued.  *, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  N represents the number of observations for each panel, NOR is the abbreviation for Notice of Results announcements.  The analysis is carried out over the five 
different event windows, 0 being the announcement date. S.T-Stat represents the standardised t-test using standardised abnormal returns. Rank is the non-parametric Rank 
test. 
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7.7  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines two main questions: what is the relation between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance, and how does the market respond to 
voluntary disclosures?  The use of voluntary disclosures is central to the agency 
problem as it provides investors with additional information that can, in turn, reduce 
information asymmetries (Akhtaruddin et al, 2009).  Given AIM companies are 
granted great discretion in how they communicate with investors, coupled with these 
companies being small and tightly held, it is expected that information asymmetries 
are more acute on this market.  Therefore, disclosure is potentially an important aspect 
of AIM companies in order to reduce agency costs.  Furthermore, Ajinkya et al (2005) 
and Kanagaretnam et al (2007) report that corporate governance increases disclosure 
and reduces information asymmetry.   
 
This study therefore incorporates a wide range of corporate governance variables, as 
well as proxies for performance and information asymmetry, to determine how these 
effect the level of voluntary disclosure.  This is the first study examining voluntary 
disclosures on AIM and is also the only study to incorporate all voluntary disclosures 
made in the earnings pre-announcement period. 
 
Prior literature has well documented the positive association between governance and 
voluntary disclosure but this analysis has been focused on the disclosures made in the 
annual report.  The voluntary disclosures include: trading statement, operating 
statements, notification of results, quarterly earnings and general announcement.  This 
study collects voluntary earnings preannouncements to create a voluntary disclosure 
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index against which to test corporate governance attributes and abnormal returns.  The 
results from the LS regression indicate that corporate governance may not be well 
placed to influence the level of disclosure.  However, there is strong evidence of a 
positive relation between disclosure and board independence, which supports the 
findings of Akhtaruddin et al (2009) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006).  Furthermore, 
there is also a positive relation documented between voluntary disclosure and the 
presence of a nomination committee.   
 
This is the first study to examine this committee separately from other board sub-
committees although previous studies by Allegrini and Greco (2013), O’Sullivan et al 
(2008) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) have used this variable as part of an index, 
but with mixed results.   
 
The analysis also provides strong evidence that voluntary pre-announcement 
disclosure is associated with bad news as a significant negative relation is observed.  
This suggests that voluntary disclosures are perceived as a signal of negative news in 
the earnings announcement.  There is, in addition, a negative relation between 
voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry.  Using an event study expands the 
examination into the role of voluntary disclosures as a means of signalling.  This 
documents whether notifications of results are perceived as a signal of bad news.  The 
findings strongly indicate that companies pre-releasing the date of their results 
experience negative abnormal returns on the day the announcement is made.  
Furthermore, a negative relation is also observed on the date the notification is made.  
These findings indicate that shareholders view the notification as a signal of bad news 
which is then realised when the announcement is made.  This also supports the theory 
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from Collett (2004), Soffer et al (2000) and Skinner (1994) that managers voluntarily 
pre-disclose bad news as a way of mitigating negative earnings shocks and avoiding 
litigation. 
  
7-271 
 
APPENDIX 7.1 AIM Rules - Principles of disclosure 
 
Schedule Four 
In respect of transactions which require notifications pursuant to rules 12, 13, 14 and 
15, an AIM company must notify the following information: 
 
a) particulars of the transaction, including the name of any other relevant parties; 
b) a description of the assets which are the subject of the transaction, or the business 
carried on by, or using, the assets; 
c) the profits attributable to those assets; 
d) the value of those assets if different from the consideration; 
e) the full consideration and how it is being satisfied; 
f) the effect on the AIM company; 
g) details of the service contracts of any proposed directors; 
h) in the case of a disposal, the application of the sale proceeds; 
i) in the case of a disposal, if shares or other securities are to form part of the 
consideration received, a statement whether such securities are to be sold or 
retained;  
j) any other information necessary to enable investors to evaluate the effect of the 
transaction upon the AIM company. 
 
Schedule 5 
Pursuant to rule 17, an AIM company must make notification of the following: 
a) the identity of the director or significant shareholder concerned; 
b) the date on which the disclosure was made to it; 
c) the date on which the deal or relevant change to the holding was effected; 
d) the price, amount and class of the AIM securities concerned; 
e) the nature of the transaction; 
f) the nature and extent of the director’s or significant shareholder’s interest in the 
transaction; 
g) where a deal takes place when it is in any close period under rule 21, the date upon 
which any previous binding commitment was notified or the date upon which the 
Exchange granted permission to deal in order to mitigate severe personal hardship; 
h) where the notification concerns a related financial product, the detailed nature of 
the exposure. 
 
AIM Rules: 
 
10. The information which is required by these rules must be notified by the AIM 
company no later than it is published elsewhere. An AIM company must retain a 
Regulatory Information Service provider to ensure that information can be 
notified as and when required. 
 
General disclosure of price sensitive information 
11. An AIM company must issue notification without delay of any new developments 
which are not public knowledge concerning a change in: 
 its financial condition; 
 its sphere of activity; 
 the performance of its business; or 
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 its expectation of its performance, 
which, if made public, would be likely to lead to a substantial movement in the price 
of its AIM securities. 
 
Disclosure of substantial transactions 
12.  A substantial transaction is one which exceeds 10% in any of the class tests. It 
includes any transaction by a subsidiary of the AIM company but excludes any 
transactions of a revenue nature in the ordinary course of business and transactions 
to raise finance which do not involve a change in the fixed assets of the AIM 
company or its subsidiaries. 
 
An AIM company must issue notification without delay as soon as the terms of any 
substantial transaction are agreed, disclosing the information specified by Schedule 
Four. 
 
Fundamental changes of business 
15. Any disposal by an AIM company which, when aggregated with any other 
disposal(s) over the previous twelve months, exceeds 75% in any of the class tests, is 
deemed to be a disposal resulting in a fundamental change of business and must be: 
 
 conditional on the consent of its shareholders being given in general meeting; 
 notified without delay disclosing the information specified by Schedule Four 
and insofar as it is with a related party, the additional information required by 
rule 13; 
 accompanied by the publication of a circular containing details of the disposal 
and any proposed change in business together with the information specified 
above and convening the general meeting. 
 
Where the effect of the proposed disposal is to divest the AIM company of all, or 
substantially all, of its trading business, activities or assets the AIM company will, 
upon completion of the disposal, be treated as an investing company. The notification 
and circular containing the information specified by Schedule Four convening the 
general meeting must also state its investing policy to be followed going forward 
which must also be approved by shareholders. 
 
The AIM company will then have to make an acquisition or acquisitions which 
constitute a reverse takeover under rule 14 or otherwise implement the investing policy 
approved at the general meeting to the satisfaction of the Exchange within twelve 
months of becoming an investing company. 
 
Where an AIM company proposes to take any other action, the effect of which is that 
it will cease to own, control or conduct all, or substantially all, of its existing trading 
business, activities or assets (including the cessation of all, or substantially all, of the 
AIM company’s business), the above requirements to notify the action, publish a 
circular setting out its investing policy going forward, obtain shareholder consent for 
that investing policy and implement it within twelve months of taking such action, will 
apply. Shareholder consent for the action itself will not be required. 
 
Disclosure of miscellaneous information. 
17. An AIM company must issue notification without delay of: 
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 any deals by directors disclosing, insofar as it has such information, the 
information specified by Schedule Five; 
 any relevant changes to any significant shareholders, disclosing, insofar as it 
has such information, the information specified by Schedule Five; 
 the resignation, dismissal or appointment of any director, giving the date of 
such occurrence and for an appointment, the information specified by Schedule 
Two paragraph (g) and any shareholding in the company; 
 any change in its accounting reference date; 
 any change in its registered office address; 
 any change in its legal name; 
 any material change between its actual trading performance or financial 
condition and any profit forecast, estimate or projection included in the 
admission document or otherwise made public on its behalf; 
 any decision to make any payment in respect of its AIM securities specifying 
the net amount payable per security, the payment date and the record date; 
 the reason for the application for admission or cancellation of any AIM 
securities; 
 the occurrence and number of shares taken into and out of treasury, as specified 
by Schedule Seven; 
 the resignation, dismissal or appointment of its nominated adviser or broker; 
 any change in the website address at which the information required by rule 26 
is available; 
 any subsequent change to the details disclosed pursuant to sub-paragraphs (iii) 
to (viii) inclusive of paragraph (g) of Schedule Two, whether such details were 
first disclosed at admission or on subsequent appointment; 
 the admission to trading (or cancellation from trading) of the AIM securities 
(or any other securities issued by the AIM company) on any other exchange or 
trading platform, where such admission or cancellation is at the application or 
agreement of the AIM company. This information must also be submitted 
separately to the Exchange. 
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Appendix 7.2  Voluntary Disclosure (additional HYE tables 1) 
 
Table 7.11  Regression Analysis for HYE Voluntary Disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 VIndex CAR Information 
Asymmetry 
Vindex 
(combined) 
Big-4 auditor -0.292 -0.00409 -0.0281 -0.435 
 (-0.95) (-0.82) (-0.77) (-1.44) 
Total number of directors -0.203 -0.00190 -0.0105 -0.215 
 (-1.10) (-1.07) (-0.80) (-1.15) 
Number of neds 0.433 0.00326 0.00589 0.434 
 (1.06) (1.30) (0.51) (1.05) 
Board independence -0.0464 -0.00131 -0.0594 -0.0915 
 (-0.10) (-0.20) (-1.13) (-0.19) 
CEO duality -1.049 -0.0137** 0.0486 -1.087* 
 (-1.65) (-2.56) (0.93) (-1.67) 
Gender diversity -0.173 -0.0101 -0.0167 -0.306 
 (-0.60) (-1.18) (-0.55) (-1.04) 
Audit committee total -0.386 -0.000536 0.0246 -0.331 
 (-1.38) (-0.15) (0.96) (-1.18) 
Present accounting expert -0.00505 0.00318 0.0116 -0.0157 
 (-0.02) (0.43) (0.47) (-0.05) 
Solely neds on remuneration -0.672** 0.00246 -0.0586 -0.731** 
 (-2.00) (0.59) (-1.21) (-2.17) 
Nomination total -0.00205 -0.0000115 -0.000569 -0.00311 
 (-0.63) (-0.18) (-1.10) (-0.96) 
Share issue -0.0946 -0.0112 0.153 0.0203 
 (-0.16) (-0.94) (1.20) (0.03) 
top5nomad -0.0185 0.000794 -0.0392 0.0190 
 (-0.06) (0.17) (-1.11) (0.06) 
Dual nomad -0.273 0.00194 0.0410 -0.326 
 (-0.71) (0.27) (1.01) (-0.84) 
Tobins q 0.0319* 0.000243 0.00310 0.0221 
 (1.68) (1.00) (0.82) (1.06) 
Log market cap 0.248** -0.000458 0.0220 0.263** 
 (2.21) (-0.24) (1.13) (2.28) 
roa 0.0300 -0.000692 0.00288 0.0480 
 (0.32) (-1.10) (0.66) (0.62) 
gearing -0.0151 0.000155 -0.00147 -0.0146 
 (-0.90) (1.07) (-1.04) (-0.89) 
     
year -0.0771 -0.000588 0.000941 -0.0824 
 (-1.13) (-0.71) (0.28) (-1.21) 
Live/dead 0.237 0.00193 0.0247 0.247 
 (0.43) (0.32) (0.64) (0.45) 
industry 0.0370 -0.000472 0.00251 0.0418 
 (0.52) (-0.55) (0.67) (0.59) 
Total voluntary hye  -0.000916 -0.00729  
  (-0.90) (-0.90)  
caar    -4.450 
    (-0.92) 
Info asymmetry    -1.539 
    (-0.32) 
_cons 156.8 1.203 -2.116 167.5 
 (1.14) (0.72) (-0.31) (1.23) 
N 136 134 135 134 
R2 0.194 0.090 0.176 0.201 
adj. R2 0.053 -0.081 0.023 0.042 
F 2.024 0.902 0.255 1.666 
df_m 20 21 21 22 
df_r 115 112 113 111 
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Chapter 8   Conclusion 
 
8.1  Chapter Description 
 
This chapter presents the main objectives, findings, implication and limitations of the 
three studies comprising this thesis.  This thesis studies the role of monitors, the 
determinants of corporate governance, and how governance influences voluntary 
disclosure using the exchange-regulated market, AIM, as the institutional setting.  
Nomads are the principle regulators of the companies they represent.  Their role as 
monitors is essential to the continuing success and growth of the market.  Despite this 
role the eligibility requirements to become a Nomad are narrow with criteria such as 
being a firm and not an individual, and having a minimum of two years corporate 
finance experience.   Therefore, the relative ease by which a firm becomes a Nomad, 
as well as the limited listing requirements for companies to float on AIM, raises 
questions about the monitoring quality and governance implications surrounding this 
market.  
 
8.2  Summary 
 
Chapter five leads the initial investigation into the role of Nomads.  One of the arcs of 
this thesis is developing the theory into the role of Nomads.  The first study is 
concerned with establishing a Nomad Reputation Index.  The index is based on seven 
measures of Nomad reputation, which is then aggregated to form the Nomad 
Reputation Index.  This index is then used to test the market reaction to Nomad 
switches to determine the strength of the index using panel data and event study 
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methodology.  The study finds significant evidence that a switch-up to a reputable 
Nomad is associated with positive abnormal returns.  This analysis also serves to 
develop agency literature, as the choice to switch-up to a costly but more reputable 
Nomad could be perceived as a form of bonding, as managers are willing to submit to 
increased external monitoring to protect shareholder interests.  The result from this 
analysis is concentrated in the market-model event methodology; the result is stronger 
when switches are made to Nomads ranked in the top-5.  However, the results from 
the more robust three-factor model, find that the concentration is limited to the top-15.   
 
On the flip side of the bonding theory is market discipline, whereby shareholders 
deliberately depress share prices upon the announcement of news perceived to be bad 
management decision-making.  Lateral switches (switches to Nomads of equal rank 
and includes downward switches) are used as the proxy for this analysis as there is no 
benefit in making a costly switch when there is no increased quality in the incumbent 
Nomad.  The results support this theory and document a negative market reaction upon 
the announcement of a lateral switch.   
 
Finally, this study creates the idea of ‘strict Nomad’ whereby some Nomads are more 
stringent with regards to the application of the AIM Rules.  The company’s reporting 
lag is used as a proxy here, as it is theorised that strict Nomads will encourage their 
clients to issue their earnings announcement early to avoid possible delays and 
potential suspensions if the announcement is made after the 6-month reporting 
window.  For both event-study methods, there is significant evidence that a switch to 
strict Nomads is perceived favourably in the market, with positive abnormal returns 
being earned following the switch-up. 
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Chapter six examines the determinants of corporate governance of AIM listed 
companies with a specific focus on how regulation has changed the level of 
compliance in what is considered an unregulated market.  In addition to regulation, the 
reputational role of Nomad is also extended to examine whether reputable Nomads are 
associated with better corporate governance.  To do this, a corporate governance index 
is created using governance items disclosure in the sample companies admission 
documents.  As well as compliance with the corporate governance standards presented 
by the QCA, the index used in this study also incorporate more recent literature 
pertaining to governance and includes measure such as gender equality and the 
presence and structure of the nomination committee.  Using LS regression and Ordinal 
Logit methodology, the results find that rather than as a response to regulation, 
corporate governance standards have been increasing significantly over time.  This is 
partly due to the proliferation in the awareness of corporate governance issues since 
the 2007 economic crisis.  Furthermore, the findings also suggest that governance is 
positively associated with company size.  This is an intuitive outcome as the costs 
associated with creating and maintaining quality governance structures are prohibitive 
to SMEs.  Finally, with regard to Nomad reputation, the findings support the 
hypothesis that Nomad reputation is positively associated with corporate governance 
compliance.   
 
Chapter seven investigates how the level of voluntary disclosure relates to corporate 
governance and Nomad reputation, and is the final study in this thesis.  To do this, 
earnings preannouncements are collected to form a disclosure index to assess which 
corporate governance attributes is associated with the level of disclosure.  This is the 
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only study to examine governance in relation to earnings pre-announcement as prior 
studies have focused on disclosure made in the annual report.  The findings for the 
corporate governance measures is limited, with only positive significant interactions 
found between board independence and the presence of the nomination committee.  
There is also a significant negative relation between the percentage of females on the 
board and the level of voluntary disclosure.  This is also the first study to directly 
examine the role of the nomination committee as prior studies have incorporated this 
measure, as part of a committee index.  The regression analysis undertaken also 
documents that voluntary disclosure has a significant negative relation with the 
company abnormal returns earned over the (-1, +1) earnings announcement window, 
which suggest that voluntary disclosure is associated with bad news.  This supports 
the findings from Collett (2004), Soffer et al (2000) and Skinner (1994) that managers 
voluntarily pre-disclose bad news as a way of mitigating negative earnings shocks and 
avoiding litigation.  The LS regression did not support any relation between voluntary 
disclosure and Nomad reputation.  This study also examined the specific earnings-
related preannouncements by undertaking an event study to see whether the market 
perceived the disclosure of the results data as a signal of bad news.  This finding 
strongly supports the view that managers signal bad news through voluntary 
disclosures as the abnormal returns at both the notification of results date, and the 
eventual earnings announcement, saw significantly negative abnormal returns being 
earned. 
 
 
8.3 Limitations and Further Study 
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The sample and methodology used in the thesis has both merits and limitations.  
Firstly, the data is restricted to the AIM market.  Although unique in its structure with 
regards to self-regulation and limited barriers to trade, it is still a developing market 
which attracts a large number of small companies.  This has implications when 
applying event study methodologies with regard to thin trading.  In addition, the theory 
developing the role of Nomads is only applicable to this market, although it does 
supply more general associations regarding the importance of monitoring in agency 
theory specifically to bonding and corporate governance quality.  Furthermore, the 
second and third studies examine new companies admitted to AIM.  Further analysis 
examining how these companies develop their corporate governance would also be of 
interest.  However, these studies do incorporate up-to-date sample data, which 
provides the opportunity to study how corporate governance has developed, given the 
2007 economic downturn.   
 
Finally, this thesis uses LS regression in the final two studies.  Although prolific in its 
application in extant literature, it does have several limitations.  Firstly, LS is biased 
in the presence of multicolinearity, which can result in the variances being larger.  The 
estimator is also sensitive to outliers, which can negatively affect the LS as a linear 
estimator.  Finally, their causality is difficult to determine under LS regression.  For 
example, the direction of the relation between governance compliance/voluntary 
disclosures and firm performance is difficult to determine.  A company with better 
governance/voluntary disclosure might lead to an increase in firm performance.  On 
the other hand, if a company is performing better, it may have more capital to invest 
in better governance and increased disclosure. 
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